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ABSTRACT
GENERALS IN THREE-PIECE SUITS - CONTRACTORS IN CAMOUFLAGE:
A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ
Wyman E. Shuler, III
Old Dominion University, 2008
Director: Dr. Regina Karp

Contractors compose part of the total force for U.S. warfare capability in Iraq.
Some augment U.S. warfare capability; others do not. Some of the contractors are
controlled by the military; others are controlled by civilian (nonmilitary/political)
government agencies. The problem: Who are the contractors and how has the nature of
government oversight and control over contractors determined whether contractor
contributions augment or diminish U.S. warfare capability in the Iraq War?
Argument: It is the degree of government control over contractors that
determines whether the contractors' contributions have a positive or negative impact on
warfare capability. Ultimately the findings support this argument.
My method is a single case study that compares two groups of individual cases.
The first group is composed of firms that have military contract administrators; the
second has nonmilitary/political administrators. The individual cases are framed by a
research question set to trace contractor control and contributions to changes in warfare
capability. The firms are identified by function type and contract administrator.
The military had procedures for controlling contractors when the war started, but
failed to follow through on them. Contractor fraud and the Abu Ghraib scandal were the
result. With congressional oversight and military control, contractors contributed to the
size of the military force structure and augmented warfare capability. Contractors
modernized military capability with technology support; in addition, they provide

specialized skills such as language capability and oil well maintenance. All of these
functions augment warfare capability. However, both military dependence on contractors
and contractor lobbying are fundamental threats to military readiness and warfare
capability.
Nonmilitary/political administrators had no force structure, plans, or procedures
for contractor control at the start of the war; control policy was written as an afterthought.
Contractors provided the force structure, building skills, and police training essential for
the warfare capability goal of rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq. However, armed security
firms that were used to protect rebuilders became a threat to political order because the
nonmilitary/political control policies for contractors did not change with the political
situation. Thus, the nonmilitary/political administrators' failure to control contractors is
linked to the erosion of warfare capability.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

There is a spirited debate about the extent and nature of the role that contractors1
should play in the Iraq War. I argue that contractor contributions either augment or
diminish U.S. warfare capability in Iraq. The key to understanding the impact of
contractors on warfare capability is the nature of governmental oversight and control.
Ultimately, I argue that
It is the degree of government control over contractors that determines
whether the contractors' contributions have a positive or negative impact on
warfare capability.
The fact that Pentagon policy now includes contractors as part of the total military
force is an important national security issue. More to the point, now that contractors are a
part of the total force it is important to know how contractors either augment or diminish
U.S. warfare capability.2 However, there have been few studies that can inform the
debate. For that reason, I have taken up the challenge to analyze the contractors' specific
contributions in the Iraq War in light of the numerous issues related to the fundamental
debate of whether contractor contributions enhance or diminish U.S. warfare capability.

This dissertation follows the format requirements of The Chicago Manual of Style, 15th edition.
' Contractors are private actors. My preferred term for my units of analysis is contractors. I will
occasionally have to refer to "private actors" or "armed private actors" or use other terms to conform to
another author's description when necessary. Contractors are operationally defined as the firm and/or the
employees of a firm that are of interest for this study. The contractors who provide security are armed
actors, while those who are builders or who provide special expertise are not. I argue that all of these
contractors' services, armed or not, can either augment or reduce warfare capability.
2
Warfare capability includes both military capability and political capability, which are further
defined in Chapter III. Warfare capability integrates military capability and security protection to enable or
support political governance or stability. Political capabilities include the skills to build and protect
infrastructure and to provide protection for people.

2
Hence this is a logical analysis of the relationship between government control of
contractors (the independent variable) and warfare capability (the dependent variable).
Warfare capability includes both military and political capability. I have answered this
problem by way of structured analysis of (1) who the contractors are; (2) how they are
controlled by warfare administrators;3 and (3) the specific contributions contractors have
made for warfare capability in the Iraq War.4
Warfare capability includes both political capability and/or military capability for
achieving the U.S. objectives for rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq.5 The administrators that
control the contractors are either civil-political administrators or military administrators.
Contractors' contributions can augment warfare capability in a number of ways; for
example, by increasing the mass and readiness of the military force. Contractors can
augment warfare capability by eliminating obstacles that would otherwise hinder military
and political, tactical, and operational success. For example, contractors can help
eliminate civil-political instability by training police and repairing electrical service as
part of the U.S. warfare goal to rebuild and stabilize Iraq. However, the nature of
contractor contributions can also diminish military and therefore warfare capability by
damaging the military principle of unity of command. Contractors may also perpetrate

Warfare administrators are the U.S. military and civilian government officials such as the
Coalition Provisional Authority. The administrators are involved with making policy decisions for the
administration or governance of Iraq. Until Iraqi sovereignty was declared, the U.S. military handled most
governance issues. The Coalition Provisional Authority also played a role. The issue of how contractors
react with administrative governing authorities in Iraq will be further defined in Chapter III. I use the term
warfare because civil order is out of control and the political issues have not stabilized.
4
The characteristics observed include the nature and function of the contractors, and how their
support has impacted on U.S. warfare capability in terms of force structure, modernization, readiness, and
sustainability.
5
The U.S. operational objectives include the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, the
stabilization of the civil order, the rebuilding of infrastructure, and the establishment of a democratic form
of government. The role or services performed by contractors are analyzed to answer how they augment
their clients' ability to achieve both political and military objectives. The operationalization of the
characteristics observed and the plan used to observe them are set out in Chapter III.

3
criminal acts such as fraud and human rights abuse, which diminishes domestic U.S. and
Iraqi public confidence in political and military policy makers. When contractor
contributions damage Iraqi perceptions of the United States, the results are at crosspurpose to the U.S. objective of establishing Iraqi stability. This dissertation takes a
critical approach to analyze whether and how contractor contributions have benefited or
diminished the U.S. warfare capability in Iraq.

THE PROBLEM
The best way to explain the problem of how contractors contribute to U.S.
warfare capability is to start with an example. On March 31, 2004, an angry mob hung
the desecrated bodies of four Blackwater USA6 security contract employees on a bridge
outside of Fallujah in Iraq, thousands of miles from the Blackwater USA corporate
headquarters, which is located in Moyock, North Carolina. When they were ambushed
and killed by Iraqis, these Americans were providing armed protection for a convoy of
military kitchen appliances. This incident brought instant and widespread media attention
to the presence of contractors in Iraq. Why were four armed U.S. civilians involved in
such an incident in Iraq? There are simple answers for the question as it relates to this
specific incident. However, a more complex analysis is needed to evaluate the specific
problem of whether contractors contribute to or diminish U.S. warfare capability in Iraq.
The research question, the problem I seek to answer, is this:

6

Blackwater USA is one of the most successful security contractor firms. The video scenes of this
incident were shown worldwide on news networks. Blackwater USA is a firm that is analyzed as a case
study in Chapter VI.

4

Who are the contractors, and how has the nature of government oversight and
control over contractors determined whether contractor contributions augment or
diminish U.S. warfare capability in the Iraq War?
The research problem is focused on the administrators' control of contractors,
which compose part of the total force for warfare capability in Iraq. The research problem
critically addresses whether and how the contractors are controlled by their
administrators, as well as the varied contributions contractors make that augment or
diminish U.S. warfare capability in the Iraq War. The process of developing a detailed
and exhaustive answer for the stated research question is based on (1) identifying and
describing the nature of the contractor companies, which includes identifying the
contractors' clients (and/or administrators) along with the functions the contractors are
expected to perform; (2) identifying empirical evidence of the interactions between the
contractors and their administrators, their contractual arrangements, and specifically how
contractors are controlled by warfare administrators; and (3) detailing specific contractor
contributions or functions that augment or detract from both the military and the political
dimensions of warfare capability.
The Fallujah incident, by showing that contractors are combatants, indicates that
the composition of the total force the United States is using in Iraq may have changed to
integrate contracted private firms rather than the predominantly professional military
force it deployed in the first Gulf War.7 According to Deborah D. Avant, an expert on the
market for contractors, there was a ratio of one contractor to fifty-eight military members

7

The Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) of 2006 states that contractors are a part of the "total
force." The QDR is an important source that identifies the policies and evolving status of U.S. military
capability as it is at the beginning of each new presidential term. The QDR process is covered in the
literature review.

5
in Gulf War I; as of February 2006, the ratio was one contractor to every six military
members working in Iraq.8
This is evidence of a dramatic increase in the numbers of contractors, but that
does not fully answer how contractors change warfare capability. This is why my
analysis of warfare capability includes the identification and description of the contractor
companies and how they are controlled/administered. The analysis describes contractual
arrangements and how contractors interact with the warfare administrators in Iraq. The
warfare administrator includes the U.S. military and government officials as well as Iraqi
and coalition representatives. The description of the contractors helps to establish how
they are being used as instruments to augment U.S. warfare capability in Iraq.

CONTRACTOR IMPACT ON U.S. WARFARE CAPABILITY
This section introduces five factors for explaining how contractors impact warfare
capability components.9 The five factors are resources (personnel and public funds);
public opinion; political lobbying; military professionalism; and security threats. The
factors are not mutually exclusive and overlap in their effect on warfare capability.
Those effects can be either positive or negative, augmenting or threatening warfare
capability. Therefore, understanding the potential impact of the five factors is useful for
explaining how to control contractors so as to balance ways in which they augment
capability while avoiding or minimizing negative effects.

Avant, "Privatization of Security," 328-29.
'Warfare capability includes four components: force structure (size and composition),
modernization, readiness, and sustainability. For the definitions of the components of warfare capability,
see pages 21-22.

6
Contractor contributions that waste precious resources can erode the United
States' readiness and the sustainability needed to rebuild and stabilize Iraq. At the same
time, counter to this, a contractor can augment resources with modern technology and
personnel who have special expertise. The potential for augmenting warfare capability is
eroded when contractors become involved in the commission of a crime such as fraud or
human rights abuse. Even contractors whose services are relatively inexpensive waste
resources needed to augment warfare capability when they commit a criminal act such as
theft of government property or when they make fraudulent claims under terms of the
contract.
Security contractors such as Blackwater USA change the composition of the force
structure and add special expertise but are an expensive drain on economic resources. The
engineering firm Bechtel spent more than 25 percent of the firm's contract cost on
security firm support. The security cost was then paid by the U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID) contract administrator.11 Therefore, the cost of
security contractors threatens the resources available to pay for the warfare capability to
rebuild Iraq.
Contract bidding also factors into ways in which contractors augment or threaten
resources necessary to increase force readiness and sustainability. When contractors do
not compete, they threaten scarce resources. Competition stimulates the free market
advantages of privatization. Contractor lobbying, as I will explain shortly, can have
impact on competition and influence whether or not the contract acquisition or bid
10

Singer, "Outsourcing War" ; McKenzie, "Armed and Ready."
Kelley, "GAO: U.S. Contractors"; and U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rebuilding
Iraq: Actions Needed.
12
For a succinct discussion of the economic issues concerning privatization and free market
competition, see Hedahl, "Outsourcing the Profession."
11
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process is fair. Therefore, lobbying and contract bidding are linked to the erosion of
warfare capability.
Iraqi public opinion (support/opposition) can have impact on U.S. warfare goals
in Iraq because public opinion is linked to order and stability. Public support is needed to
sustain and shape the government choices necessary to achieve the U.S. security or
warfare capability goal to rebuild and stabilize Iraq. Contractor behavior that threatens
public support is linked to the erosion of warfare capability.
Contractor human rights abuse incidents, such as Abu Ghraib, can have a negative
impact that erodes Iraqi public opinion and shapes opposition against contractors and
U.S. policies.13 Rhetorically, Iraqi citizens can ask why should we support U.S.-imposed
order when U.S. contractors are allowed to operate above the law? Also, contractors
damage public opinion when the public sees excessive public funds spent on private
security salaries instead of less expensive public police/military.
Lobbying, as noted earlier in this section, can havae impact on warfare capability
by influencing government decision makers and contract administrators. Contractor
lobbying has helped to secure profitable contracts for the firms that pay back politicians
with political donations and support. I argue that this damages public confidence in
elected officials and contractors, and ultimately the damage to public confidence results
in an erosion of U.S. warfare capability.
Contractor firms are active lobbyists with strong government connections.
Contractors use lobbying as a tool to increase their profits. The results of mixing politics
and profits can be linked to the erosion of U.S. warfare goals in Iraq. The profitable

Regan, '"Trophy Video.'"
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relationship between contractors and politicians is easily exploited by critics of
contractors. These critics can influence public support in the U.S. and Iraq, which
ultimately damages warfare capability to achieve U.S. goals in Iraq.
Contractors, especially security contractors, impact on warfare capability when
they erode military professionalism. Contractors can threaten military/warfare capability
by competing with the military for its traditional roles. Private firms pay excessively high
salaries to contract employees for skills similar to those performed by professional
soldiers for their military pay. Contract firms also can damage military readiness and
sustainability by hiring military personnel away from the military. In most cases the
training for professional military members was expensive and time consuming. For
example, special operations skills have been drained away by contractors who pay high
salaries for such skills.14 The result of this competition damages the military
professionalism that is essential for military capability.
Contractor impact on warfare capability is frequently centered on the legitimacy
of contractors on the battlefield. The potential problems associated with management and
administration of contractors have been known since the Gulf War. However, in the Iraq
War the laws pertaining to the control and legitimacy of contractors are unclear, and the
contractors are mostly unregulated. Armed contractors that are not regulated (out of
control) can clash with regular military forces, producing devastating results that
ultimately threaten warfare capability.
Unity or chain of command is a military control procedure used to coordinate
forces on the battlefield. Contractors operating in the battle space outside of military

Singer, "Outsourcing War."

9
control disrupt military operations and erode military capability. A GAO report titled
Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private Security Providers (June
2005) indicates that security contractors have threatened military readiness and
professionalism by instigating friendly fire clashes against regular U.S. military forces.15
The impact of such incidents damages contractors' reputations, erodes military relations,
and threatens warfare capability by damaging order and stability.16
Contractors' activities in the battle space must be coordinated with the military in
order to keep contractors from becoming a security threat that damages military
capability. The contractors' failure to coordinate with the military has caused dissension
between the two groups. The resulting damage to military and contractor professionalism
further erodes force readiness and warfare capability.
Contractors diminish military/warfare capability when the military becomes
dependent on contractor services, because this represents a loss of unit readiness. That is
to say that the military cannot then stand to fight on its own. The inability of U.S. forces
to establish order in Iraq shows that it does not have the size and composition of forces
necessary to carry out civil protection or policing operations. The fact that contractors
were tapped by the Pentagon civilian leadership to be part of the total force to fill the
empty military "boots" is empirical evidence of U.S. military dependency on contractors
to ensure a ready and sustainable warfare capability. This dependency is traceable to
ways in which contractors diminish military readiness. In particular, army dependency on
contractors is at cross-purposes with the general U.S. Army policy for contract support
for military operations. That policy states that contractors are not intended to replace

15
16

Waxman, "GAO Finds Problems."
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Operations, 25.
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force structure. Instead, contractors are to augment Army capabilities, and must be
integrated into the overall support plan.17
Contractors that are not properly vetted are a security risk and therefore present a
threat to readiness and sustainability, which negatively impacts on warfare capability.
Contractors such as Erinys have hired non-vetted employees in Iraq. Iraq and other
security employees' countries of origin do not maintain criminal records, which normally
would be checked as a part of the vetting process. The ineffectiveness of the background
vetting is reflected in the security problems currently posed by Erinys Iraqi guards.18 The
Iraqi guards from the Facilities Protection Service were not properly vetted and have
become a security threat. Contractors need to undergo security background checks before
they are given responsible security protective positions.19
When contractors respond quickly to fill a critical request, there is a possibility
that the employees will not be properly vetted. This is especially the case with firms that
are new and not yet established. Proper background checks and vetting is time consuming
and can slow a contractor's response to fill a new contract. The Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) contracting authority signed the security firm Custer Battles to provide
security for the Baghdad Airport without proper vetting. Subsequently, criminal behavior
by Custer Battles executives and employees has shown how improper vetting and control
of a contractor can threaten U.S. warfare capability.
In sum, this section has identified five factors that are important for analyzing the
impact of contractors on U.S. warfare capability. First, resources are precious. Explaining

Urey, "Civilian Contractors," 8.
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Still Needed, 11-12.
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Operations, 33.
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how resources are utilized is an important factor for analyzing how contractors threaten
or augment warfare capability. Squandering resources threatens capability. Resources
include the available personnel to make up the size or mass for the force structure and the
public funds needed to equip and sustain the force. Contractors can augment the size and
composition of force structure, but they also can cause the misspending of public funds.
The second factor is public support or opposition to U.S. force presence. Public
support is a factor that is indicated by public order and stability. Public support is a
fundamental factor necessary to achieve the U.S. warfare goal to rebuild and stabilize
Iraq.
Political lobbying, the third factor, is used by contractors to influence government
and military decision makers' use of contractors and resources. For example, political
lobbying has a negative impact on warfare capability when it influences the bidding
process for awarding contracts.
Military professionalism is the fourth factor identified in this section. A
professional military executes the U.S. warfare goals established by civilian authority.
The impact that contractors have on military professionalism is a factor that impacts on
warfare capability.
The final factor is whether or not contractors are a security threat. Contractors that
are security threats fail to provide protection for the people, property, and information
essential for warfare capability.

STATE OF THE DEBATE
Understanding the debate is a significant step toward unraveling how contractors
are both contributing to and eroding U.S. warfare capability. The research question and

12
this study's independent variable, government control of contractors, is an underlying
theme that runs through the general debate concerning the utility and legitimacy of
contractors.
The current debate is between the supporters of private contractors and those who
are critical of contractors performing in roles that were traditionally performed by the
military. One theme in the private versus public debate is that profit-oriented contractors
have assumed roles that should be performed by a professional military (public actors).
Former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's position in the debate was that
contractors provide "efficient" support for the U.S. military.20 Those opposed to his
argument questioned the meaning of "efficiency." Also, those opposed to the use of
contractor services go so far as to argue that contractors are paid mercenaries. These
critics argue that profit-oriented mercenaries and contractors are not loyal to the state.
This argument is further linked to the question of the legitimacy and control of armed
civilians serving in a combat environment. The definition and legitimacy of mercenaries
and contractors is covered in detail in the literature review.
The use of contractors and their role as part of the composition of the total force
for U.S. capability in the war has been debated since the war started. Spencer E. Ante and
Stan Crock, writing for BusinessWeek, have identified three incidents that they assert
have fueled the debate over contractors. The issues pointed out by Ante and Crock
include Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR) Inc.'s alleged overbilling and special ties to Vice
President Cheney; the ambush of Blackwater USA employees and the ensuing U.S.

This point is important because Rumsfeld acted on his argument and changed military policy to
include contractors as part of the military force structure. This will be explored under the title
"Transformation and Contractor Services" in Chapter II.
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Marine retaliation on Fallujah, which increased violence there; and the alleged contractor
involvement in abuse of prisoners at Abu Ghraib. I have included the contractor
contributions made in these three incidents within my research of the dissertation to find
out how U.S. warfare capability was affected by contractor involvement in the
incidents.21
Now, after nearly five years of contractors having contributed support in Iraq,
Congress is investigating the loss of billions of U.S. taxpayers' dollars that were intended
for rebuilding and providing order for the war-torn state. The House Foreign Relations
Committee took aim at a recent report filed by Stuart Bowen, the special inspector
general for Iraq reconstruction. Bowen reports the loss of approximately
$5 billion per year because of deteriorating and incomplete building projects and
corruption due to lack of oversight and accountability. In one example of possible
corruption and inadequate security, Rep. Gary Ackerman cited a U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) report. That report indicates that 100,000 to 300,000 barrels
of oil worth approximately $5 million to $15 million has gone missing per day.22
Contractors have been hired for the protection of the Iraq oil fields as well as storage and
production facilities. The evidence is not available at this time, but it is prudent to
question whether the security contractors are contributing to protection or theft of the
missing oil.
The fundamental allegations of corruption, faulty building, war profiteering, and
failed contractor security services revealed in the Bowen and GAO reports contribute to
the debate of whether contractors or military forces are most capable of providing such

Ante and Crock, "Other U.S. Military."
Dinmore, "Congress Seeks Missing Billions."

14
services. The studies that are critical of contractors who provide warfare capabilities
argue that state sovereignty is weakened when private contractors provide such
contributions. According to the sovereignty argument, the authority for providing security
for the state is under the purview of the state.23 Security for the state is authorized for
state forces that are paid for with state revenues or taxes. The state has the sole authority
to wage war.24 Those who favor contractor support, such as Rumsfeld, argue that the
contractors are bound by legal contracts to provide services to or for the state. I argue this
does not weaken the state's authority because the contract gives the state authority over
the contractor.
Some critics in the debate against the use of contractors assert that armed and
unarmed contractors in Iraq are "mercenaries" because they are civilians paid to provide
services that support warfare. Those who make this argument, as mentioned earlier, reject
contractors as being illegitimate, contending that they run afoul of international law.
Their opponents, such as Doug Brooks, a recognized authority on private contractors,
argue that contractors are legitimate according to the same provisions of international law
argued by the critics. Opponents of the use of the term argue that the word mercenary has
negative connotations due to the excessive human rights abuses perpetrated by
mercenaries in Africa during the 1960s. The argument, voiced by author Robert Young
Pelton, who has closely studied contractors that are armed personal security providers, is

National security policy aims to mitigate threats from other states to the nation's social,
economic, and political institutions. See Huntington, Soldier and the State, 1.
24
On issues of sovereignty, see Adams, "New Mercenaries," 103-16; Kegley and Raymond,
Exorcising the Ghost of Westphalia; Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns; and Tilly, Coercion,
Capital and European States.
25
Brooks, "Messiahs or Mercenaries?" 131.
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that the contractors are legitimately hired civilian security firms that are providing their
services in a foreign war.26
The complexity of classifying the contractors adds confusion the debate. The
taxonomy for contractors, or how contractors are defined, is a fundamental part of the
debate between those who are for or against their services. For example, in her study of
pirates, mercenaries, and sovereignty, Janice Thomson refers to "actors of non-state
97

98

violence." Author Peter Singer identifies similar actors as "corporate warriors."
Scholars David Shearer and Deborah D. Avant, respectively, identify them as "private
military companies"29 or "private security companies."30 Abdel-Fatau Musah, a critic of
armed private actors, refers to them as "mercenaries."31 Some previous studies of actors
that provide similar services as do the contractors in Iraq refer to them as security
companies, while others refer to them as private military companies. Because there are no
standardized terms or labels used to identify all of these actors, I will identify the actors
"39

of interest for this dissertation in terms of the identities of their administrators

and what

they are contracted to do. 33 1 will refer to the firms as "contractors" and their employees
as "contractor employees."34
26

Pelton, Licensed to Kill, 304.
Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, 21.
28
Singer, Corporate Warriors, 3.
29
Shearer, Private Armies, 9-10.
30
Avant, Market for Force, 22-26.
31
Musah and Fayemi, Mercenaries, 13.
In some studies contractor clients include dictators, criminals, sovereign states, multinational
corporations, and humanitarian NGOs. In this study clients include the U.S. military and other agencies,
coalition partners, other contractors, and Iraqi authorities. See Singer, Corporate Warriors, 8-9.
33
Mandel, Armies Without States, 95; Singer, Corporate Warriors, 230-33; and Avant, Market for
Force, 7-18.
34
The actors here are contractors or subcontractors that provide services for the U.S. military
and/or enhance political efforts such as rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq. Contractors are controlled by the
U.S. State Department, the Coalition Provisional Authority, the Western media, and other private firms. For
example the United Kingdom employs 3,500 contractors in Afghanistan and Iraq.
27
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Armed security providers and unarmed construction workers both can be referred
to simply as contractors. However, I argue they should not be counted as the same
because they impact on warfare capability differently. Each of these two can contribute
special but different skills to augment their respective clients. Differences in scope,
source, form, and function make it difficult to subdivide the varieties of contractors into
categories that resemble one another.351 have devoted Part I of the literature review to the
history and studies of private actors that provide military and/or security services similar
to those provided by contractors in Iraq.
In his study of private security actors, David Shearer asserts that the debate over
the nature and role of "military companies" is too basic. Military companies are a specific
kind of contractor firm, which I fully define in Chapter II. Shearer has rigorously
examined private armies or "military companies." In his explanation of the debate over
the use of contractors, he sees that one side argues that these companies (contractors) are
a free-market response for an unmet need for governance, while the other side sees them
as agents selling violence for profit. Shearer further states that the simplistic debate
obscures the "strategic" impact that private armies can have when they intervene in a
state's affairs. He argues that "failure to engage with these companies runs the risk of
rejecting their potential for helping to resolve seemingly intractable disputes."36
Identification of the "best practices" for the use of contractors is a fundamental
contribution of this dissertation.
The clients served by the contractors in Iraq are also varied. The trend is to
associate the contractors with the U.S. military. However, the U.S. military is only one of

Mandel, Armies Without States, 95.
Shearer, Private Armies, 9-10.
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the clients or one of several warfare administrators with whom contractors interact. For
example, according to Jeremy Scahill, author of Blackwater: The Rise of the World's
Most Powerful Mercenary Army, "most people believe that Blackwater is on contract
with the U.S. military." Actually the Blackwater client is the State Department, which
since June 2004 has paid the North Carolina-based contractor $750 million to protect
U.S. diplomats in Iraq.37
The literature review, Chapter II, tackles the details of the terminology that is
descriptive of armed private actors motivated by profit. There I link the terms that
identify these actors with the fundamental debate just introduced, and contractors' utility
as contributors or detractors from governance. The understanding of this historical
background is important for the analysis and for a full understanding of the findings for
this dissertation.

REFINING THE ARGUMENT
The analytical problem is how to structure the argument to get detailed answers
for the previously stated research question: Who are the contractors, and how has the
nature of government oversight and control over contractors determined whether
contractor contributions augment or diminish U.S. warfare capability in the Iraq War?
Some of the contractors have had a positive impact on warfare capability and
others have not. Significantly, not all of the contractors are controlled or administered by
the military. Some contractors are administered and controlled by civilian government
agencies. Therefore, I argue that

Cited by Roy, "Rise of Blackwater."
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It is the degree of government (military and/or nonmilitary/political) control over
contractors that determines whether the contractors' contributions have a positive or
negative impact on warfare capability.
Considering the research question in light of all of the foregoing, I will refine my
argument by defining the terms related to military capability. I will do this in the context
of introducing why and how the case study method is important for explaining the
expected findings. I will also explain why the comparison of the case study's individual
cases is important for explaining the expected findings for the study.
I have constructed a question set based on warfare capability

and private

security industry criteria.39 The question set that follows is used to focus the case study
analysis of the impact of contractor control on warfare capability in Iraq by way of
"process-tracing." I explain the case study method in Chapter III.40 Process-tracing is a
method for focusing the research of the links suspected to connect the evidence of causes
and outcomes for the stated thesis. In this dissertation, process-tracing is part of the
method for examining contemporary media reporting, data-based documents, journals,
and books for empirical evidence, and it is used to focus intensive study of various types
of contractor support and their outcomes. Outcome is expressed in terms of how the
dependent variable—warfare capability—is augmented or threatened. The answers to the
questions posed in the question set are used to identify recurring themes and new

Warfare capability is defined by force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability.
These four components of capability will be defined in the discussion to follow.
39
The sources that influenced my construction of this question set are Cunningham, Strauchs, and
Van Meter, Private Security Trends, 10-11; Camm and Greenfield, How Should the Army Use Contractors,
18-20; Greenfield and Camm, Risk Management and Performance, 1.
40
Yin, Case Study Research, 1.
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variables within the data that can explain how control of contractors impacted on U.S.
warfare capability in Iraq.41
The question set structures the analysis of the cases according to warfare
capability criteria based on (1) who the contractors are; (2) how they are controlled by
warfare administrators,42 and (3) the specific contributions contractors have made to
warfare capability in the Iraq War. 43 The following is the question set for how
contractors contribute to U.S. warfare capability:
1. Who are the contractors and how do the nature, size, characteristics, and
function of the contractor firms and their personnel impact on their support
in Iraq? This includes the training of individual personnel and the distinct
capabilities they provide.
2. Who is/are the administrators for the contract? How are the contractors
controlled by their clients, and what legal restrictions or jurisdiction do the
contractors operate under? How are their contractual relationships managed?
3. How do contractors interact with contract administrators: U.S. government
agencies, military, coalition partners, and Iraqi authorities?
4. How do contractor contributions augment or diminish U.S. military and/or
warfare capability needs?

For the seminal writing on process tracing see George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory
Development, 6.
Warfare administrators are the U.S. military and civilian government officials such as the
Coalition Provisional Authority. The administrators are involved with making policy decisions for the
administration or governance of Iraq. Until Iraqi sovereignty was declared, the U.S. military handled most
governance issues. The Coalition Provisional Authority also played a role. The issue of how contractors
interact with administrative governing authorities in Iraq will be further defined in Chapter III. I use the
term warfare because civil order is out of control and the political issues have not stabilized.
43
The characteristics observed include the nature, form, and function of the contractors, and the
scope of whether and how their support has impacted on U.S. warfare capability.
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5. How do contractor contributions enhance or threaten the U.S. political or
civil affairs capability in Iraq?
6. How do contractor services add to or diminish U.S. public support for the
Iraq War?
Warfare capability was selected as a concept for analysis in this dissertation
because the most recent Quadrennial Defense Reviews (QDRs)44 conducted by the
Pentagon are based on military capability. Military capability change is linked to state
survival; in other words, successful states must efficiently utilize economic and human
resources to maintain their security. This is linked to the argument made by those who
favor the use of contractors to help keep military structure and doctrine economically and
politically affordable by replacing professional military members. Military capability—
the adequacy of the forces provided—is qualitatively and quantitatively tested during
times of crisis and war.45
Warfare capability is defined in this dissertation by four components. The first is
force structure, which includes the size and composition of the force. For example, a new
contract firm with 200 brick masons increases the total U.S. force-rebuilding
infrastructure by 200. This is an important concept because the quantitative adequacy of
U.S. forces in Iraq is a theme that is implied by critics in the contemporary debate when
they state that "there are so many private contractors in the Iraq crisis that it is the first
privatized war."46

The QDR process is covered in the literature review in Chapter II.
My operational definition for military capability is intellectually influenced by Posen and the
U.S. Army criteria for strategic studies. See Posen, Sources of Military Doctrine, 24-25.
46
Holmqvist, "Private Security Companies," 1.
45
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The second capability component is modernization of the force, which includes
the increase of technical sophistication of weapons systems and equipment. For example,
contractors that train military police in how to operate digital bomb detection sensors
increase military capability by modernizing the military police force.
The third capability component, readiness, is increased when the ability of a unit
is improved to deliver outputs for which it was designed. For example, the new police
officers trained by DynCorp increased Iraqi police ability to patrol the streets of Baghdad.
The added security increased the readiness of or capability of contractors from Bechtel to
repair the infrastructure for potable water. Thus the increased readiness and improvement
of the police unit capability is also linked to increased warfare readiness/capability by
improving public support for governance in Baghdad.
The fourth component, sustainability, can increase when the force becomes larger
and thereby is more sustainable. Sustainability is the duration and level at which the force
is capable of maintaining operational activity necessary to achieve U.S. warfare
objectives.47 For example, by having up to 20,000 contractors in Iraq, the total military
capability of U.S. forces in Iraq has increased by 20,000. The 20,000 contractors fill the
"boot space" for 20,000 military personnel and add to sustainability of the total force by
allowing the military personnel to rest and train back in the United States rather than
deploy.
In this argument, warfare capability includes both a political and a military
capability for achieving the U.S. objectives for rebuilding and gaining public support for
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stabilizing Iraq. The administrators that control the contractors also include both the
military and political dimension. The cases selected for Chapters IV and V are important
because the selected firms are controlled by military administrators. The cases selected
for Chapters VI and VII are important because they are firms controlled by
nonmilitary/political administrators.
My analysis considers contractor cases that are controlled by administrators from
both the political and military dimensions to find the answer to whether and how such
control is significant. I analyze the contractors controlled by the administrators of the
political dimension in view of how the contractors augment or threaten warfare capability
for two components of civil affairs assistance for the Iraq occupation: (1) rebuilding and
construction of infrastructure such as communications, transportation, roads, public
services, and buildings, and (2) security and policing, including establishing public
support and protecting the builders and infrastructure. I argue that these two components
of civil affairs assistance are linked to public support of U.S. warfare objectives that are
further linked to create conditions for an orderly society. In the same way, I analyze
contractors controlled by the military according to how the contractors augment or
threaten the military force capability.
A key to my assessment of warfare capability is the comparison of findings for
the group of cases controlled by the military with the findings from the group of cases
controlled by non-military administrators. I do this in Chapter VIII, in which I argue that
the findings for cases of firms controlled by the military (Chapters IV and V) augment
48

The U.S. operational objectives include the removal of Saddam Hussein from power, the
stabilization of the civil order, the rebuilding of infrastructure, and the establishment of a democratic form
of government. The role or services performed by contractors are analyzed to answer how they augment
their clients' ability to achieve both political and military objectives. The operationalization of the
characteristics observed and the plan used to observe them are set out in Chapter III.
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capability, while the cases of firms that are controlled by political-rebuilding
administrators (in Chapters VI and VII) show that the contractors' essential contributions
both augment and seriously threaten warfare capability.

RELEVANT FINDINGS
The relevant findings in this study show that as a practical matter, some
contractors make positive capability contributions; others do not. The key conceptual
point in the findings is that it is the nature of government oversight and control over
contractors that determines how successfully contractors augment warfare capability.
Contractors under military oversight and control do increase military capability by
modernizing the force, by assisting with the operation of technology, and adding mass to
the force structure.
However, some contractors in Iraq have been a hazard or liability in domestic and
international political issues, which damages warfare capability. For example, when
public opinion49 is informed by the international media that armed contractors acting as
part of the total U.S. force have perpetrated acts of humanitarian abuse, it indicates the
United States is incapable of controlling its contractors. The controversial shooting of a
number of Iraqis by a Blackwater USA protective security detail in Baghdad on
September 16, 2007, is a case in point. Situations such as this diminish warfare
capability because they damage the public confidence and support that is necessary for
establishing governance and a stable society.

Public support for the U.S. goal to establish order and to rebuild Iraq is frequently referred to as
the "hearts and minds of the people."
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The U.S. policy of employing contractors in Iraq is enmeshed in humanitarian
controversies, such as the Abu Ghraib prisoner scandal. In the Abu Ghraib incident,
contractors are suspected of having been involved in one out of three of the known
incidents. However, while military suspects have been prosecuted, the civilian suspects
have not. Speculation in the press indicates that no prosecution has taken place because
the contractors fall into a gray area of the law. This is empirical evidence of how the lack
of legal control over contractors threatens U.S. warfare capability, or readiness to gain
public support.50 When contractors are not properly controlled it is difficult for the Iraqi
public to have confidence in the U.S. political capability, which is all linked to
maintaining civil order.
The use of foreign nationals as contractor employees provides special advantages
in some situations, while they are a potential threat to warfare capability in others. For
example, hiring Iraqi citizens for rebuilding infrastructure creates jobs and instills in the
workers pride of accomplishment, which increases the readiness of the Iraqi society to be
more orderly. At the same time, foreign contractors are a potential safety and security risk
to U.S. forces and installations, and this is a threat to force readiness. This is empirically
supported by the investigative findings that indicate the U.S.S. Cole attackers may have
been contractors associated with refueling operations.
Force readiness and sustainability have been seriously damaged on those
occasions when U.S. military forces and contractors have experienced armed
confrontations between themselves. For example, employees of Zapata Engineering were
apprehended and subsequently expelled from Iraq in May 2005 by U.S. Marines. The

Easton, "War Privatization Talks."
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contractors are alleged to have indiscriminately, perhaps deliberately, fired on U.S. forces
and Iraqi civilians.51 I argue that yet again the issue of the lack of contractor control and
oversight is a key cause for the incident occurrence. This incident in particular was found
to have created a tension of distrust between the contractors and military. One of the
strengths of military operations is unity of command, with the entire force moving or
working together under one commander for the same goal. Disintegration of the unity of
command for the U.S. total force, due to weak contractor oversight and control, weakens
the force capability by destroying its readiness for achieving its warfare goals.

SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY
Chris Stirewalt, political editor for the State Journal, has asserted that "the
relationship between soldiers and civilians is in many ways the central one of western
civilization."52 I agree with Stirewalt and feel that his statement is an important reason
why the findings of this study are a significant contribution to the field of international
security studies. This study was conducted under the assumption that civilian contractors
and soldiers are both part of the total force in Iraq, and that previous to this study there
were no real standards by which to evaluate contractors as part of the total force
necessary for U.S. warfare capability and achievement of U.S. policy goals in Iraq. This
study helps to fill the gap by collection and analysis of empirical evidence that shows it is
the nature of government oversight and control over contractors that determines how and
why some contractors make positive warfare capability contributions in Iraq and others
do not.

51
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Peter Singer, for example, believes that answers to the following questions are
needed to inform U.S. policy makers regarding the role of contractors in Iraq: "What is
this industry and where did it come from? What is its role in the United States' largest
overseas venture in Iraq? What are the broader implications of that role?" He warns that
if policy makers fail to understand what he terms an "emerging foreign policy force," it
could prove to be destructive to policy and democracy.
My research question and question set frame the analysis of the problem, which
also answers Singer's questions. In doing so the dissertation also contributes to the
comprehensive understanding of security by adding to what is known about private
security and its contractors. This is the only study I am aware of that critically compares
ways in which different contract administrators and the degree of control they exercise
over contractors determine the impact that contractors have on U.S. warfare capability.
This dissertation is a collection of practical information about contractors and the
private security industry that can be used by security scholars, U.S. military planners, and
practitioners in the private security and military-industrial complex. This is one of the
earliest analytical studies of the impact of contractors on warfare capability. The study
has undertaken the consolidation of findings from multiple sources and profiles the trends
and issues that now exist and are developing in the private security and military
industries' contract firms. This study has considered the few previous studies of the
domestic private security firms and the impact their service has had on their relationship
with public police. The relational issues experienced by domestic private security and
public police are similar to the problems in the relationships between contractors and
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military actors in the Iraq War. This study serves as a critique of previous assertions
related to private actors or contractors with military potential. As such it serves to
increase the understanding of how contractors from private enterprise impact the general
security environment. At the conclusion of the dissertation I make suggestions for the
control of contractors that provide services to augment U.S. warfare capability.

DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION
This dissertation consists of nine chapters. Chapter II is the literature review.
Chapter III is devoted to the research plan. Chapters IV and V form a group of cases that
analyze the contractors administered and controlled by the military. Chapters VI and VII
form a group of cases that analyze contractors administered and controlled by nonmilitary civilian agencies, such as the U.S. State Department, U.S. Agency for
International Development (USAID), the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), or the
Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. The individual cases in Chapters IV, V, VI, and VII trace
how each contributes to U.S. warfare capability in Iraq. Chapter VIII compares the
findings from the cases administered by the U.S. military with the findings from the cases
administered by civil-political (non-military) rebuilders. Chapter IX summarizes the
conclusions and makes recommendations for controlling contractor impact on U.S.
warfare capability.

SUMMARY
This dissertation analyzes how the nature and degree of government control over
contractors determines whether the contractors' contributions have a positive or negative
impact. This chapter introduces and explains the focus and purpose of the dissertation.
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The state of the contemporary argument for and against the U.S. use of contractors in Iraq
is the basis of the research problem, which is introduced in this chapter. This chapter has
clearly stated the research question and explained why answering it is a matter of
importance to security studies in general. I have included essential conceptual definitions
for terms such as warfare capability, military capability, civil-political capability, force
structure, modernization, unit readiness, and sustainability. The question set is
constructed to provide detailed answers for the research question and to focus the case
study analysis by way of process-tracing. The goal of the next chapter, the literature
review, is to provide the essential background and the historical focus that is the basis for
the stated research problem.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW

I set the stage in the introductory chapter by discussing the importance of the
research topic and citing some contemporary examples depicting the issues and debate
regarding contractor use in Iraq. As noted in the introductory chapter, there has been
limited academic study on the character and nature of contractors in Iraq, their
contributions to warfare capability, and their interactions with or control by governmental
agencies. There is, however, a significant and interesting body of literature on related
issues that provide essential background information in the explanation of my study.

CHAPTER GOAL
The goal of this literature review is to bring an eclectic, yet practical, historical
focus that will act as an informative background necessary for the analysis of how the
nature and degree of government control over contractors determines whether or not their
contributions have a positive impact. This literature review presents a broad cross-section
review of primary and secondary sources to help refine the research question, and is
intended to be a comprehensive and up-to-date review of major issues that form the
historical base for the research question.
I have organized this literature review in two parts. In Part I, I focus on literature
to help define such actors as mercenaries, private military and security companies, the
military-industrial complex, and the new private security industry, as well as contractor
legitimacy and control. I further identify and define a number of misperceptions and legal
issues of significance to this study. The goal is to understand the implications of the
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literature as it pertains to both public and private security and how it contributes to the
eventual analysis of the firms of interest in the current debate over the U.S. use of
contractors in Iraq.
The review in Part II includes issues related to the evolution of both U.S. military
change and policies that include the use of contractors as part of the total force. The
major topics included in this part are how contractor services and policies evolved along
with post-Cold War U.S. military change; major Defense Department policy reviews;
military capability change; and transformation. The goal for both parts of the literature
review is to analyze and synthesize the literature to provide the background for an up-todate understanding of contractors. Additionally the goal of the review is to produce a
comprehensive understanding or background for the eventual analysis of the contractors
that are part of the total U.S. warfare capability in Iraq.

PART I: EVOLUTION OF ARMED PRIVATE ACTORS
The legacy of contemporary private security contractors includes an interesting
history rooted in the evolution of armed private actors—for instance, mercenaries and
pirates. This portion of the literature review highlights that history. This is a literature that
is expanding and is framing the perceptions of the current private security issues. The
maturity of the historical literature for armed private actors capable of both security and
violence adds rigorous insight into the contemporary private security puzzle and
contemporary assertions pertaining to it.1

Primary sources for historical information related to private actors with military potential are
Adams, "New Mercenaries," 115; Brown, Agents of Manifest Destiny, 458-59; Davis, Pirates Laffite, xixii; Green, Filibuster, and Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns.
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Not only is the literature emerging, but the terminology has also been in
transition. The debate between those who favor the use of contractor support for various
roles in Iraq and those who do not can be confusing because many useful terms needed to
explain contractors are not well defined. Some terms can be pejorative; for example, the
terms "mercenary" or "dogs of war" are frequently associated with the ruthless non-state
actors that were the scourge of various African states in the 1960s. Therefore, an
additional purpose of this part of the review is to conceptually establish the language
necessary for answering the research question by defining, adopting, or "weeding out"
terms as necessary in order to properly analyze contractors and contractor services.
In discussing the actors and history that are an important part of the lineage and
background for present-day contractors in Iraq, I will highlight and separately discuss
these key private actors: mercenaries, private military and security companies, and the
new private security industry. I will also review the historical concepts of security,
sovereignty, and private security.
The literature related to armed private actors generally looks at them as potential
transnational troublemakers. For example, one issue of concern related to contractors
with military potential is the possible threat they can become to the client state. This is
because some contract firms, depending on the states that are their clients, have the
potential of becoming stronger than their clients. They can do this in various ways,
including developing economic power in the client state, exploiting the natural resources
of the state, and controlling infrastructure such as airports, seaports, and roads.2 Some
previous studies have sensationalized as well as explained how and why armed private

2
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actors have shaped the concept of state sovereignty. The literature pertaining to armed
private actors has also explained armed private actors from the criminal and moral
perspectives. This literature is rapidly emerging at this time; hence, it has not benefited
from significant peer criticism.
In some previous studies, contractors or private actors with military potential are
anecdotally referred to as "agents of security" and are identified by a variety of terms.
Some military-industrial-complex contractors who provide services and technology that
modernize the military force are at times identified as security contractors. Referring to
contractors as private military companies and private security companies is perplexing.
This is because, ceteris paribus, they are not the same. The paradox that defines the
difference between private military and security companies is complex. Conceptually this
review provides insight into this paradox and results in the ultimate definition of the
contractors of interest for this study.3

Mercenaries, Filibusters, and Pirates
Janice E. Thomson's Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns is the seminal work on
the history of armed private actors and state sovereignty from as early as 1250 to the late
1800s. Thomson's assertion is that sovereignty is the authority of the state.4 She
distinguishes sovereign authority of the state from control. Based on Thomson's
assertion, the concept of sovereign authority is helpful in defining the nature of
contemporary contractors in the general debate. In other words, the sovereign state has

3

1 will present a refined definition of the particular actors that are the units of interest for this
study under the heading of Taxonomy in Chapter III.
4
Thomson, "State Sovereignty," 214. Also, Thomson and Krasner, "Global Transactions," 208
and 216.
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authority to hire contractors. I argue that the United States, by virtue of the contract, has
authority over the contractors in Iraq. At the same time, the United States may or may not
have control over the same contractor depending on whether the state chooses to exercise
its authority to supervise the contract or not.
In her study, Thomson uses the term "mercenarism" when she refers to the
practice of those individuals who enlist in a foreign army. Thomson is a critic of what she
refers to as low-cost private actors who buy and sell military manpower like a
commodity on the global market no matter who the suppliers or purchasers are. Her
thesis is that over time states learned that the use of low-cost private actors with military
potential (mercenaries and pirates) led to dangerous "unintended" consequences.6 As
such, Thomson's thesis partly complements my own that individual contractor
contributions can either augment or diminish U.S. warfare capability.
Other characteristics highlighted in previous studies on private actors with
military power have focused on criminal and moral aspects, humanitarian law,7 and
globalization and the crisis of governance in the nation-state.8 The citizens within a state
can be the source of security problems for the sovereign because of revolutionary or civil
unrest, or they can be the victims of extreme tyrannical violence. The chaos that may
result from citizens is frequently the threat of most concern to tyrannical leaders, many of
whom come to power by overthrowing a predecessor. The historical precedence is for the

5

My term for these private actors in contemporary history and for this study is contractor(s). That
is to say, contractors by nature are private actors, not government actors.
6
Thomson, Mercenaries, Pirates, and Sovereigns, 4-27.1 have reviewed Thomson here primarily
to introduce mercenary history.
7
Avant, "From Mercenary," 2.
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Musah and Fayemi, Mercenaries, 16.
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sovereign to use the state's army or a police force that consists of citizens of the state
when it is necessary to use coercive violence directed at the people.9
There has been a long and important historical tradition of enterprising civilians
supporting U.S. military operations, as illustrated in Table 1. Therefore, the policy of
using civilian contractors to support military operations is not new. Two well-known
examples of early contractors are the civilian U.S. Army scouts in the Indian Wars, and
the Pinkerton Private Investigative Agency, which collected intelligence for the U.S.
Army in the Civil War.

Table 1. U.S. Wars and Civilian Contractors
WAR

CIVILIANS to MILITARY

Revolution

1,500 to 9,000 or 1:6

Mexican/American

6,000 to 33,000 or 1:6

Civil War

200,000 to 1,000,000 or 1:5

World War I

85,000 to 2,000,000 or 1:20

World War H

734,000 to 5,400,000 or 1:7

Korean

156,000 to 393,000 or 1:2.5

Vietnam

70,000 to 359,000 or 1:5

Gulf War

9,200 to 541,000 or 1:58

Bosnia

1,400 to 20,000 or 1:15

Iraq

21,000 to 140,000 or 1:6 (as of February
2006)10
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The notorious nature of the history of pirates, mercenaries, filibusters (armed
private actors), and private armies is having a strong influence on the public's general
misperception of today's private actors with similar characteristics. A proper
understanding of the historical actors that were capable of coercive violence is a helpful
part of a framework that can be used to gain accurate perception of U.S. military
capability and the private actors that support it today. That history is an important part of
this literature review. Private security actors share numerous characteristics with other
private actors with military potential that have historically been known as privateers,
pirates, and mercenaries.
Machiavelli, the fifteenth-century Renaissance philosopher, in discussing a ruler's
choice to defend the state using mercenary forces, linked the mercenary use with disaster.
Machiavelli warns that mercenaries, or condottieri—those paid under contract—are
treacherous, useless, and not to be trusted. He says this is so because the mercenaries
have no loyalty for the ruler. They have no other reason other than money to fight. In this
sense Machiavelli indicates that, not only are mercenaries unreliable as a choice for
defending the state's security, but they are a direct threat to it.12
The history of hired private soldiers is linked to the emergence of nationalism.
The French Revolution's nationalism initiated the idea that it is correct for every citizen
to fight for his or her country. Consequently it is dishonorable for citizens to serve under
another flag as a private soldier. Over time, this idea has evolved to such a point that
mercenary service is fundamentally considered immoral. On the other hand, under
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customary international law, captured mercenaries were treated the same as other
combatant POWs until 1977.13
The inflammatory legacy of pirates and mercenaries continues to fuel the current
widespread opposition for sovereign states to employ contractors or private military and
security actors. Furthermore, in spite of facts to the contrary, the critics of private security
insist that contractors are illegitimate purveyors of violence. This inflammatory
perception further assumes that private military and security firms are a cyclic return of
the pre-Westphalian security order. Before the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), private
armies or mercenaries were the prime forces for waging war. Accordingly, one approach
for analyzing current armed private actors is to assert that states no longer have a
monopoly on the means of violence and to evaluate the ways in which the use of private
actors erodes state sovereignty.14
Historically private actors have played significant roles in support of and in
opposition to U.S. military operations, and yet critics of the practice still abound. One
only has to look at David McCullough's seminal work, 1776, to find an excellent
example of a historical narrative of U.S. military doctrine and the effective use of private
actors in roles that were militarily profitable. Most of the provisions, including vast
quantities of rum for Washington's forces—especially at the siege of Boston—were
provided by enterprising individuals from the private sector. Americans at the time of the
Revolution took a particularly dim view of the British use of Hessian mercenaries, while
at the same time they depended on their own privateers to harass British shipping. George
Washington is known to have paid $333.33 for a spy "to go into Boston . . . for the
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purpose of conveying intelligence of the enemy's movements and designs."15 The
contract teamsters that supported General Washington in the Revolutionary War led the
way for contractors that have provided services on American battlefields ever since. This
includes support in the American Civil War, World Wars I and II, Korea, Vietnam, and
the Gulf War.
In addition to private spies, there was a colorful collection of pirates that were
based out of the United States and operated in U.S. waters. Some pirates have made
military contributions to the national security. Two of the most colorful were Pierre and
Jean Laffite. These brothers were smugglers, spies, privateers, and pirates. They
represented the restless overachievers of their time. In our time they are celebrated as
U.S. patriots for assisting American forces in the Battle of New Orleans.
Certain times in U.S. history produced the perfect conditions for private actors
with military capabilities. One of the perfect times was the unsettled period when a young
United States was beginning to expand across the continent. Those times provided
adventurous men with an enterprising spirit a great opportunity to earn their fortunes as
armed private actors. Many did, and the results are a legacy of private self-help and
enterprise.16 U.S. private enterprise and its actors on the battlefield in Iraq exhibit some
of the same characteristics. This perception is useful as a point of comparison and in the
analysis of their potential capabilities on the battlefield today.
The patriotic spirit of adventure and misadventure that shaped Pierre and Jean
Laffite appears to continue to infect the twenty-first-century ideals of armed U.S.
contractors. Like the Laffites, the contractors today can favorably augment U.S. military
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forces when they operate under U.S. authority and control. When they are not regulated
and controlled they can fall to the dark side of greed, exceptionalism, and
entrepreneurialism, just as did the Laffite brothers.
In one of the earliest works to study contemporary private military actors, Peter
Singer, in Corporate Warriors, argued that the corporate structure for the firms was new
in the post-Cold War environment. The objective of his valuable study is to compile the
facts of the individual firms so as to create an analytic architecture for future organized
study of the emergence of private military firms.17 This literature review shows that the
U.S. private security industry has had a long history in this country. The armed private
actors that are proliferating in the security environment are not a new phenomenon, as
some have argued. Furthermore, the current private actors are more capable terrorists,
international criminals, mercenaries, pirates, and private security companies. The
terrorists, international criminals, mercenaries, and pirates are only a peripheral interest in
this dissertation because of their illegitimate status. For that reason, they cast a
derogatory shadow over private security actors that are of direct interest to this study.
According to David Isenberg, an authority on private security, contractors made
substantial contributions to the U.S. warfare efforts in Vietnam, as they are doing in Iraq.
As a result of contractor success in Vietnam, a modern-day historical precedent was
established for the use of contractors on the battlefield. Without a doubt a result of the
contractor program was that as an aid and assistance program, it paid wages to
Vietnamese citizens and put money into the economy. At the same time, U.S. private
enterprise also profited. The aid and assistance program goal was to build the
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infrastructure that South Vietnam did not have. Roads, bridges, hospitals, airports, and
seaports all needed to be built to facilitate increasing the physical capacity for them to
receive both military and economic aid from the U.S. A consortium of contractors
responded to President Lyndon B. Johnson's authorization to proceed with construction
as early as 1962. The military builders turned over the preponderance of the construction
they were involved in to U.S. contractors such as Raymond International and MorrisonKnudsen(RMK).18
The infrastructure was needed before U.S. military escalation was possible. By
1964, RMK had hired several hundred American construction workers and 11,000
Vietnamese, but was not able to keep up with the contract orders. In August, RMK
combined with two additional U.S. firms, Brown and Root and J.A. Jones Construction.
The RMK-BRJ consortium that became known as the "Vietnam Builders" quickly
ramped up to eventually take on building 90 percent of Vietnam's infrastructure. Of the
$700 million appropriated by Congress in 1965 as supplementary Vietnam spending,
$100 million was for construction. The contractors trained Vietnamese students in a sixweek program for construction skills. Eventually the builders hired 51,000 individual
contractors. Vietnamese held down 47,000 jobs while Koreans, Filipinos, and others
composed the rest. The supervisory staff was made up of approximately 4,000
Americans.19 In addition to RMK-BRJ, Vinnell Corporation had as many as 5,000
contractors doing construction and providing combat service support. Booz Allen also
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provided contractors in support of the U.S. military mission in Vietnam that helped to
develop the Vietnamese officer corps.20
The lesson to be learned from the story of the Vietnam Builders is not the funds
spent or the numbers of contractors that worked there. The lesson is that the story is not
well known at all. Those who hype Iraq as the first privatized war for the U.S., in fact,
have it wrong. The contractor support in Vietnam was instrumental in creating the
infrastructure needed for the escalation of the war. President Johnson did not want
transparency as the administration shifted from advising the South Vietnamese to a more
active support role. Hiring thousands of Vietnamese and U.S. contractors made it
possible to get the work done in secrecy without the deployment of large military
construction units. 21 As in Iraq, Vietnam was not the first U.S. use of contractors to
contribute to U.S. warfare efforts. Contractors were on the battlefield and did start to fill
some roles, such as combat engineering, that the U.S. forces were not structurally capable
of. I maintain that even if a historical precedent was not set, it was at least recognized that
contractors can be a potential force multiplier on the battlefield.

Expansionism and Filibusters
U.S. expansionism was an endeavor that was largely carried out by enterprising
private citizens, some of whom were known as "filibusters." As a result, expansionism
includes historical insight into actors similar to present-day armed private actors or the
private security industry. This is important background to know because of the negative
perceptions the historical actors reflect upon today's enterprising private security firms.

20
21

Avant, "Privatization of Security," 328.
Carter, "Vietnam Builders," 50.

41
The legacy of filibusters

is linked with U.S. expansionism and provides specific

examples of how contractors who work out of the bounds of government control could
damage U.S. interest. Unlike the actors of interest for this study, filibusters were not
legitimately sanctioned as a part of official U.S. foreign policy. Rather, they were armed
private U.S. actors, and in fact were an especially ugly "species" of armed private actors
in U.S. history. They were exceedingly ambitious and fallible in exercising the forces of
23

expansion.
The "go ahead" spirit abounded when early colonial settlers squeezed the land
from the grip of Native Americans. Filibusters grew out of those early expansionist
efforts. The young nation's spirit or "manifest destiny" for westward expansion did not
stop until the U.S. boundaries were marked by the shores of the Pacific. Even as those
boundaries were being established, a few filibusters in the nineteenth century were taking
land in armed actions mounted against U.S. regional neighbors. The unregulated actions
of William Walker provide a notorious example. Among his many exploits, Walker
overthrew the government of Nicaragua in 1855 and put himself in power there. In the
process he managed to cheat Commodore Cornelius Vanderbilt,24 the prominent U.S.
business tycoon, by revoking the charter for Vanderbilt's Accessory Transit Co. and
creating another firm in partnership with two of Vanderbilt's men. In response Vanderbilt
hired his own private force of nearly 100 Costa Ricans who invaded Nicaragua and
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expeditions of conquest." See Green, Filibuster, Preface.
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caused Walker to turn himself in to the U.S. Navy. Later, in 1860, Walker ran afoul of
British bankers' business when he invaded the Honduran Bay Islands. The British
bankers had him arrested by the Honduran army, who readily executed him by firing
squad.25
William Walker's notoriously violent interventions are well known by most
Central Americans up to this day. For that reason, Walker is in fact the paramount
example of U.S. imperialism in Central America. The legacy of past damage caused by
armed private actors who were not regulated or whose actions were at cross-purposes to
U.S. foreign policy is important to keep in mind while evaluating the nature and
characteristics of contractors that support U.S. warfare capability. I have reviewed the
history of filibusters for three reasons. First, the story of U.S. filibusters documents flaws
in past unregulated or unenforced transnational interventions by private military actors.
Second, filibusters were mercenaries as well as an American phenomenon. Third, the
effects of filibuster interventions were so severe that resentment of the U.S. is still
prevalent among the citizens of Central America.

Military Companies
Currently, "military companies" is one of the prominent terms used to refer to
armed private actors similar to the contractors of interest in this paper. David Shearer, an
expert on private military actors, defines military companies as providers of military
skills. Shearer asserts the purpose of their assistance is to add to the client's military
capability to function in war and hence to become a more effective deterrent force.
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Military companies function as trainers, arms suppliers, and threat assessment analysts.
Shearer specifies that it is the nature of military companies' assistance to have a strategic
impact on the political and security environment. He asserts that in some situations
military companies provide security assistance for states and in others they are a threat to
state security because they exploit the state and/or its resources for monetary gain.
Peter Singer's term for private actors with military potential is "private military
firms." The term is frequently referred to in current literature by the acronym PMF, or
PMC (private military company). Singer's definition: "PMFs are businesses that provide
governments with professional services intricately linked to warfare; they represent, in
other words, the corporate evolution of the age-old profession of mercenaries. Unlike the
individual dogs of war of the past, however, PMFs are corporate bodies that offer a wide
range of services, from tactical combat operations and strategic planning to logistical
support and technical assistance."27
The global threat environment in the era after the Cold War left the gate open to a
permissive global market in which mercenaries or private enterprise could trade in
military and security services while growing wealthy. The post-Cold War era was a void
left after the dynamic tension dissolved between the United States and the Soviet Union.
That void was partly filled with mercenary or private military-like firms with combat
skills for hire. Peter Singer wrote that his goal in writing Corporate Warriors was to
organize and integrate what is known about PMFs in a systematic manner and to develop
theories to guide future studies. In distinguishing the PMFs, Singer takes into account
that they are shaped by military and economic fundamentals, and he puts them into three
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sectors: military provider firms, military consultant firms, and military support firms.
Singer asserts that the military provider firms such as Sandline and Executive Outcomes
provide direct combat functions in the tactical environment. These firms are private
armies. I do not know of any U.S. firms engaged in combat operations to the same degree
as Sandline or Executive Outcomes. However, firms such as Blackwater USA are
currently functioning in roles and in a manner that is hard to distinguish from direct
combat.
Singer's second type is military consultant firms, which he characterized as
advisors, trainers, and planners. These firms rarely go onto the battlefield. They apply
knowledge, not firepower. The best example is Military Professional Resources Inc.
(MPRI), a U.S. firm I have included in the case studies. Singer's third type is the military
support firms, which provide nonlethal assistance for logistics, intelligence, and
transportation.

End of the Cold War
The end of the Cold War and the downsizing of military forces that followed it
occurred in an environment that contributed to the proliferation of private military firms.
The demise of the Soviet Union was followed by incremental restructuring or downsizing
of U.S. military forces. I maintain that when U.S. warfare capabilities were stretched thin
in Iraq because the forces had been downsized, contractors were called on to fill
numerous roles.

Singer, Corporate Warriors, 91-97.

The end of the Cold War marks the beginning of the changing status of U.S.
warfare capability and is the starting point for serious use of contractor services to
supplement U.S. military capability. Therefore I have traced the ways in which the
contributions of the post-Cold War contractors impacted the later use of contractors in
the invasion and occupation of Iraq. For example, the release of former soldiers from
active duty by the United States and other states made them available for the private
market. These large numbers of well-trained soldiers increased the military expertise
available in the private sector that could be used to augment existing force mass and
thereby increase force sustainability.29

U.S. Reluctance to Intervene
The collapse of the Cold War created broad changes in the global threat
environment and the nature of war. As a result, military capability changed so as to create
a need for services that contractors could provide. In the post-Cold War era the United
States and its Western allies became reluctant to intervene in security matters in
developing states and regions. This is because the United States and its NATO alliance
partners were free of a peer competitor after many decades of balancing against the
Soviet Union and were free to concentrate on self-interest in an anarchical world. In that
world, private enterprise and non-state actors with coercive power were free to engage
and enlarge the international security market because states were not doing so. The result
has been the expansion of market opportunity for armed private actors organized as
enterprising firms. Accordingly, some security scholars, such as Peter Singer, who have
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studied private military companies in the global environment have asserted that these
private security firms can efficiently compete for traditional, state-monopolized security
functions.30
Singer's assertion, in a few words, implies that private security firms or
contractors can provide capabilities on par with or equal to state security actors. My
research question analyzes the central part of Singer's theory by focusing specifically on
how contractors contribute to U.S. warfare or security capability.

Private Security Company
The term "private security company," in much the same way as explained in
regard to the term "private military company," does not have one standard usage within
the literature. In order to explain what a private security company is, I review pertinent
literature for the traditional U.S. domestic security firm. Such a firm provides numerous
protective functions within the United States that take on a different character in a wartorn environment. Picture the difference in the personnel, weapons, and tactics for
securing an oil refinery in Louisiana and those for securing an oil well in Iraq, where oil
fields and battlefields are the same. Private security includes various types of private
organizations and individuals that provide numerous types of security-related services,
including private investigations, guard and patrol, lie detection, locks and alarm services,
armored money transport, armored car and executive protection, consultants, and security
equipment and technology manufacturing and distribution, among others. These services
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within the United States include almost all police and security functions performed by
entities or individuals other than law enforcement agencies.31
Carolyn Holmqvist, who has studied the regulation of security contractors,
combines security and military companies under the umbrella term of "private security
company." Her argument links assumptions of "offensive" and "defensive" or "active and
passive" while eliminating the concept of "protection."32 I argue that she misses the point
by not recognizing the important differences in the nature of contributions between
private security and military companies. I feel she misses the opportunity to explain the
details that are important for eliminating misperceptions fundamental to the private
versus public security debate as it pertains to her study of the regulation of security
contractors. As a result I argue that her explanations are more explicit as military
contributions than they are as security contributions that contribute to U.S. warfare
capability. Deborah D. Avant's analysis, which I review in the following paragraphs,
provides a clearer explanation of the differences in public and private services than does
Holmqvist's.
Deborah D. Avant, writing in The Market for Force, analyzes the market for
private security based on the premise that private security may affect how citizens are
able to control violence. Her focus is to determine whether optimists or pessimists have
the best road map for explaining private security's implications. Avant emphasizes the
implications that privatization of security has for the control of force. Avant does not
declare herself to be a critic of the privatization of security. She takes a position midway
between the pessimists and optimists. She points out that although the pessimists argue
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that private armies undermine democracy and development in Africa, the optimists argue
that private options can advance governance and order.
Avant uses the term "private security companies" (PSCs) when referring to her
actors of interest. She discards the use of "mercenary" as a descriptive term. She asserts
that she does so because the meaning for mercenary has shifted over time and its
implications are not clear. She uses "private" in referring to non-governmental actors and
"public" for governmental actors. She explains that the term "private" is associated with
markets or profit and "public" with the state and politics. She associates public with the
pursuit of collective ends.34
Avant asserts that the work done by PSCs in Iraq is work that was formerly done
by military personnel. The contractors performed numerous roles in providing services
for logistics, operational support of weapons systems, and training. She explains that
there is an existing debate regarding the distinction between PSCs and PMCs.35 In this
regard, I return to Shearer's distinction that PMCs have a strategic impact on the states'
military force whereas PSCs focus on protection of installations and providing security in
situ. Shearer further states that private security also augments or replaces public services
and traditional policing functions.36
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Sovereignty
Sovereignty, security, order, and war have been closely intertwined throughout
history. For this reason, in the literature reviewed in this section I link security, order, and
war to state sovereignty and contributions of private security. In his study of operational
warfare, Clayton R. Newell writes that Aristotle developed his concept of order about a
hundred years after Thucydides wrote his history of the Peloponnesian War. Aristotle, as
we know, was one of Alexander the Great's teachers. The association of teacher and
student, warrior and scientist, raises interesting questions of where this convergence of
science and war has led. The effect of this convergence almost certainty is that Aristotle's
order was a starting point for the universal search for order, which can be linked to state
sovereignty.37
Previous studies of contractors or the private industry's armed security providers
have relied on a state-centered or state sovereignty approach. The majority of these
studies focus on how private contractors, as transnational actors, have changed the level
of the host states' sovereignty or the regional balance of power.381 argue that the
relations that emerged between private security and public law enforcement over
domestic issues within the United States appear to have some similarities to current
relationship issues being experienced between contractors and military actors in Iraq.
As such the solutions to the relational problems between domestic security and the police
may have some promise for shedding light on similar problems between contractors and
the military in Iraq. The issues regarding contractors and the military are fundamental and
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practical, encompassing the nature of their cooperation, their communication, and how
their mutual contributions contribute to the U.S. objectives in Iraq. The literature
available on sovereignty, security, and private security is reviewed in this section.
The sovereign right of states to conduct war and to protect its citizens slowly
evolved following the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 as the states' sovereigns asserted the
right to do so. Accordingly, states are the only actors that have full and complete
authority over domestic and foreign issues as observed under the jurisdiction of
international law.40 In putting a fine point on the sovereign right of states, Janice
Thomson, who was cited earlier in this chapter, has pointed out the significance of a
state's authority in terms of its ability to "control actors and activities within and across
its borders" and to "make authoritative decisions in the final decision to make war."41
One of the most important elements of sovereignty is that states are the legitimate
actors with authority to conduct war. If this is taken literally, contractors have no
authority to conduct war. Therefore to be legitimate actors for conducting war they must
be granted authority from the state. In an excellent analysis of sovereignty and security,
Martin van Creveld, an Israeli military historian, cites Clausewitz's assertion that war is
shaped by society and the government. He also cites Immanuel Kant's argument that a
state's unequivocal right to wage war is the job of the state's army. War could only be
fought by the state for the state, and against the state. Soldiers were legitimized under law
that evolved after the battle of Solferino in 1859 and the second Hague conference in
1907. The former practice of issuing Letters of Marque and Privateering were eliminated
and states were charged with registering or licensing soldiers. Soldiers were required to
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fight according to the orders of a responsible commander. Also, according to the law,
soldiers were required to wear a uniform and to display their weapons openly. According
to van Creveld's assertion, the military legitimacy to exercise force comes on behalf of
the state.42
Christopher Spearin has explored the issue of state sovereignty and the U.S. use
of contractors in response to terrorism.43 He explains that the tenets of state sovereignty
are challenged when the U.S. employs contractors to work against the threat of
extraterritorial terrorism. He addresses two questions by way of solving the problem:
How does the state partnership with private actors to combat terrorism affect international
statecraft? In future U.S. expansion of public-private partnerships, what are the issues
that may be expected? The thrust of Spearin's finding is that the potential for future
acceptance of contractors in "international affairs" will depend on their actions and
success in the current U.S. war targeting terrorism. The acceptance of armed private
actors in the international environment depends on their actions and the actions of their
client.
In the study of politics among nations I argue that the definition of security begins
with the citizens' need for protection and the states' responsibility to provide it. Domestic
security, state security, international security, and global security all include different
issues and frames of reference under differing historical circumstances.45 The various
security concepts have different explanatory criteria that usually have to do with the
threat. For example, is the threat to the survivability of the state from another state, or is it
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a domestic issue wherein an individual's personal security is threatened by another
citizen? National security policy aims to protect the state and its citizens from other
states' intervention into the nation's social, economic, and political institutions. The
police and/or private security aim to protect the citizen from threats within the state. I
argue that the contractor services change U.S. force structure when they are considered a
part of the total force used as a security instrument outside of the U.S. because
contractors are private actors even when they contribute to military or government
47

actors.
Conceptually, including contractors or private enterprise as an element of state
security is a profusion of thorns. Helga Haftendorn has defined security as a system that
maintains value and the absence of threats to it over time.481 argue that the core value of
security is the condition of being or feeling safe from harm or danger. Security, at the
core, has the same criteria for states as it does for individuals. My operational definition
of security weaves the theme of public (states) and private (individuals) into one concept
of being or feeling safe from danger.
Terry Terriff, who has analyzed the evolution of security studies, writes that state
security must focus on the potential harm or danger from wars and the protection
necessary from actual and threatened attacks. State security considers threats to its ability
to survive, which is linked to the management of a state military force for potential or
actual deployment at times of war.49
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Stephen Walt's security model is framed by the relationship of the "threat" and
the principles for using and controlling military force. Walt asserts that the diagnosis of
the security condition begins with environmental conditions surrounding the threat. To
count as a security threat, Walt's strict criterion eliminates all problems unless they are
vital to shaping issues that transform the national security. Policies, doctrine, and national
strategy are prepared by states in order to either prevent or engage in war.5

Private Security
The domestic private security industry has a long history in the United States and
it has a record of contributing to the U.S. military since the earliest days of this republic.
For example, a private security firm, Pinkerton's, provided investigative expertise for the
U.S. government during the Civil War. Unfortunately, private security has been largely
ignored as a research topic by the criminal justice community. I suspect this is part of the
problem that has led to misperceptions related to the value of private security. The Rand
Corporation conducted a study of the domestic private security industry in the United
States that covered 1970-1972. The Private Security Advisory Council conducted
another study for 1972-1977, and the Task Force on Private Security conducted a study
covering 1975-1976. The best description of the private security industry is contained in
the reports made by the Rand Corporation for the National Institute of Law Enforcement
and Criminal Justice. The purpose of that study was to describe the nature and extent of
the private police industry in the United States, its problems under the regulations of the
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time, and how the U.S. law impinged on it. The reports also sought to evaluate the cost
and benefits to society represented by private security.51
Hallcrest Systems Inc. did a study covering 1980-1983, followed by a second part
that was completed in 1990. The Hallcrest report contains a review of the previous
security industry studies. The report provides evidence of a strong and steady growth of
the private security industry. The report indicates that private security is pervasive in
almost all areas of U.S. society.52
James Kakalik and Sorrel Wildhorn, in one of the few scholarly assessments of
the domestic private security industry, observed that the descriptions of the nature and
extent of the private security industry are incomplete and fragmented. Kakalik and
Wildhorn found that there had been only a few studies such as theirs.53 Therefore it is not
surprising that there has been little conceptualization or theory building for the domestic
private security industry in the United States. According to the findings of the Task Force
on Private Security in 1977, there are several possible approaches that are useful for
studying the role of private security. One is to study it from the organizational
perspective. Another is to analyze the industry's technology. Yet another is to study the
role and functions of private security in contemporary society and how it relates to public
security provided by government agencies.54
The private security sector differs from the public sector in that private firms are
influenced by the market, whereas the government or public sector is driven by public
service or the collective good. It is important to keep in mind the input Deborah D. Avant
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gave regarding the differences in public and private, as cited earlier in this chapter. A
further difference that distinguishes government and private is that government pertains
to the collective good while the private is dedicated to individual matters or personal
gain. Government is open or more accountable, while private is closed, hidden, or
secretive.55 Private is less accountable than government. When states rely on private
actors instead of public actors, the consequence is a reduction of society's ability to
collectively deal with problems.56
William C. Cunningham, John Strauchs, and Clifford Van Meter have asserted in
their excellent study of the private security industry that a useful way of describing
private security is to identity the source of the private firm's income. In other words,
identify the private firm's sponsor or client. They explain it is important to determine
whether the private security firm is under contract to contribute protection for another
private firm or the public government. The term used for security or protection that a firm
provides for protection of its own employees, property, and information is
"proprietary."57
Another useful descriptive characteristic, according to Cunningham, Strauchs, and
Van Meter, is the identity of the source of the private firm's authority. The key
denominator that distinguishes public law enforcement from private security is that
private security performs protective functions. Police provide public services and enforce
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the public or civil law. In other words, private firms provide protection whereas public
police enforce the law and serve the public.58
Domestic private security in the U.S. is linked to the public or police security in
the community. Private security and public policing fundamentally trace the process of
providing protection and preventing people, property, and information coming to harm.
U.S. private security and public policing are based on a historical precedent for
individuals to protect their own property. In doing so the individual is to act so as to
prevent the loss of his or her property within the private sector. Private security balances
against five types of threat: crime, waste, accidents, errors, and unethical practices.
Private security functions are very similar to public police activities. The distinguishing
difference between private security and public policing is who provides the protection
and who benefits from the services provided, along with the identity of the authority used
to do so.59
The concept of protect and prevent is the key aspect in U.S. private security and
public policing. The concept is linked to democratic concepts of liberty, independence,
self-determination, and self-protection. It also speaks to the enduring questions of
democracy and the issues of public versus private protection. To protect and prevent is a
form of deterrence but it is not as aggressive as military defensive tactics. Private security
begins with citizens and property owners who use initiative for preventing crime. An
example of private security initiative is installing locks and alarms, or collective security
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measures including community-based crime prevention programs such as a neighborhood
watch. Protection and prevention begin with the individual.60
The private security industry includes private organizations and individuals that
provide numerous types of security related services, including private investigations,
guard and patrol, lie detection, locks and alarm services, armored money transport,
armored car and executive protection, consultants, and security equipment and
technology manufacturing.61

Legitimacy Issues
How do the contractors in Iraq receive their legitimacy to provide services that
include the use of deadly force? Their legitimacy, I argue, comes from being a part of the
U.S. government's mission. Their behavior must be in compliance with the contract and
with U.S. operational objectives. When they act otherwise they lose legitimacy. What is
the legal recourse when a contractor providing executive protection exceeds the rules for
engagement and fires on innocent civilians? For example, some contemporary evidence
indicates that private actors have participated in massacres, executions, looting, rapes, or
other human rights violations. Private security forces must adhere to the same standards
of international humanitarian law as do state military forces.
Sovereign states, according to the literature reviewed earlier, have a legitimate
monopoly on the use of violence when waging war. Sun Tzu, the timeless sage of war,
began his writings on war by recognizing that war is a vital state concern and, as such, it
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must be studied thoroughly. This challenge to investigate war is especially important for
understanding the legitimacy of contractors at war. Tzu's writings show that war is a
recurring and deliberate act that can be rationally analyzed.63 War, as it pertains to this
study, begins with its definition as laid out by Professor Hedley Bull. Legitimate war,
according to Bull, is waged on authority of a public body. War waged without such
authority is private war. War is organized violence waged by the political units against
each other. Bull has stipulated that the violence is not war unless it is done in the name of
a political unit. The use of deadly force in war is not murder because of its official
character. Deadly force is a responsibility of the political unit that the agent belongs to
that executes the force.65 In line with this logic the U.S. contractors get their legitimacy
from their clients, the various agencies of the U.S. government.
The contractors that provide private security and military services in Iraq are
privately owned and are operated for profit. They are capable of a large spectrum of
different military activities. They can provide combat or police training, supplying arms
and logistics as well as combat service support. They also are capable of using deadly
force. They are transnational and cover the full spectrum of violence from an individual
with a handgun to a small army with close air support.66

Military-Industrial Complex
The term "Iron Triangle" has a somewhat derogatory connotation as it links U.S.
politics, the Pentagon, and groups willing to pay for influence as lobbyists. The arms
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industry, or military-industrial complex, was first cited as a potential societal problem in
President Eisenhower's farewell speech. In a circumstance he termed as one of
"imperative need for a vast military and arms industry," Eisenhower warned of the grave
implications for not comprehending the unwarranted influence of the arms industry. In
light of President Eisenhower's warning I have analyzed evidence of ways in which
military-industrial contractors have influenced the nature of security and building
contractors' contributions in Iraq.
The functions, nature, and character of the military-industrial complex, or "Iron
Triangle," and the security contractors contributing to the Iraq War share commonalities
to the extent that it implies the two industries have morphed as a special-interest group.
The result is that as they share entrepreneurial opportunities they also share the potential
for contributing problems in accordance with Eisenhower's warning. This means that the
civilian weapons developers, information technology experts, logistics supporters, and
security providers that are contributing to the government market for goods, manpower,
and services are also a threat. To illustrate, a list of common contributions for both
industries includes weapons systems, training, logistics, military skills, and military
experience alongside or directly under contract to the U.S. military. Should the military
or government become dependent on contractor contributions, I argue they are vulnerable
to the influence of contractor's lobbyist.
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Regulation of Contractors
Private contractor services are less regulated and accountable under law than are
government services. In January 2006, a distinguished forum met at the Duke University
School of Law, Duke University, Durham, North Carolina, to tackle the subject of the
regulation and accountability of contractors on the battlefield. On one side of the debate
were those who argued that there is not enough regulation and oversight. They made the
point that regulations for the actions of contractors or private actors that support the U.S.
on the battlefield are less than clear, and legal accountability either does not exist or is
not sufficient. The critics of the first argument believe that, while the industry presently
has a low level of regulation, this trend can be improved. Scott Silliman, a Duke law
professor, spoke to the forum and explained that under federal law there are provisions,
largely untested in court, which can be used to bring contractors to justice. Silliman
observed that an important legal issue centers on whether the military controls the
/TO

contractors. The problem is that not all contractors fall under the supervision of the U.S.
military; some are supervised by nonmilitary/political organizations that are
administering the rebuilding of Iraq, such as the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA)
and United States Agency for International Development (USAID).
Private or contracted armed actors confront two faces of the law on the battlefield.
The first is military law and the Geneva Conventions, which have a long-established
history. The second is civil and contract law administered by the federal government. The
Uniform Code of Military Justice can be used to court-martial contractors only when war
has been declared. The War Crimes Act, Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of

Bonner, "Private Military Contractors."

61
2000, and Patriot Act extension give jurisdiction to the U.S. federal district courts. This
does not give the military commander in the field jurisdiction or quick response. Also,
U.S. contractors and third-world nationals working under contracts supporting clients
other than U.S. government agencies, such as the UN or a private enterprise, fall further
from the bounds of useful means of control.
Contract law is not adequate for daily use in the chaos of war. Poorly written
contracts do not specify requirements or assurances of a training standard for individual
contractors. Contractual remedies or fines are clumsy or unenforceable in combat
environments that require an immediate remedy for failure to perform. As an example of
how this affects military capability, consider soldiers in a desert environment forced to go
weeks without showers because the water delivery contractors balked at the danger
involved in the delivery. The military commander under existing rules cannot compel the
contractor to perform even with the health of the soldiers imperiled. ™
According to the law of war, civilians are not to participate in the hostilities.
However, contractors are civilians that work side by side with the military. The Third
Geneva Convention states that a "lawful combatant" must wear a uniform and answer to
military authority. The Fourth Geneva Convention indicates that armed contractors are
considered "lawful combatants." These issues are not clear, and as contractors' roles
come closer to actual combat, the fundamental question of their legitimacy and the
legitimacy of the contract and client become imperative.71
U.S. contractors are regulated by Congress to a certain extent. Contracts of
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$50 million or more for any U.S. government actor must be reported for congressional
oversight. The companies that fall under congressional oversight must also be in
compliance with the U.S. International Traffic in Arms (ITAR) when doing business
outside of the United States. The U.S. State Department is the overseer of ITAR, which
comprises the regulations that govern arms import and export.72
Military commanders augmented with contractor capabilities on the battlefield
must understand the legal relationship between their command and the contractors
providing the capabilities. The military commander must understand the legal bounds of
the contract inclusive of the contractor, its employees, and/or its subcontractors. The
military commander's authority is derived from the federal acquisition regulations under
•71

which the contract was acquired.
Army Regulation 715-9 "prescribes policies, procedures and responsibilities for a
disciplined approach to managing and using contracted U.S. citizens who are deployed to
support Army requirements.74 This regulation is the doctrine that gives the military
commander the requirements for managing contractors. The military commander must
first establish that the level at which contractors serve is needed, based on mission
requirements. The military commander determines how far forward to deploy contractor
support according to tactical need, the enemy situation, and the specifications of the
contract. Army regulation 715-9 makes it clear that, in the case of military contractors,
the military commander is responsible for their deployment and supervision.
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In an area of operations where U.S. military presence is under a jurisdiction
covered by a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA), the legal status of U.S. contractors and
their employees must, according to Army Regulation 715-9, be established by
international agreement. Failure of SOFA agreements to address the status of contractors
and their employees may render them "unable to perform" under several scenarios:
1.

The contractor and employees could be prevented from entering the
country.

2.

If they did enter, the contractor could be subject to local law as a foreign
corporation.

3.

As a foreign corporation, the contractor could be subject to local taxation
and customs regulations.

4.

Employees under these conditions would be subject to local labor
restrictions.

5.

The contractor and its employees would be subject to local criminal law.

Private Security Professional Association
Situations like the Abu Ghraib prison scandal, which will be analyzed in Chapter
VI, and allegations about contractor fraud, which also will be analyzed in the appropriate
cases, have caused unfavorable public attention. Contractors, as a result, have looked for
ways to control the industry and enhance their image. One way to enhance the image of
professionalism is to create a professional association and establish professional
standards of conduct. The International Peace Operations Association (IPOA), in
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Rosslyn, Virginia, was created to fill that role. The IPOA requires its associates to
comply with a professional code of conduct. The code of conduct requires contractor
firms to obey the international laws and protocols on human rights. The president of
IPOA is Doug Brooks, and the organization now has nine firms working in Iraq as
members.77
Licensing or laws that might interfere with industry profits are shunned. Selfgoverning associations such as IPOA therefore provide one means of controlling
contractors without licensing. The U.S. private security firms today share the same spirit
of patriotism and willingness to take risk for profit as did the licensed privateers in the
early 1800s. An example of the latter is the ship General Armstrong, which as a U.S.
privateer in the War of 1812 had a license when it fought overwhelming British odds to
save Louisiana from invasion. However, current U.S. security firms, which in one sense
are fundamentally the same as the privateers, also are different from them because the
security firms are not licensed, as were the privateers. The U.S. government regulated
privateers by having them post bond to ensure compliance with the international law of
the sea, thus preventing piracy. The license known as Letters-of-Marque did set a
standard of professionalization and provided a basis for regulating a form of private
military capability.78
Contractor professionalism lowers the comparative risk between the military and
contractors. The military understands, respects, and practices professionalism.
Contractors are profit-oriented, and they know that repeat business will not materialize if
they do not produce to the standard expected and as set out in their contracts. The firms in
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the system are regulated by their reputations to maintain high standards and legitimacy.
The IPOA was created by Doug Brooks to link security firms within the industry to a
body with standards and a code of conduct that will guide best practices.79

Contractors and Classified Information
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has investigated the adequacy of
the Defense Security Service's (DSS) ability to monitor and protect classified
information required by contractors in order to perform their services. The report of the
investigation shows the enormity of the program required to protect classified
information. The report is important to this study because it reveals the nature of
additional resources or opportunity costs that are required to support the work performed
by contractors. Contractors provide services that entail classified access. Some examples
of contractor roles that require a security clearance range from working on the design of
advanced weapons to providing translations for prisoner interrogations in Abu Ghraib.
The contractors' access to and production of classified information makes them a
potential security risk. The contractors can compromise the classified information by
deliberate or unwitting divulgence to unauthorized persons. That means that the
contractors with classified access must be granted a security clearance, and facilities
where classified material or information is stored must be cleared and operated according
to classified security programs. The DSS monitors the clearance for access on behalf of
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Department of Defense (DOD) and twenty-four additional federal agencies for the
SO

security programs of more than 11,000 facilities.

PART II: TRANSFORMATION AND CONTRACTOR SERVICES
The U.S. contractors in Iraq and the private security industry have been working
to establish a working relationship with the U.S. military for over a decade. The history
that traces the process of that emerging relationship is important background for
understanding the current contributions that contractors are making in Iraq. The
complications of the military changes after the Cold War are relatively well known.
However, the military changes as they are related to contractor issues have not been a
subject of any substantive interest and are not well known or understood. The evolving
relationship has generated precedents and regulations that are foundational for governing
how the contractors and clients interact on the Iraqi battlefield. An understanding of the
process of the private security industry becoming a part of the military force is essential
background for the research design and case study method outlined in Chapter III.
This section reviews the literature that traces the evolution of the U.S. contractorgovernment client relationship as U.S. warfare capability was changing after the Cold
War. I use the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) review process as a road map to
follow the changes in U.S. warfare capability and the emerging use of contractors.
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George H. W. Bush's National Security Policy
President George H. W. Bush and his secretary of defense, Dick Cheney, based
the national security strategy on a force capable of fighting two regional conflicts at the
same time.81 George H. W. Bush was slow to make changes to U.S. warfare capabilities
even though the USSR no longer existed to be contained. Eventually the total force
including both DOD civilians and military members was reduced by 30 percent from
what it was at the end of the Cold War. These force reductions and structural changes
began the process that eventually led to DOD policy during the administration of George
W. Bush, which includes contractors as a part of the total force.
The first defense review was known as the Base Force Plan of 1989. The review
was conducted during the administration of George H. W. Bush by General Colin Powell
under the provisions of the authority granted to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Base Force Plan contained provisions for small
incremental changes. It did not include policies directly related to the role of contractors.
By 1991, at the time of the Gulf War, the U.S. Army had about 700,000 soldiers on active
duty. The army active duty structural level was down from what it was at the end of the
Cold War by a little over 230,000 and stood at approximately 470,000 at the start of the
current Iraq War. There have been five military reviews of warfare capability since the
Base Force Plan of 1989. The reviews are now known as Quadrennial Defense Reviews
(QDR).
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The Gulf War, Contractors, and LOGCAP
In the Gulf War, President George H. W. Bush organized a coalition of more than
twenty partners to raise a combined force of 660,000 troops to expel the Iraqi force from
Kuwait. I argue that even with that many troops, the Gulf War is the essential current
event that accelerated the U.S. military's use of contractors and put them on a steady
track for a robust role in the current Iraq War. Among the collection of historical
milestones that mark the U.S. government's use of contractors are the lessons learned by
the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) planners that supported the multinational forces in the Gulf War of 1990-1991.
During the Gulf War the U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) learned that the
Navy Military Sealift Command's contracts had been too inflexible and had only focused
on functional support such as providing meals and administrative vehicles. Also at that
time, the U.S. Army, as the designated executive agency for LOGCAP, learned that one
umbrella contract carried out by one prime contractor enabled a flexible response for a
wide spectrum of functional areas. In Operation Desert Shield/Storm the USCENTCOM
learned that access to private enterprise's global resources increased the level of logistics
capability at their disposal. The LOGCAP literature is linked with the contractor Kellogg,
Brown, and Root and can be found with the case study for that firm in Chapter IV.

Downsizing, Outsourcing, and Privatization
Those who are in favor of small government assert that downsizing government
by cutting civilian and military members is an efficient way to save public money. They
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argue that downsizing saves the cost of government salaries, retirement benefits, and
health care. An extension of the argument is that the use of contractors or private
enterprise increases the level of military efficiency when they are used for short-term or
crisis situations. In the long term, however, the use of contractors sacrifices military
professionalism and detracts from military capability.86 Private enterprise may decrease
some political cost and has some economic advantage, but that is eventually offset by
fraud and corruption. The United States and United Kingdom are contracting with private
enterprise to serve in some traditional military roles and provide civil affairs functions to
stabilize and rebuild Iraq. Interestingly, it was President Ronald Reagan and Prime
Minister Margaret Thatcher who led the way for their governments' use of contractor
services. The privatization approaches that both took altered expectations about
government, private enterprise, and free markets.87
Privatization goes hand in hand with outsourcing, another business management
tool that has been used to help modernize the U.S. military. For example, Michael F.
Corbett ascertained in his study of outsourcing that half of the big businesses he
interviewed had used outsourcing because of cost savings. Primarily the goal is for firms
to gain access to better skills and to improve the quality of output. Conserving capital and
gaining the expertise of others for new innovations is a secondary business organizational
goal. Private enterprise has organized former military personnel into firms that contract
their services to the U.S. government. The contractors received their military training
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while in service, and the private firms efficiently provide their military services based on
that expertise for the financial profit of their stockholders.89
Outsourcing moves functions in whole or in part from the public sector (from the
military force) into the private sector. In so doing, the private actors are contracted to take
over the functions that were once regarded as duties for government or military
personnel. Contractor services are analyzed as political90 and military developments. The
rapid expansion of the U.S. military-security industry and its global counterparts makes it
difficult to know precisely how many private firms there are. One international study
documents that the global private security industry has nearly 100 companies operating in
at least that many countries around the globe. 91
According to one explanation, privatization is proliferating because there are huge
profits to be made by private actors with military potential. There is a market need for
such a service; even some states see that privatization is less expensive than deploying
their own state army. Yet another explanation for the proliferation of private security
companies is that they are filling the security vacuum that results when weak states need
additional help to protect political elites from civil violence. Some maintain that
privatization's emergence since the end of the Cold War is a result of social, political,
and economic-influenced issues and trends.92 Local and state governments are also
transforming themselves through privatization. For example, South Carolina's Charleston
County School District has recently negotiated to turn over operation of the district's
Discipline School to a private company. The company, Community Education Partners,
89
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is based in Nashville, Tennessee, and already operates alternative programs for disruptive
students in Orlando, Florida, and Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
In the era of privatization, downsizing, and a free-market philosophy,
governments are turning to the private sector for security assistance. In the private sector
there has been a reemergence of organizations willing to provide military potential for
profit. These firms are organized and efficient and characteristically operate out of office
suites. However, the services they provide exceed those of traditional security firms and
night watchmen.94

Clinton's Military Reviews and Contractors
The Bottom up Review (BUR) of 1990 was conducted during President Bill
Clinton's first administration. The BUR recommended incremental adjustments and a
balanced reduction of force. The BUR, like the Base Force Plan, was also administered
by General Powell, who remained as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. At the same
time, the U.S Army administered the LOGCAP contract in Somalia with contractors that
originated from countries in the immediate region. These contractors were used for the
operation of the Mogadishu Seaport and two airports. As a result, military logistics
planners developed confidence and a sense of appreciation for the contractors' ability to
respond quickly to provide effective contributions that augmented military capability.95
In February 1995, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers awarded a $24 million
contract to American International Contractors, Inc., of Dallas, Texas, to renovate Camp
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Doha, twenty miles north of Kuwait City. The contractors that worked to prepare the
warehouses, maintenance, storage, and quality-of-life facilities for that contract were not
noticed by the general public at that time. However, the military appreciated the
contractors' accomplishment and gained confidence that private enterprise could augment
military capability. Thus the facilities were available and used for U.S. forces preparing
for the invasion of Iraq in 2001.96
Another milestone for the evolution of contractor support occurred in 1996. That
year, Congress, in reaction to European complaints that the United States provided
weapons and intelligence to Bosnia, investigated and found that the Clinton
administration, in disregard of an arms embargo, had encouraged Croatia to allow
weapons to pass through its territory into Bosnian hands. As a part of its inquiry, the
congressional subcommittee included the investigation of the role of a U.S. firm, MPRI,
in the region. However, the portion of the congressional report that is open to the public
at this time does not shed further light on the matter. This lack of transparency fogs the
issues and is fertile ground for the dangerous half-truths of counter-factual analysis. With
those flaws recognized, here is what is known. The U.S. policy for the region was to
avoid U.S. military commitment to the region. Keeping ground troops out allowed
President Clinton to avoid stirring up public opinion over the volatile and politicized
issue of "quagmire."97 MPRI has denied that its support for the Croatians was under the
tacit direction of the U.S. government.98
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The MPRI99 scenario is evidence of how President Clinton increased his political
currency using.contractors instead of active duty military forces to accomplish foreignpolicy goals. Political leaders can keep out of the public eye by using contractors and
thereby limiting the flow of information that can reach the public—a public that may
disagree with the goals the political leaders have set. The other side of the coin is that the
public loses currency in the political dimension when their view of government decisions
is impeded due to the government's use of contractors.
This raises the question, When is the magnitude of consequences so great that the
means of accomplishing them must be kept out of public scrutiny? Private actors can
limit transparency. In this scenario, public knowledge of the government relationship
with MPRI at the time was fragmented or did not exist. The contract was negotiated out
of view of the American people, who had no say in this international political issue.
President Clinton's foreign policy gained in the short term because the level of Croatian
military capability increased. The political decision makers gained by not having to face a
political debate over sending ground troops into a "quagmire." In this case, I argue, the
magnitude of the decision was due to both the operational and the political dimension.

QDR of 1997
According to Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., who is an expert on the QDR process
and U.S. force capability and has studied the defense review processes, U.S. government
officials were increasingly displeased over the slow progress defense reform was making
through 1995-1997. The U.S. military is tradition-bound and does not accept change
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readily.100 The QDR of 1997 called for an incremental downsizing of the force strength
by 5 percent and for economizing by closing bases. Of immediate significance is the fact
that the QDR of 1997 proposed reforms such as outsourcing and privatization of military
base work. These measures were intended to relieve budget pressure because the
marginally downsized total force structure would result in only marginal cost
dividends.101

Reinventing Government and Contractors
Vice President Al Gore downsized the federal work force as a part of his program
for "Reinventing Government." In 1994 Congress passed the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act, which made federal acquisitions from the private sector a simple
matter. When the level of the federal workforce decreased, the contractor workforce
increased. The issues and results of reinventing government overlap my argument. What
happens when the military force is decreased and the number of contractors increases?102
The answer to this question can partly be found in the consequence of the
government's cutback of 50 percent of federal workers between 1990 and 2001. Among
those cut were government civilian experts who wrote and supervised DOD contracts.
The expertise they could have offered was therefore not available when it was needed
during the Iraq War. The workload for those who were not cut increased by 12 percent
after their experienced coworkers left. Later, when Operation Iraqi Freedom required a
large number of contracts for interrogators and security providers, the contracts were not
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well written.103 This is evidence that the short-term decision to downsize the government
civilian workforces to save money came at a cost to military capability.
Apparently some of Vice President Gore's inspiration to change government and
to use contractors came from President Reagan's efforts to make government more
efficient through outsourcing. Both President Reagan's and Vice President Gore's
decisions to competitively outsource government functions are similar to the private
business management trend to downsize and outsource non-core functions.104
Some of the first policy guidance for contractors that was published during the
Reagan administration was used by Vice President Gore in his attempts to change
government. In 1983 the President's Office of Management and Budget published
Circular No. A-76, which provided guidelines that were to be followed by the executive
departments for the performance of commercial activities. The circular supplement
provides procedures for determining whether or not activities should be performed by
contractor sources or by government sources. The background paragraph of the circular
states:
"In the process of governing, the Government should not compete with its
citizens. The competitive enterprise system, characterized by individual
freedom and initiative, is the primary source of national and economic strength. In
recognition of this principle, it has been and continues to be the general policy of
the Government to rely on commercial sources to supply the products and
services the Government needs."105
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George W. Bush
While still campaigning for office, before 2001 and well before September 11 of
that year, presidential candidate George W. Bush provided his map for what was to
become Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld's mission orders for "creating the
military of the next century." In a speech at The Citadel, The Military College of South
Carolina, Bush pointed out that, since the end of the Cold War, U.S. military forces had
deployed at an increased tempo while the defense budget had decreased by almost 40
percent. He said that resources were overstretched and he pledged to increase the defense
budget.106
In the same speech, Bush made several points that conform to those called for in
the QDR of 1997. Bush pointed out that the military was still organized as it had been for
the Cold War. He observed that there was little relationship between strategic vision and
budget priorities. He pointed out that the technology revolution afforded an opportunity
that matched the strengths and skills of the people of this nation. He went on to say that
power could be defined by mobility and swiftness and not by mass or size. He pledged
that, if elected, he would have the secretary of defense challenge the status quo and
conduct a comprehensive review of the military. His stated goal was more than marginal
1 07

change; it was to "replace existing programs with new technologies and strategies."
Candidate Bush further revealed that it was his opinion that the U.S. military
forces must be changed to make them agile, lethal, and readily deployable while needing
minimal logistical support. Significantly, he stated that these changes "will require a new
spirit of innovation. Many officers have expressed their impatience with a widespread,
Bush, "A Period of Consequences."

77
bureaucratic mindset that frustrates creativity." He pledged to encourage a culture in
which change is welcome. He promised he would recognize and promote visionary
leaders. He stated an intention to match military budgets with strategic vision and, in a
veiled threat, said he would direct the secretary of defense to "allocate these funds to the
services that prove most effective in developing new programs." Bush said, "I intend to
force new thinking and hard choices."108
U.S. military capability and contractor support did begin to change broadly during
George W. Bush's first term as president as a consequence of his administration's
policies to reshape the U.S. military. Once Secretary Rumsfeld assumed his Pentagon
duties, he used "transformation" as his term of choice for shaping U.S. military capability
change. The modernization of U.S. military capability is at times discussed as a matter of
revolution in military affairs (RMA), change, and now transformation. The terms for
change may be subtle, but in the military and national security, the manner of change
they imply is a hot-button issue. Indeed, one of Mr. Rumsfeld's critics, Lt. Gen. Paul Van
Riper, United States Marine Corps (Ret.), has said that "transformation" is a slogan that
indicates that those who use it do not know what they are doing. To this end Van Riper
insists that the ideas upon which transformation are based have not been vetted.
Furthermore, he believes that they have no valid intellectual foundation.109 In this section
I look at the sequence of events and empirical evidence of the decision to change military
capability and the use of contractors.
Historically, change in U.S. warfare or military capability has been driven by
modernization supported by technological advances in weapons development and

Public Broadcasting Service, Front Line: Rumsfeld's War.

78
communications; for example, nuclear-powered submarines, and the cell phone.
Accordingly, I will begin the review of military capability changes for the current Bush
administration by defining and tracing the recent RMA and military capability change.
After that I will return to Rumsfeld's transformation policies as reflected in the
Quadrennial Defense Review of 2001.

Tracing the RMA to the QDR
In the 1990s, the revolution in military affairs was an issue of paramount interest
for Pentagon strategic thinkers. The RMA was focused on how to best modernize military
capability by taking advantage of rapidly advancing technology such as digital
information technology. The RMA ultimately led to a downsizing of the force structure,
which I suggest is a starting point for the eventual need for contractor capability to
augment the force mass in the Iraq War. The RMA debate also included studies of how
changes to military capability can best be achieved.110 Subsequently, as can be seen in the
review of the Quality Defense Review of 2001 (QDR), a result of the RMA was that
modernization and technology became focal points for military capability change.
Transformation was the spirit for how military capability change was to be achieved.
The RMA debate was divided by those who wished to modernize the force and
the traditionalists who did not. Those who favored modernization argued primarily that
technology could replace many soldiers and protect them from the danger of combat. In
contrast, traditionalists reasoned that weapons may change, but in the end changing the
will of the enemy requires "boots" on the ground. For this reason they argued that
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technology alone cannot be depended on to win wars. With these reasons in mind the
traditionalists argued for an incremental and balanced reduction in force capability.
Therefore, the evolutions of issues regarding military capability change identified in the
RMA debates of the 1990s are important to know as background for explaining Secretary
Rumsfeld's force transformation. The transformation decisions to modernize the force
structure to rely on technology in a short time resulted in a limited ground force
capability. In the review of the QDR of 20011 will show that the use of contractors for
warfare was planned before the intervention in Iraq was considered.
Ryan Henry, a principal deputy undersecretary of defense for policy, has
provided some historical examples of how the U.S. military has changed. His examples
provide useful insight for understanding the RMA, military transformation, and how and
why military capability changes. Henry has identified three cases that show how the U.S.
military has developed new strategies and made investments in capabilities appropriate to
modernize the military for anticipated conflicts. First, in the 1930s, the strategy the
United States devised in the face of Asian and European expansionism was amphibious
warfare, aircraft carriers, a strategic bombing force, and a strong industrial base. Second,
in containing the Soviet Union during the Cold War, the United States changed its
strategy to integrate nuclear and conventional forces. And the third case, according to
Henry, is the series of competitive strategies of the 1980s that were intended to identify
vulnerabilities in the Soviet military establishment and strategic posture so as to
checkmate their competition with advanced U.S. military capability. Henry's assertion is
that the logic of change in these examples started with a new set of strategic problems.
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The new strategic problems were followed by new strategic thinking that shaped the
"sweeping transformation in the structure, posture, weapon systems, and tactical
119

doctrines of our military."
Accordingly, transformation is a concept of sweeping change for the U.S. Armed
Forces for the strategic situation that existed when President Bush took office. Rumsfeld
even created an Office of Force Transformation—reporting directly to the secretary of
defense—to integrate transformation activities. According to Douglas Macgregor, an
expert on military reform and opponent of the Rumsfeld transformation policy,
transformation can be defined as changing the armed forces structure and composition to
become something new and presumably more effective. Transformation of U.S. warfare
capability today requires an effective way of combining and integrating the various
military service and government agencies such as the Department of State. It also
requires a new joint operational structure.113 One of the transformation concepts pushed
by Secretary Rumsfeld is to change the service culture and to rely on "jointness."114
According to Richard A. Lacquement, Jr., six operational goals were put forth to
guide transformation efforts: (1) protect critical operational bases; (2) provide
information systems security; (3) the ability to conduct anti-access and area-denial
threats; (4) deny enemy sanctuary by surveillance and engagement with precision airground-all-weather/terrain strike capabilities; (5) enhance space systems and
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infrastructure; and (6) use information technology to develop a joint operational
structure.115
Secretary Rumsfeld has linked his transformation goals for restructuring the force
to the U.S. tradition for downsizing the military force after a major conflict. One of the
best examples of the downsizing of U.S. forces and the security problems that can result
from a rush to change force structure is the demobilization after WWII. Traditionally,
when the fighting is done, the U.S. taxpayers are more than ready to bring the nation's
forces home and to reduce military expenditures. Even with a requirement to occupy
Western Europe and Japan after World War II, President Truman sought to reduce the
U.S. Army from 8,000,000 to 1,950,000. The U.S. Navy and Marine Corps were drawn
down from 3,400,000 to 1,139,077. By March 1946, proposals were on the table for the
army to downsize to a force of 1,070,000, and that included 400,000 earmarked for the
new U.S. Air Force.116
Transformation takes a business approach to war by adjusting military capability
through proven and tested business management practices. The business approach to war
includes adopting ways to manage military organizations so as to economize the use of
resources. The business approach includes adopting ways to modernize government or
the military force by copying methods that have proven to effectively economize the use
of business resources. An example of the management approach is outsourcing, which is
currently a hot trend within private management circles and is now transformation
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policy.117 Private business has found that technology enhances vision and modernizes
capability. Organizations that ignore the success of commercial systems cannot be
confident of future success. Embracing the technology revolution is the path to
confidence and success, especially when the possibility or potential for misconceptions is
anticipated.118
Commercial experiences with technology can identify useful ways for
transforming the structure and composition of military forces and can provide examples,
principles, and measures that may have a useful application for modernizing U.S. military
means and capabilities. Modernization includes reengineering plans, "revolutions in
business affairs," procurement reforms, and information systems. Technology enables
vision and response to the external environment. Modernization that embraces the
information revolution is the path to success.119
The QDR of 2001 documents the Pentagon policies for transformation,
modernization, and the use of contractors. The first QDR for the administration of
George W. Bush was conducted in 2001 by the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Secretary Rumsfeld began his defense review knowing that Congress was not pleased
with the slow progress for military reductions that his predecessors at the Pentagon had
made. Also, the LOGCAP revisions120 were published in December 2000, just a matter of
weeks before Rumsfeld would start his new job. As a result, Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld was able to use his office's mandate to conduct the QDR in a way that could
reinforce his policies to transform the U.S. military into a smaller, more technology-
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centered force.121 The QDR indicates that Rumsfeld planned on using contractors to
augment the downsized force, and the revised LOGCAP provided a contingency plan for
doing so.
The QDR of 2001 directly addresses the downsizing of force structure and the
outsourcing of core government functions that are of paramount interest in this study. The
QDR is important because it designates the criteria for the functions that DOD must
perform and states what a "core government function" is:
Only those functions that must be performed by DOD should be kept by DOD.
Any function that can be provided by the private sector is not a core government
function. Traditionally, "core" has been very loosely and imprecisely defined and
too often used as a way of protecting existing arrangements.1 2
The test for determining a core military function is whether it is directly necessary for
warfighting.
Secretary Rumsfeld pointedly avoided consultation with the chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff as the QDR was written. He and the Pentagon military leadership did not
agree with each other about his proposed changes to the defense posture and policy as
eventually published in the QDR of 2001. Rumsfeld made it clear to the Pentagon
military leadership that he was going to transform the U.S. military whether they agreed
with him or not.124
The QDR of 2001, which has been posted on the Internet by the DOD, gives clear
notice to the public and to the military services that private enterprise is to be used on the
battlefield whenever possible. It indicates that contractors will be called on for battlefield
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services as frequently as private industry is called on to build tactical aircraft and naval
ships.125
The QDR also states that the DOD will improve performance and define new
models for the public-private partnerships that will function together in activities linked
to warfare. Those functions not linked to combat, and that are best performed by the
private sector, will be outsourced with private firms or public actors.
By the spring of 2002, the resources of the active duty force were down from the
1980s level of 2.1 million to 1.36 million. Of the reduced force level, 15 percent, or
235,000 military personnel, were deployed out of the United States. In a critical article on
U.S. force preparedness, Lawrence J. Korb argued that under the conditions of the day,
the military was not overworked. Korb argued that even at downsized strength, sailors
were spending about the same time at sea as a decade before, and that "the net effect of
long or hostile-area duty on retention is actually positive for Army and Marines."
Korb's argument is something that Rep. John Murtha from Pennsylvania would dispute
in light of overextension of troop deployment in the Iraq War in 2006.
Significantly, the due date for Secretary Rumsfeld to submit his first QDR to
Congress was September 30, 2001. As a consequence of the terrorist attacks, one of
which struck the Pentagon on September 11, there were purposeful revisions to the QDR
at the time and to the U.S. view of security interest forever. The review retained
Rumsfeld's agenda for transformation, but as a result of the terrorist attack the reductions
and reshaping of the military were put on the back burner.127 Rumsfeld's strategic
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guidance for the review before September 11 called for U.S. forces to be sized for
deterrence as well as missile and nuclear, biological, and chemical defense.

The

guidance called for forward-deployed security operations. These operations were to be
performed with regionally tailored forces capable of rapidly defeating enemy forces with
a minimum of reinforcements. When the report was finally published, it did not call for
any reductions of the armed forces.129
The QDR of 2001, which gave priority to improving homeland defense and
established guidelines for military transformation, took a capability-based approach. On
the whole, the capabilities approach gives the advantage of widening the strategic
perspective. It is based on how an adversary might fight in contrast to who they are. The
latter characterized previous defense reviews, which took a threat-based approach. In
fact, this QDR backed off the threat-based strategy that required the capability to
simultaneously fight two major wars. The QDR changed military capability to support a
strategy to defeat one major adversary and to simultaneously "hold" a second with the
use of air power. The scheme was that, when the former was defeated, the U.S. ground
forces could move on to defeat the latter. A final point made in the QDR is related to
requirements and suggestions for joint force operations.130

SUMMARY
In this literature review I examined the primary and secondary sources for private
military actors in history and the contemporary studies of the trends related to their
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reemergence in the early 1990s. The literature review included a multidisciplinary view
of the changing nature of U.S. warfare. Also, the review provided a comprehensive
update of the literature pertaining to how U.S. civil-military decisions have changed
military capability over the course of recent history, including the downsizing of force
structure after World War II.
The history of contractor support actually started before World War II, when it
was common for civilians to provide the U.S. military with logistic support such as
transportation, medical, and provisional services. Since the end of the Cold War,
contractors have been counted on for routine matters such as military facility
maintenance and logistics support. The literature review further indicated that the
technological complexity of weapons systems, which started to evolve as early as the war
in Vietnam, led to the services teaming up the contractor technical specialists with the
military specialists. Thus, it has now become routine to depend on contractors for the
lifetime support of advanced weapons systems. B 1 As a result of changes made after the
Cold War, contractors became a part of the total U.S. warfare capability. The changes
included downsizing the military force and outsourcing traditional government roles.
These options were based on a business management model for economizing resources.
The decisions to change also were based on the RMA and the argument that one way of
retaining a substantial level of military capability was to modernize with technology and
advanced weaponry. Another result of these decisions was the need for contractors to
contribute to the total force.132
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The richest part of the literature on private security-military actors and
transformation was written during the past decade. While scholars have given the related
issues some attention, there is an apparent gap in studies focused on how private actors
have transformed client governments. This study is not that broad; on the contrary, it
focuses on identifying the contractors and the analysis of how they have contributed to
U.S. warfare capability. As a result, this study contributes to the knowledge of ways in
which contractors may be changing client governments. The following chapter reveals
the methods I used to analyze this problem.
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CHAPTER m
RESEARCH DESIGN

CHAPTER GOAL
The goal for this chapter is to explain the research design and the case study
method and why the cases selected are important for finding the expected answers to the
research problem. The research design structure and method in this chapter include the
following aspects: The research problem is stated and defined, and the independent and
dependent variables are specified along with the operational definitions of key terms used
in this study. The individual case study method is developed and the structure for
organizing the collection of data for the contractor cases is clearly defined as the function
of the research question subset. The research questions trace the process required for
analysis of the cases by linking the cause and outcome of the events described. This
chapter also discusses the selection of the cases analyzed. Finally, the chapter goal is to
present my argument in terms of why the cases selected are important and what I expect
to find by analyzing them.2
The research problem is focused on who the contractor firms are and how the
nature of government oversight and control over those firms have determined whether the
contractors' contributions augment or diminish U.S. warfare capability in the Iraq War.
I argue that the nature of governmental oversight and control are essential factors
in the contractors' impact on warfare capability. In the final analysis of the problem, I
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will show how it is the degree of government control over contractors (my independent
variable) that determines whether warfare capability (my performance or dependent
variable) is augmented or diminished. The research systematically identifies and explains
who the contractor companies are as well as how they are controlled by military and
nonmilitary/political administrators, and how contractor services specifically contribute
to U.S. warfare capability. The research design establishes a structure that selectively
focuses the collection and organization of the empirical evidence found, which can be
defined as benefits (augmentation) or threats to diminish capability. The design method
shapes how that evidence is analyzed to determine how contractors have contributed to
U.S. warfare capability in Iraq.
The review of literature indicates that previous studies that have analyzed private
military or security actors as threats to state sovereignty have missed the mark in failing
to theorize or consider the plausible benefits of private transnational security firms.3 This
study is a heuristic investigation that rationally traces and records the events and actions
for analysis and is intended to answer whether and how contractors contribute benefits or
threats to the U.S. capability within Iraq.4
The method uses a single case study, the contractors in Iraq, as the qualitative
technique for analyzing their contributions to U.S. warfare capability. As explained later
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in this chapter, the case study is structured to organize individual cases for each firm into
two groups. The first group consists of contracts administered by the U.S. military. The
second group includes contractors whose administrators are agencies or actors that are
nonmilitary. The collective findings or generalizations for the two groups are analytically
compared and distilled for the study's final conclusions. Contributions are broadly
defined as the functions, actions, and events performed by contractors. Capabilities are
defined later in the chapter. The collection of evidence for the cases is based on the main
research question: Who are the contractors, and how has the nature of government
oversight and control over contractors determined whether contractor contributions
augment or diminish U.S. warfare capability in the Iraq War? The collection of the
empirical evidence for the contractor cases is structured by tracing the observed events
and actions that are contingent upon data found in answering the research question
subset. The following questions make up the research question subset:5
1. Who are the contractors and how do the nature, size, characteristics, and
function of the contractor firms and their personnel impact on their support
in Iraq? This includes the corporate culture and how interdependent the firm
is with the traditional military-industrial complex. Also, the identity of the
firm's leadership and training of individual personnel and distinct
capabilities they provide is used to analyze who the contractors are.
2. Who is/are the contractors' client(s)? Clients pay for and administer the
contract. How are the contractors controlled, and what legal restrictions or
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jurisdiction do the contractors operate under? How are their contractual
relationships managed?
3. How do contractors interact with contract administrators or authorities: U.S.
government agencies, military, coalition partners, and Iraqi authorities?
4. How do contractor contributions augment or diminish U.S. military and/or
warfare capability needs?
5. How do contractor contributions enhance or threaten the U.S. political or
civil affairs assistance goals in Iraq?
6. How do contractor services add to or diminish U.S. public support for the
Iraq War?
The question set is a heuristic tool for tracing how the government controls over
contractors affected the work they were hired to do. In other words, the question set is
part of the fact finding or research process. The question set structures the discovery
process and focuses the collection of evidence of contractor functions and events that will
eventually complement analysis of contractor capability. The question set seeks to find
evidence of the degree and nature of control and oversight that military and
nonmilitary/political administrators exercise over the contractors, which can be traced to
whether the contractors' contributions have a positive impact on (augment) or negative
impact on (erode or diminish) warfare capability.
This is a qualitative evaluation of comparative risk that contractors' behavior
poses as a function of fulfilling their contract, which either augments the client's warfare
(military and/or political) capability or diminishes it. The goal is to collect the evidence
or data for the government's oversight and control of contractors that can plausibly be
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used in the final analysis as an explanation of how contractors' contributions change
warfare capability.6

OPERATIONAL DEFINITIONS
I have used the following operational definitions for the foundational explanatory
terms for analysis of my argument that contractors either augment or diminish U.S.
warfare capability due to the degree of governmental oversight and control exercised over
them. Specifically, these definitions are necessary for explaining the assessment of the
findings and conclusions regarding how the dependent variable, U.S. warfare capability,
is augmented or diminished.
U.S. warfare capability for the total force is operationally defined as including
both political and military dimensions and characteristics. Military capability is a
fundamental military term that I have operationally defined as being equivalent to
organizational output or contribution.7 Warfare capability is augmented or threatened
when either the political and/or military capability of the force is augmented or
threatened. The measure for change in warfare capability is the exhaustive explanation of
each contractor case based on the logic of the observations found in the case study for
how the force ability to increase or decrease its output or contribution is changed. The
question set focuses the approach for tracing the findings of how warfare capability is
augmented or diminished.
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The operational definitions for the four parts of warfare, military, and/or political
capability follow: Force structure is defined as a matter of the organization's size and
composition. Modernization is defined as the technical sophistication of the force,
weapons systems, and equipment. The force, unit, or organization's readiness is its
ability to deliver outputs for which the force, unit, or organization was designed. The
final definitional part of capability is sustainability, which is how a force, unit, or
organization can maintain the necessary level and duration of operational activity to
achieve its stated objective. As a function, sustainability is how well a unit can provide
for and maintain the levels of ready forces, materiel, and consumables necessary to
support a military effort.
Effectiveness is not considered a part of the definition of capability at any time in
this study. Barry Posen, who has studied the sources of military doctrine, asserts that
military capability must be analyzed both qualitatively and quantitatively.8 Accordingly,
my operational definition of capability and its parts can be used to explain how a
contractor contribution to the size and composition of the force structure is a change in
military capability. For example, when ten contractors provide translation capability to
augment a military intelligence unit, the capability of the military unit to collect
battlefield intelligence is changed. Specifically, the contractors in the example increase
the size, force structure, and readiness of the unit to perform its mission.
Here is an additional example: military structure includes the quantity and type of
force. For instance, the structure of a Navy SEAL team is eight. That is eight sailors with
SEAL or special operational capability. The structure or capability changes when the
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quantity or type of force is changed. Eight contractors do not have the same capability or
structure that the eight SEALs have. The concept of structure is important both for
analyzing contractor capability and for determining what role contractors have played in
U.S. warfighting efforts in Iraq.
Because the research problem and the case study include all of the various
contractor functions and the ways in which the degree of their control by the government
contributes to U.S. warfare capability in Iraq, the research design includes ways to
analyze contractor political or civil contributions. The political objective, according to
Carl Von Clausewitz, is the motive of war. The political objective, which I refer to as the
U.S. warfare objective in this dissertation, determines the military objective and the
warfare capability necessary to achieve it.9 Clausewitz asserts that war is the art of using
the given means10 in combat, in the wider sense; this includes all activities that exist for
the sake of war. The development of the fighting forces, the recruiting, arming, and
training constitute one level. Another level is the conduct of war on the battlefield.
Clausewitz wrote that "tactics teaches the use of armed forces in the engagement;
strategy, the use of the engagement for the object of the war."11
Political capability is operationally defined as the "output" or the potential ability
to influence political or civil assistance. The definition of political capability consists of
the same parts as military capability, except that the organizations that administer or
control the contracts for rebuilders and security firms are not military. Rather, they are
government civilians and institutions. I occasionally refer to these administrators as civil-
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political rebuilders. The influence of political capability can be traced from the level of
civil-affairs assistance provided, such as training Iraqi police, to the civil order or public
support it is intended to produce by providing security for Iraqi citizens. For example, if
DynCorp trains Iraqi police in accordance with its contract, it is a benefit to the political
dimension of warfare capability. If the firm does not do the training as contracted, it is a
capability threat because economic and personal resources that could have been used for
other goals have been wasted. For this study the effectiveness of the trained police is not
used as a part of the assessment. Political capability includes two goals intended to gain
public support, which is linked to establishing order: (1) rebuilding and construction of
infrastructure such as communications, transportation, roads, public services, and
buildings, and (2) security and policing, including establishment of public order,
protection of the builders, and infrastructure.
19

This research plan is designed to ultimately compare contractors

that are

controlled by military administrators with contractors that are controlled by
nonmilitary/political administrators. A quantitative analysis—that is, a simple count of
the contractors on the battlefield—is not sufficient for explaining the role contractor
contributions have played in the total scheme of warfare capability. When the comment is
made that the current war in Iraq is "the most privatized war in U.S. history," there are
two important implications. The first generalization is that all contractors are alike, that
their contributions are similar. However, grouping contractors into one "lump" hinders
describing and explaining the variety of contractor contributions in specific terms of

In the results of final analysis, the comparison of cases increases the plausibility of explaining
the results found in the individual cases. George, "Case Studies," 58-59.
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capability change. The second implication is that the increased use of contractors is not a
good thing. Both of these ignore ways in which the degree of government oversight and
control help to explain the impact of contractors on warfare capability. I will show that
there is a solid empirical basis for the argument that the nature of control over contractors
determines their success in augmenting military and/or political capability. Also, I will
show empirical evidence of instances in which individual contractors who were not
properly controlled have damaged or threatened U.S. warfare capability. This study is
designed as a qualitative analysis to increase the general knowledge related to contractors
and to find out how and whether contractors' contributions are a benefit or threat to the
total scheme of U.S. warfare capability in Iraq.
For this study I have held or frozen U.S. warfare, political, and military
effectiveness as a constant. Effectiveness, which is not a part of this study's assessment, is
defined for the purpose of this explanation as a measure of how the total force achieves
the stated military or political objective or goal, which within this work is operationally
defined and considered to be the establishment of order or stability and the rebuilding of
Iraq. The U.S. goals to stabilize and to rebuild Iraq have not been accomplished during
the scope of this study. Therefore the effectiveness of contractor contributions is not a
1 O

part of the analysis.

CASE STUDY DESIGN
I chose to use the case study method because it provides useful insight into "how
and why" research questions. The goal of my research design is the qualitative analysis

Dorff, "A Primer in Strategy," 11.
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and historical narrative that explains the evidence to support my argument for how the
nature of government oversight and control of contractors' firms has a positive or
negative impact on warfare capability within the context of the Iraq War.14 I will use
history as a frame of reference to explain and generate insight through careful narration
and thoughtful analogy.15 The analytic findings are derived from the logic of the
observation of the contractors' contributions as a function of their client's capability.
Two additional conditions have influenced my strategy to use case studies. First, as a
researcher, I have no way of controlling the actual events of interest as they unfold in the
Iraq War. Second, this dissertation is focused on contemporary events.
In this dissertation the plan for analysis developed as an epistemological strategy
based in part on the idea that the trends such as transformation and downsizing that lead
to military capability change result in both intended and unintended consequences. For
example, the trend to modernize army divisions with technically advanced weapons
systems resulted in more capable army units with greater levels of sustainability and
readiness, as intended. However, an unintended result was that the army needed
contractors to teach its soldiers how to operate the new weapons. This is linked to the
unintended consequence of changing the unit structure's composition to include both
civilians and soldiers. The case study method ferrets out whether and how contractor
contributions changed U.S. warfare capability and helps to "fix" the complexity of this
hypothetical puzzle for analysis. The case study analysis provides the narration to

14

Events such as the Abu Ghraib Prison scandal and contractor regulations established by the Iraqi
Coalition Provisional Authority provide the historical context and order for analysis of the case studies.
15
John L. Gaddis argues that good scientists and historians use all the tools they have: theory,
observation, narrative, analogy and so on. Gaddis, "International Relations Theory," 57. Also see Gaddis,
"History, Theory, and Common Ground," 75-78.
16
Yin, Case Study Research, 5.
17
George and McKeown, "Case Studies and Theories," 21-58.

98
explain, compare, and criticize the results of contractor contributions to warfare
capability.
Cases for the individual contractor firms act as a script for the observations that
allow explanation of how contractor services or actions impacted on warfare capability
as they did. Using contractor case studies provides a disciplined approach for logically
ordering the trends, perceptions, and facts related to the degree of government control
over contractors and the resulting contractor behavior in regard to how it changes U.S.
warfare capability. The cases for each contractor firm are structured by the question set,
which focuses the search for what is to be studied. Tracing the events, functions, and
actions that are found as a result of the questions results in the exhaustive description that
forms a systematic analysis of how successful the impact of contractors is on warfare
capabilities. The cases and question set function as heuristic guide for a searching inquiry
to identify and analyze the performance effect or capability that results from contractor
behavior.18 The results are what Professors Andrew Bennett and Alexander L. George
have referred to as a "good historical explanation."19
As stated earlier, the research method uses a single case study that is structured to
organize individual cases for each firm into two groups. The cases in the two separate
groups are structured in the same way, and by the same question set; the difference
between them is the government agency that administers the contract and how it controls
the contractor. The first group (organized in Chapters IV and V) consists of individual
contractor cases in which contracts are administered and controlled by the U.S. military.

Schwartz, Art of the Long View, 4. Schwartz's definition of case scenarios influenced my case
study design.
19
Bennett and George, "Process Tracing."
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Primarily, the firms in this group are expected to make contributions that augment
military capability. The second group (organized in Chapters VI and VII) includes
contractor cases whose administrators are government agencies or actors that are
nonmilitary/political. These contracts call for contributions that augment civil-political
affairs (nation building). The contractors for the second group consist of two basic types
of contractors: those who are builders and those who provide security.
The case study is designed to facilitate a logical comparison of the findings for
contractors controlled by the military and the findings for contractors that are controlled
by nonmilitary/political administrators.20 In designing the question set I anticipated that
some contractors in the first group will contribute to civil-political capability, while some
in the second will contribute to the military. The comparison of these two groups of cases
is important because I expect that the differences in the nature and degree of control and
oversight exercised over the contractors will be different for the two groups of contract
administrators. I expect to find that the difference in how the administrators control the
contractors will be reflected by the impact that contractors have on warfare capability.
In sum, the single case study, contractors in Iraq, is an analysis of individual
contractor firms or cases that are guided by the question set and process-tracing. The
analysis is organized in the context of a historical narrative.211 expect to find that the
contractors studied in Chapters IV and V, which are controlled by the military, will have

The analysis or "process tracing" of the firms is framed by the research question subset.
Process-tracing is a method that focuses the research and traces the links between cause and effect. George
and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development, 6; and Bennett and George, "Process Tracing."
21
According to Gaddis, the language of history can provide a frame of reference to explain and
generate insight through careful narration and thoughtful analogy. Gaddis, "International Relations
Theory," 6 and 57. Also see Gaddis, "History, Theory, and Common Ground," 75-79.

a more positive impact on warfare capability than do the contractors studied in Chapters
VI and VII, which are controlled by nonmilitary/political administrators.

LEVEL OF ANALYSIS
Based on the research questions, the level of analysis for this study is the state.
The analytical level is centered within the state of Iraq. The goal is to analyze the
political and military capability in terms of the ways in which contractor contributions
augment or detract from U.S. warfare capability.

DATA COLLECTION
The data for this dissertation was collected through the document analysis of
various primary and secondary sources, official government records, and print and digital
media. Data was collected from the emerging literature, official U.S. government and
military Web sites, and the open press. Information was also collected from online
databases such as those found at http://www.marketwatch.com,
http://www.publicintegrity.org, http://www.msnbc.com, http://www.corpwatch.org, and
http://www.sourcewatch.org. Information was also obtained from the Web pages of
various firms that make up the private security industry. A primary digital resource for
source material was the AMPMlist database of messages. AMPMlist is a Yahoo! Groups
list (http://groups.yahoo.com). The list is a multisource collection of papers and news
articles, inter alia, related to the international trade in private military services. The list
focuses on private military and security companies. The data list was initiated on April
19, 2000, and as of December 17, 2006, had 24,777 individually numbered messages or
documents. List members can search the list digitally by keyword or by message number.
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Non-members can join the AMPMlist by contacting the list manager, currently Doug
Brooks at Hoosier84@Hoosier84.com.

RELIABILITY AND VALIDITY
The reliability of collected information was confirmed by cross-comparisons with
additional sources when such sources were available. To the extent possible, the study
uses original empirical information collected from across a broad spectrum of eclectic
sources. Reliability and validity is a problem because this subject is rapidly emerging in a
dynamic climate in which private security actors are reluctant to provide firsthand source
information. In this study, the researcher has no control over the contract firm. The
collection and evaluation of empirical data was qualitatively analyzed, and replication is
complex. The audit trail of printed material and quantitative data is found in Works Cited.
Copies of documents that were obtained from digital sources are maintained in a paper
file. The hostile combat environments, travel restrictions, and absence of funding
precluded firsthand collection of data from the battlefield.
The findings for this research are not assigned a numeric value or grade. In this
qualitative analysis, the confirmation of the findings is based on the analysis and
empirical evidence presented within the study. The validation of the findings is based on
the reader's practical acceptance of the findings as a matter of them being reasonable and
prudent.

CASE SELECTION AND GOALS
The goal of this section is to explain how the firms were selected for the
individual cases and to explain why the cases are important and what I expect to find by
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analyzing them. These cases are important because they represent a variety of firms that
are controlled by either the military or by civilian government administrators that are not
part of the military. The literature review indicated that the degree and nature of control
that these administrators exercise over the various contract firms may be different.
Ultimately the case study analysis involves a comparison of a group of cases/firms that
are controlled by the military with a group of cases/firms that are controlled by
nonmilitary/political administrators.
When the U.S. invaded Iraq the military had doctrine and experience for working
with contractors due to the U.S. Army Logistics Civil Augmentation Program
(LOGCAP); the nonmilitary/political administrators did not. For example, the rules of
engagement, for controlling circumstances under which armed contractors can fire their
weapons, were written by nonmilitary/political administrators and were instituted in the
early months of the war. They are still in effect. Therefore, the rules written in the early
phase of the occupation by the nonmilitary/political administrators, I argue, are
symptomatic of the control problem. Hence, these cases are important for the analysis of
my argument22 that contractor contributions either augment or diminish U.S. warfare
capability due to the nature and degree of oversight and control exercised by the military
and/or nonmilitary/political administrators of the contract.
The individual case selections started with government contractors working in
Iraq as listed on the 2006 Central Command census, which is posted in Table 3 (Chapter
IV). I selected all of the five firms listed, along with their subsidiaries that have traceable
links to their own contract(s) in Iraq. The list included Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR), L-

22

My argument is presented in detail in Refining the Argument on pages 17-18, and in the first
three sections of this chapter.

3 Communications, Titan, DynCorp, and Blackwater USA. I will identify some of these
firms as cases controlled by the military and others as being cases controlled by
nonmilitary/political administrators.
I selected Halliburton because of KBR's status as its subsidiary. During my
research on KBR I discovered that many documents and sources intermingle and use the
two names, Halliburton and KBR, interchangeably. I chose to do two separate cases, one
for each firm, to clarify their contributions. I will explain in those cases that Halliburton
divested itself of KBR during the course of this study. I also selected KBR because of its
association with the LOGCAP contract, which is essential to understand in assessing
contractors in Iraq. I selected Boots & Coots because it is linked to KBR as a
subcontractor that provided specialized services during the invasion phase of the war.
Chapter IV has separate cases for Halliburton, KBR, Boots & Coots, and Wild Well
Control, Inc.
Titan is a subsidiary of L-3 Communications. Both companies have made
contributions aimed at augmenting the military. L-3 Communications did a buyout of
MPRI during the scope of this study. I have included a case for MPRI because of its
important status as a defense contractor. I selected Titan because it was on the Central
Command census and because Titan employees were involved in the notorious Abu
Ghraib human rights scandal. I added CACI because some of the firm's employees were
also involved in the Abu Ghraib scandal. L-3, MPRI, Titan, and CACI are all firms with
contracts administered by the military. I selected Armor Holdings as a case because it
was involved in a buyout and sale of ArmorGroup, which is now a British security firm
with contracts in Iraq.
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Blackwater and DynCorp are also on the Central Command list, but their
contributions are more to the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) and
the U.S. State Department. The identity of the contract administrators is not clear. Since
this is a common occurrence with security contractors, I selected these two prominent
firms and included them with the group of contractors not administered by the military. I
selected Bechtel because the firm has a long history as a defense contractor and because
it has one of the largest contracts for work in Iraq. I selected Custer Battles and Zapata
Engineering because during the course of doing research for the first cases these two
firms were identified due to their notorious character. For example, as will be described
in detail in its case, Custer Battles is currently involved in a lawsuit that may set
precedents for prosecuting contractor fraud in Iraq. Custer Battles is in Chapter VI and
Zapata Engineering is in Chapter V.
Chapter VII consists of non-U.S. firms that provide security in Iraq. These firms
were selected because the administrators of their contracts are not the U.S. military. Also,
they all were selected because the status of their contracts appeared suspicious to me
during my preliminary research and because they originated from an alliance partner, the
United Kingdom. In doing research on Erinys's contract, I traced links through various
executives to Aegis, DSL, and ArmorGroup. Cases for these firms all are grouped in
Chapter VII.
The limitation of cases was based on the lack of transparency and available
information. This is a significant discovery in itself. Private enterprise, particularly
private security firms, are known for protecting information pertaining to how they do
business. This means that the firms that were selected for the study became more visible
or transparent because of alleged notorious behavior. For example, Blackwater USA is
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well known because of information disclosed in a lawsuit brought against the firm by the
family members of the Fallujah bridge victims. In the selection of cases I recognize this
bias and have taken advantage of it. The cases selected give a clear picture that helps to
answer how contractors contribute to U.S. capability in Iraq.
As a matter of limiting the number of cases studied, I did not focus on the study of
contractors that are related to one branch of military service over another. I tried to take a
general or joint approach to the U.S. military when selecting contractors for the cases
except in the case of KBR because the U.S. Army is the lead agency or contract
administrator. In Iraq the contractors serve most visibly on the ground, where U.S. Army
and Marine forces have more direct contact with them. Because of that, evidence
pertaining to the military-contractor relationship involves those two services most
frequently, and the study refers to the other services infrequently.
Chapters IV and V consolidate the first group of individual firms/cases. These
contractors are important for analysis because they are administered and controlled by the
U.S. military.
The cases in Chapter IV consist of Halliburton, KBR, Boots & Coots, and Wild
Well Control, Inc. I expect to find that the military control of these individual firms is
framed by LOGCAP. The result is that these firms have operated under the highest
degree of oversight and control of any of the other cases in this study.
Chapter V consists of cases for MPRI, L-3 Communications Corporation, Titan,
CACI International Inc., Armor Holdings, and Zapata Engineering. These firms provide a
variety of different functions and originate from the military-industrial-security complex.
These firms operate under the same oversight and control as do the firms in Chapter IV.
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Chapters VI and VII form the second group of individual firms/cases. These
contractors are administered and controlled by nonmilitary/political administrators such
as the U.S. State Department, U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the
Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), and the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. The goal of
these agencies and their contractors is to rebuild and stabilize Iraq. The cases presented in
Chapter VI consist of Bechtel National, Inc., Blackwater USA, Computer Sciences
Corporation, DynCorp International, Inc., and Custer Battles LLC.
The firms in Chapter VII are interesting because they originate from coalition
partner states and they are controlled by the same nonmilitary/political agencies as are the
firms in Chapter VI. The cases in this group consist of Erinys International, Defence
Systems Limited/ArmorGroup, and Aegis Defence Services.
In my analysis of the cases in Chapter IV and V, I expect to find that firms
augment warfare capability when they are properly controlled but can become a threat
and diminish capability when they are not. For example, KBR has increased force
capability by increasing readiness and capability with good logistics support. However,
KBR has been suspected of fraudulent execution of some portions of its contracts. I argue
that this caused increased oversight of the firm, which resulted in correction of the
problem. Thus, in Chapter IV I will show that such control has resulted in KBR providing
good logistical support that increased military capability. I expect to find that the military
control exercised over the firms studied in Chapter IV will be in accordance with the
doctrine and experience gained in controlling contractors under LOGCAP-type
contractual boundaries. I expect that these findings will hold true for the group of cases in
Chapter V. I expect to find that in most cases in the first group, warfare/military
capability will be augmented because the contractors are controlled.
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In my analysis of the cases in Chapters VI and VII, which comprise the group
controlled by nonmilitary/political agencies, I expect to find that some contractors have
augmented the political/warfare capability while others have seriously damaged it. The
agencies that control the contractors in the second group came to Iraq without a force
structure, plan, or doctrine for controlling contractors. Thus, the administrators for this
second group were involved in "crisis" planning from the start and did not establish firm
control over their contractors.
For example, Bechtel, as a building contractor, had to work in a less than secure
environment, and the quality of the firm's work suffered. This damaged warfare
capability because the goal of rebuilding was to gain the confidence of the Iraqi people.
The less than satisfactory rebuilding of schools damaged public confidence in the United
States. Also, the unstable environment set in motion a chain of events that resulted in the
hiring of armed security contractors. The nonmilitary/political administrators then had to
write rules and procedures for controlling armed security contractors and these, I will
show in the cases, have not been adequate. The result is that armed security contractors
have been involved in serious incidents that created controversies between the Iraqi
people and the United States that has damaged the warfare goal to stabilize Iraq.

TAXONOMY
In Chapter I provided an introduction to the taxonomy for the contractors. The
literature review provided additional background details related to contractors. Now, I
will specify the details that are important for analyzing contractor contributions. The
contractors in this dissertation are controlled by clients in addition to the U.S. military;
they are also controlled by the U.S. State Department, US AID, the CPA, Iraqi Ministry of
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the Interior, and the Western media. The contractors in Iraq are linked together by the
U.S. civil military objectives to establish order and to rebuild Iraq.23 Therefore, there are
basically two types of contractors: those that augment the U.S. military and those that
support civil affairs rebuilders and their security.24
Nonmilitary/political warfare contracts are administered by clients that hired
contractors to provide capabilities necessary to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. For example,
contractors contribute linguistic translators for the CPA. This dissertation uses descriptive
types as basically defined by the Department of the Army's "Contractors on the
Battlefield" manual. The operational definition of the types have been modified to fit
contract cases that are administered by the military and by the nonmilitary/political
administrative group. The army manual defines three types of contractor contributions,
which I have operationally modified. I have operationally constructed Types IV and V,
which do not exist in the army manual but are necessary to explain the contractors in
Iraq:
Type I: Military provider firms implement force offensive operations and provide
command for them. These contributions seek to engage the enemy. Examples of Type I
firms are Executive Outcomes and Sandline, which no longer exist as firms and which
are not operating in Iraq.
Type II: Military/political consultant firms provide advisory and training services;
for example, police training.
Type III: Military/political support firms provide non-lethal aid and assistance; for
example, logistics or engineering support, interrogator-translators, or mine clearing.

Naveh, In Pursuit, 1-3.
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Military Operations, 5.
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While mine clearing can be lethal, those who clear the mines are not seeking to engage
those who placed the mines.
Type IV: Military-industrial complex firms provide high-tech products or
weapons and services related to them; for example, a cell or satellite telephone network,
or operation of an intelligence surveillance device such as a drone.
Type V: Civilian security companies provide armed employees to protect people,
places, things, and information; for example, security guards for Baghdad International
Airport. Type V protection is protection- or police-oriented and is reactive in nature.
This taxonomy was constructed to distinguish the contractors that are security
providers from those that are not. Some Type I private military companies refer to
themselves as private security companies. This taxonomy does not consider Type I firms
as security providers, and no Type I firms are part of this study. Type II, III, and IV
contractors are considered as military or government support. In this dissertation I do not
consider them private security firms. Type V firms are considered private security
companies. Type V firms include those that provide stationary facility protection and
moving protection such as convoy security and executive individual protection.

HISTORICAL SCOPE AND CASE STUDIES SELECTED
The historical scope of the individual case study and the contractor cases begins
with the administration of President George W. Bush and when Halliburton divested
itself of KBR on April 7, 2007.

110
SUMMARY
In this chapter I have presented the research design structure and methods. I stated
and explained the research problem, clearly stated the independent and dependent
variables, and presented my argument that the nature of government control over
contractors is the key for determining whether their contributions augment or threaten
U.S. warfare capability in the Iraq War. I have operationally defined terms and the
taxonomy for the contractors. This understanding is necessary to analyze conditions that
answer the stated research question and question subset. I explained the design of the
single case study and the two groups of cases. The first group consists of the firms with
contracts administered by the military, and the other by nonmilitary/political
administrators. I explained the design of the contractor cases as being framed by the
question set that is used in the process of tracing contractor contributions to cause and
outcome. The ultimate goal of the cases is to collect, present, and analyze the data fairly
to achieve the identified goals of the study. The cases selected for the study were
identified and I explained why these cases are important and what I expect to find when
they are analyzed. I explained that the findings for the two groups of cases are compared
in the case study's ultimate analysis of how the nature of government control over
contractors determines whether contractors augment or erode warfare capability. The
limitation bias for case selection was identified and discussed.
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CHAPTER IV
U.S. MILITARY CONTRACTORS

This is the first of two chapters that group individual cases for analyzing firms
controlled by the U.S. military. This dissertation's stated problem is learning who the
contractor firms are, and how the nature of government oversight and control over
contractors determines whether contractor contributions augment or diminish U.S.
warfare capability in the Iraq War. It is important to note that contractor firms operating
in Iraq are not all administered and supervised by one central agency, nor are all contracts
in Iraq administered by the U.S. military. Ultimately, to answer the problem, the findings
from Chapters IV and V will be compared with the findings from the individual cases
administered by nonmilitary/political agencies, which are grouped in Chapters VI and
VII.

CHAPTER GOAL
The goal of this chapter is to begin the analyses of individual cases for firms that
are administered and controlled by the U.S. military. Each of the individual cases is
structured according to who the firms are and how the contractors are controlled by the
military. My argument, as presented in Chapters I and III, is this:
It is the degree of government (military and/or nonmilitary/political) control over
contractors that determines whether the contractors' contributions have a
positive or negative impact on warfare capability.
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In the individual cases presented in this chapter I expect to find that it is the
degree of military/government control over contractors that determines whether the
contractors' contributions have a positive or negative impact on military capability. The
U.S. military had written doctrine for the use and control of contractors before the current
war in Iraq. Also, the military had previously gained experience working with contractors
in Bosnia and Somalia under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP).
Therefore, the contractors administered and controlled by the military have generally
augmented military capability. Nevertheless, the military did fail to properly control
some contractors on accession. Some of the controversial results, and how they impacted
on military/warfare capability, will be presented in this chapter, and others will be
presented in Chapter V.
The individual cases for firms in this chapter trace the ways in which contractors
react under military control and how they specifically augment military capability so that
the military force has the utility to accomplish its mission.
Significantly, the cases covered in this chapter are administered or controlled
according to military doctrine and LOGCAP, which is the most significant contract
related to U.S. military capability for the war. The cases in this chapter include
Halliburton; Kellogg, Brown & Root (KBR); Boots & Coots; and Wild Well Control,
Inc. These cases are all linked to KBR and LOGCAP. The scope of LOGCAP and its
links to KBR span a time almost a decade before the United States invaded Iraq and now
includes the past few years of the U.S. occupation of Iraq.
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SITUATION
Before the Iraq War started, the existing policy for U.S. military capability
included contractor support to augment both the size and composition of the total force
structure. Contractor capability according to that policy was to augment military combat
units. Therefore, before looking at the contractors' contributions, such as those of
Kellogg, Brown & Root, it is important to understand the size of the reduced military
force and the number of contractors that would be needed to make the military more
sustainable.
During the Gulf War there was one contractor for every hundred U.S. military
personnel. The total force that existed for the Gulf War included 5,200 contractors and
500,000 U.S. troops. Subsequently, military planners knew that contractors would play a
much bigger and more critical role in the Iraq War than they did in the Gulf War. One
estimate predicted that there would be one contractor for every ten U.S. military
personnel.1
Between the Gulf War and the planning for the Iraq War, the size and
composition of the U.S. Army's divisions had been reduced. Defense funding was shifted
to modernize some Army divisions and to make them a smaller but more technically
sophisticated force. The smaller force and the political powerlessness to use the draft to
expand the force can be traced to the Pentagon's choice to hire contractor support to
enlarge the mass of ground forces, security providers, and builders when the need arose
to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. The current quantities, or verifiable number, of contractors

1
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For a lucid analysis of the postmodern military and the Revolution in Military Affairs and how
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2
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in Iraq is not really known. However, Liza Porteus, a reporter for FoxNews.com, has
compiled the data recorded in Table 2.

Table 2. The Number of Contractors in Iraq (as of July 6, 2005)
120,000

Total contractors in Iraq

100,000

Are rebuilding oil pipelines and critical infrastructure

20,000

Are security providers

6,000

Are believed to protect corporate enclaves, U.S. installations, the
"Green Zone" and key Iraqi/U.S. officials

14,000

Are thought to provide security for
the rebuilders3

In December 2006, Lt. Col. Julie Wittkoff, chief for the Central Command
contracting branch, provided the results of the most recent and thorough census of
contractors working in Iraq. This census, which includes Americans, Iraqis, and thirdcountry nationals subcontracted to firms with U.S. government contracts, indicates there
are ten times as many contractors in Iraq as there were in the Gulf War of 1991. The
difference in the figures provided by Liza Porteus and Wittkoff demonstrates that civilian
and military administrators at the operational level as well as military commanders in
Iraq have differing views of the status of contractor presence in Iraq. See Table 3.

3
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Table 3. Census for Contractors in Iraq (as of December 5, 2006)
100,000

Government contractors in Iraq (this does not include subcontractors)

140, 000

Total U.S. troops in Iraq

1,500

DynCorp International; 700 are training police

1,000

Blackwater USA; private security providers

50,000+

Kellogg, Brown and Root (do not have a breakdown by country, but has
this many working in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kuwait)

500

L-3 Communications

6,500

Titan (a division of L-3; provides linguists)

650

Contractors believed to have died in Iraq since 20035

The census conducted by Central Command is incomplete and creates questions
about the number of contractors and who the administrators of their contracts are. I will
untangle these relationships in the cases to follow. The list includes Blackwater USA,
whose Type V contract was originally written to provide protection for Paul Bremer of
the Coalition Provisional Authority. After Iraqi sovereignty was declared the contract
administrator continued as DOD, but the now firm works for State Department to protect
the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq. Yet the same list includes DynCorp, whose contract to

4

The largest firm in Iraq is Halliburton's Kellogg, Brown and Root. The contract for logistics and
maintenance support for the military is valued in excess of $13 billion. Singer, "Outsourcing War."
5
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provide Type III training for police is being worked with the military but is being paid for
by the U.S. State Department. When the list is examined, it is difficult to determine how
many individual contractors there are and what links exist between the contractor firms
and their administrators.
My argument is that the list illustrates the general confusion that exists regarding
how many contractors are working for the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID), the State Department, and the U.S. military. This implies that the military has
little or no control over the contractors operating on the battlefield, which in turn means
that no one knows how or whether contractors are making specific contributions to the
war. Washington Post staff writer Renae Merle states that there are 100,000 contractors,
not counting subcontractors, yet this number does not account for 40,000 contractors. The
census is not clear as to who the companies are. Furthermore, it is not based on a clear
taxonomy for the contractors, which would facilitate tracing the process of how the
contractors contribute to warfare in Iraq. Therefore there is no breakdown for various
contractors and their contributions, and no way to ascertain which firms are providing
Type I force operations, Type II consultants, Type III combat service support, Type IV
military-industrial high-tech service providers, and/or Type V protection as civilian
security providers.

HALLIBURTON AND KBR
The case studies begin with Halliburton and KBR, the key firms contributing
services in the Iraq War. This is because KBR held the LOGCAP contract when the war
plans for Iraq were written. Getting to know these two firms is a good starting point for
tracing the process of evolution for the full scope of contractor contributions for U.S.
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warfare capability in Iraq. KBR and Boots & Coots are both linked with Halliburton.
However, the case studies process begins by tracing Halliburton as the prime contractor
for LOGCAP. Much of the source material related to Halliburton and KBR weaves the
two together by using the names of the two firms interchangeably and thereby confusing
the firms' individual contributions. This study includes separate case studies for the two
in order to focus the process-tracing onto each firm's contributions and by this means
alleviate the tediousness of analyzing the entangled contributions.

HALLIBURTON ENERGY SERVICES
Halliburton sees itself as being the world's leading integrated energy services,
energy equipment, engineering, construction, and maintenance firm. The current
president and CEO for Halliburton Energy Services is David J. Lesar. The international
oil well services and equipment firm is based at 1401 McKinney St., Houston, TX
77010. Halliburton has operations in over 120 countries and is ranked 103 in the 2006
Fortune 500 annual ranking of America's largest corporations. Its current revenues are
posted at $20,994 million with profits of $2,358 million and assets at $15,010 million.7
The firm has four business goals: Technology leadership, operational excellence,
innovative business relations, and a dynamic workforce. There were 206,000 Halliburton
Q

employees as of 2005. Kellogg, Brown & Root was a Halliburton subsidiary for
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approximately forty-four years until Halliburton divested it in April 2007, at which time
it became KBR, Inc.

Halliburton: Origins/History
Halliburton was founded by Earl P. Halliburton, a poor but tough natural
entrepreneur. One result of the firm's austere origins is that its character continues to
exhibit the enthusiasm, energy, and tough-minded determination of its founder. Earl P.
Halliburton grew up poor, smart, mechanically inclined, and with a fiery drive to get
ahead. He was not averse to taking risk or someone else's patent. As an example, in a
case before the California Supreme Court that was found against him, he reportedly said,
"If the courts will not sustain my patents, I am not going to respect anybody else's." Earl
succeeded in earning over $1 million in the oil business before the end of the 1920s.10

Halliburton: Lobbying and Political Contributions
The evidence shows that Halliburton is an active lobbyist and the firm is a magnet
for political criticism. In 1992, then Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney paid $3.9 million
for a contractor to study the benefits the U.S. military could gain by outsourcing support
functions to private industry. That contractor was Kellogg, Brown & Root, the subsidiary
of Halliburton. Because of the political fallout from Cheney's former employment with
Halliburton, it is now almost impossible to read a media report on Halliburton or one of
its subsidiaries that does not include a statement that before becoming vice president,

KBR Inc.
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Cheney was the CEO for Halliburton for more than five years.11 This scenario is a
"perfect storm" for the dark side of the theme that runs through the dissertation: the
question of political influence, big money, private enterprise, and public or national
security. The Cheney-Halliburton mix just does not sit well with the general public when
they perceive that their tax dollars and security have become a matter of war profits,
political influence, and big business. On the other hand, Halliburton and huge firms like
Bechtel are strong resources that can contribute to the national security when the effect of
their lobbying efforts is held in check.
In March 2004, Maud S. Beelman, a Boston Globe correspondent, reported that
Halliburton's lobbying efforts during the last of the Clinton administration were directed
at the Senate, the House of Representatives, and the executive branch. According to
Beelman, those lobbying efforts amounted to $1.2 million. Beelman points out that in the
2000 presidential election, 95 percent of the contributions made by Halliburton, its
subsidiaries including KBR, and employees, amounting to $536,796 in total, were made
to Republicans. Beelman asserts that the lobbying effort Halliburton made when Clinton
was in office is a big contrast to what it became during the first two years of the Bush
administration. Halliburton's contributions during the first two years of the George W.
Bush administration were $600,000. This means these lobbying efforts were made while
the firm's subsidiary KBR was working contracts for the Iraq War worth more than
$8 billion. The Globe account of Halliburton's lobbying activities cited as its source the
Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995.12
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Halliburton: Political Connections
Halliburton has reported that Joe Lopez was hired in 1999, which was during the
tenure of Dick Cheney as the firm's CEO. Retired U.S. Navy Admiral Joe Lopez was a
military aide for Dick Cheney when Cheney was secretary of defense. Lopez is now
KBR's senior vice president for defense contracts.13 Halliburton indicates that Mr.
Cheney did not assist Halliburton in winning any of its government contracts. The
statement specifies he did not assist in doing so as vice president or as Halliburton's
CEO. The firm's written statement on the matter states that as CEO, Mr. Cheney focused
on the energy business. He did receive regular briefings on DOD contracts. The firm
reports that before assuming office as vice president, Cheney sold more than $20 million
in Halliburton stock. Once in office, Mr. Cheney "donated his remaining stock options to
charity."
Halliburton is not only well connected to the highest levels of government, but
also has ties to the grass roots of political influence. In March 2005 there was an
announcement that the manager for Halliburton's political action committee office in
Washington, D.C., Kelly Philson, had moved to a position with the Independent
Petroleum Association of America, the IPAA Wildcatters Fund. This move links Philson
and therefore Halliburton to an influential position to oversee the fund's political
efforts.14
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Halliburton: Iraqi Contributions
Halliburton is one of the best-known contractor names associated with Iraq.
Judging by the general reports in the media, the firm seems to have its hands in every
defense contract in Iraq and is earning huge profits while at the same time it is defrauding
the U.S. government. However, though it is a fine point, Halliburton has done no work in
Iraq. Halliburton's subsidiary KBR has the contract and does the work in Iraq.
Nevertheless, Halliburton has served as an attractive point of focus for political,
academic, and media critics of the Bush administration, the war, and contractors.

Halliburton: Threats/Adverse Public Impact
Halliburton is an extremely large and successful firm that has direct political ties
to the vice president of the United States. As such, the firm has had a big impact on U.S.
public opinion against the use of contractors in the Iraq War. For example, in March 2007
Halliburton announced its plan to move CEO David J. Lesar into a new corporate
headquarters located in Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Clifford Krauss, writing for the
International Herald Tribune, reports that at the same time Halliburton is planning to
move offshore from its U.S. headquarters, it is the subject of a Justice Department and
Securities and Exchange Commission investigation for alleged improprieties in Iraq,
Kuwait, and Nigeria. He asserts that Halliburton's reported profit as the "dominant oilfield service company in North America" was $2.3 billion. Krauss, in further critical
comment on Halliburton, also points out that Vice President Cheney was the CEO for the
firm from 1995 through 2000. Later in the article Krauss does report that the relocation of
the firm is mainly related to changes in the energy business and not because it is trying to
evade U.S. laws. Before closing the article he points out Halliburton's questioned
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administration of a $16 billion U.S. military contract in Iraq. Krauss also reports that
KBR, Halliburton's subsidiary, has allegedly improperly handled military and
government contracts worth billions of dollars.15 Krauss's article is an example of how
Halliburton's nature, its economic activities, and political connections have been used to
sway U.S. public perception of the contributions contractors make and how the war is
being managed by elected politicians, military leaders, and civilian administrators.

KBR, INC.
KBR, Inc. is widely known to be a subsidiary of Halliburton; however,
Halliburton fully divested its ties with KBR in April 2007. The heavy industrial builder
and defense contractor once known as Kellogg, Brown & Root is now listed on the New
York Stock Exchange as KBR, Inc. KBR is headquartered at 601 Jefferson St., Ste. 3400,
Houston, TX 77002. KBR, as a defense contractor, primarily provides Type III military
logistics support. The firm has approximately 56,000 employees. The president and chief
executive officer for KBR is William P. "Bill" Utt, and the senior vice president and
chief financial officer is Cedric W. Burgher.16
The New York Times has confirmed that KBR has a good share of employees with
military experience and knowledge of the defense contract competitive process. One
example is Charles J. Fiala, who had more than thirty-five years' experience with DOD
before becoming a KBR executive.17 Another example is Billy J. Gray, who is ex-Army.
Like other KBR military veterans, his paycheck from KBR exceeds his former military
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pay. He has been a KBR employee for almost ten years in places such as Camp Bondsteel
in Kuwait, where as an engineer he managed the vehicle maintenance and the electrical
power generators.18
Halliburton CEO David Lesar once asserted that KBR's defense contract business
is a natural extension of the firm's fundamental engineering capability. According to
BusinessWeek, Lesar said that "it requires many of the same capabilities that we must
have to execute our basic strategy, which is serving our oil-and-gas customers: good
engineering, good logistics, and the ability to get people on the ground fast, the ability to
handle enormous amounts of data." In September 2003, KBR reported that 20 percent of
its revenues were due to military contracts.19
KBR is an international firm. For example, in the United Kingdom, KBR has
become one of the five top defense contractors. In 1997 KBR joined with two English
partners in maintaining the UK'S Trident submarines. Today, now that Davenport Royal
Docks have been privatized, KBR has bought 51 percent of the property. In late July, the
Ministry of Defense named a consortium led by KBR as the preferred bidder for a 4billion-pound (pounds sterling), 30-year contract to upgrade British Army garrisons
housing a total of 18,000 soldiers and civilians.

KBR: Origins/History
Kellogg, Brown & Root's legacy and character was shaped by its early founders
in much the same way as was Halliburton's. The firm traces its origins back to 1901,
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when Morris W. Kellogg launched a pipe fabrication business in New York. Kellogg's
engineering innovations and petroleum technologies are at the heart and nature of
present-day KBR's operations. In 1919 George and Herman Brown, who learned the civil
engineering business as road and bridge builders in Texas, joined with their brother-inlaw, Dan Root, to start up Brown and Root.21
They also learned the value of political influence. After suffering the lean years of
the Depression, they developed a relationship with a behind-the-scenes politician, the
former Texas state senator Alvin J. Wortz. Allegedly, the Browns and Wortz entered into
a twisted deal with Texas congressman James Buchanan to build a dam on the Lower
Colorado River in the Texas hill country. Buchanan secured a Public Works
Administration loan as part of the New Deal, backed by a backroom promise from
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Even with the Browns spending more than $1.5 million
for startup costs, the deal started to unravel. At this critical point, Buchanan had a heart
attack before he could put in a fix with Congress to assure the funding for this New Deal
project. Wortz then backed the campaign for Lyndon Johnson to win his first seat in
Congress. Wortz wasted little time in letting Johnson know that "job one" for him was
saving the dam.22 It is impossible at this point to separate the truth from fiction because
of the lack of known details in this account. However, this episode is part of the legacy
that shapes the perception of how others think of the nature and character of KBR to this
day. The firm did maintain a friendly relationship with Lyndon Johnson then, just as it
does today with politically connected insiders.
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Briody, Halliburton Agenda, 41-49.

125
KBR's defense business began in 1940 when Brown and Root was awarded its
first military contract and as a result built the Naval Air Station in Corpus Christi, TX.
Brown and Root also built ships for the U.S. Navy during World War II. The firm built
the world's first offshore oil rig in 1947. In the early 1960s, during the Vietnam War, the
firm did construction work there. Then in 1988 Halliburton acquired Dresser Industries
and its subsidiary M.S. Kellogg and combined them with Brown and Root to form a new
firm: Kellogg, Brown & Root. Then, as a Halliburton subsidiary for more than forty-four
years, KBR did work for defense contracts that contributed logistical support for the
military as it responded to international situations such as Haiti, Somalia, and the
Balkans.23

KBR: Political Connections
Characteristic of most defense contractors, KBR has developed its political
connections. For example, Bill Utt sits on the National Petroleum Council. In that
position he is an advisor for the Secretary of Energy. He has been chairman of the
Electric Power Supply Association.

One political and military connection is KBR's

senior vice president for defense contracts, retired Admiral Joe Lopez. Lopez, as noted in
Halliburton's case, was a military aide for Dick Cheney when Cheney was secretary of
9S

defense.

Significantly, the 1991 DOD study of military outsourcing, which Secretary of

Defense Dick Cheney contracted KBR to do, needs to be mentioned here because it is
such a prominent political connection and issue in the industry literature. A few months
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after the first report was completed, the firm was paid an additional $5 million to update
it.26
KBR was awarded the LOGCAP contract as Dick Cheney was stepping down as
secretary of defense in 1992. KBR's selection as the prime contractor for LOGCAP
signaled a point of dramatic profits for the firm and is an important step traceable in the
recent process of U.S. military capability change. In the decade after winning the
LOGCAP, the firm has earned a totaled $2.5 billion in revenues.27

KBR: Lobbying and Political Contributions
According to the Center for Public Integrity, KBR has made a total of $2,379,792
in political contributions from 1990 to 2002.28
On March 31, 2005, Judy Sarasohn, writing for the Washington Post, identified
the Allbaugh Co. as having registered as lobbyist representing the interest of Kellogg,
Brown & Root Services Inc. Joe M. Allbaugh and his wife, Diane, are the lobbying
firm's founders. Joe is the former Federal Emergency Management Agency managing
director. At the time Allbaugh Co. was hired, KBR was not only contributing to
LOGCAP, the firm was also involved with Hurricane Katrina relief. This only partly
explains how the Allbaughs got the job as disaster relief and homeland security lobbyist
for KBR.29 The Allbaughs' long ties to President George W. Bush's political career look
like the other reason. Joe was President Bush's campaign manager in 2000. He was the
chief of staff for Bush when Bush was the governor of Texas. Diane Allbaugh, who is an
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attorney, has a wealth of experience representing clients on Capitol Hill and with the
executive branch. Ms. Allbaugh was instrumental in developing and launching the Texas
Regional Office of the National Center for Missing and Exploited Children. Laura Bush
and Diane Allbaugh announced the opening of the center in Austin in April 2007. Steve
Rhoades, the Allbaugh senior vice president, has a background that will enhance his
contributions as a lobbyist for KBR. Before gaining experience as the CEO of the
Metropolitan District Commission of Hartford, Connecticut, Rhoades, who is an
engineer, retired from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers as a brigadier general.
Hiring the Allbaugh firm as lobbyist is a smart move on the part of KBR
executives. It not only is an indication of KBR's character; it shows how contracting is
done. This lobbyist has direct personal links to President George W. Bush and his family
as well as to the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, which is the administrator of KBR's
LOGCAP contract.

KBR and LOGCAP
In order to fully understand KBR and its contributions in Iraq it is first necessary
to understand how KBR is linked to the U.S. Army's Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program. LOGCAP was originated to provide crisis response support and to facilitate the
accompaniment of contractors with the force. The LOGCAP roots extend to the postVietnam era of self-assessment by the military. The U.S. Army identified a need to
outsource combat support and combat service support for wartime and other
contingencies to maximize allocated resources. LOGCAP originally came online as
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General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, U.S. Army, became the commander in chief (CIC) for
the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM). The Area of Responsibility (AOR)
for CENTCOM, Southwest Asia, had few forward-deployed forces or bases on the
ground. General Schwarzkopf's plan entailed long lines for the delivery of forces and
logistics to support them in war contingencies. LOGCAP was developed by U.S. Army
planners largely to fill U.S. Army needs. It was the product of army "out of the box"
thinking, and as a result, the army was designated the DOD executive agency for
LOGCAP.31
The LOGCAP background is an essential part of the ultimate answer for the
research question because LOGCAP is the nexus for the integration of contractor means
with traditional military operations. When the military logistic personnel first proposed
LOGCAP, many military commanders did not readily accept the idea of depending on
civilians for combat service support. Military commanders saw LOGCAP as threat to the
status quo force structure. Early on, commanders did not have confidence that contractors
would deliver the performance needed to fill what they held to be core roles.
Commanders did not like the fact that contractors were not under their control and could
not fight as combatants. Further, tactical commanders realized that, if contractors
required protection, this would take troops from the fighting force and put them on guard
or protection duties for the contractors.32
These issues, identified by military leaders at the earliest conception for modern
use of contractors, are at the core of the problems this dissertation is analyzing nearly
twenty-two years after the inception of LOGCAP. The LOGCAP contract specifies that
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military commanders are responsible for providing security for contractors such as KBR.
As civilians in the battle space, KBR is not to provide proprietary security. In a two-part
article for Army Logistician, Col. Karen E. LeDoux, who commanded the LOGCAP
Support Unit Forward in the Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Element
Forward-South East Asia with the Coalition Forces Land Component Command in Iraq,
provided guidance for commanders in planning for the use of LOGCAP. Col. LeDoux
noted that according to U.S. Army policy, commanders are responsible for providing
adequate force protection for LOGCAP contractors when the contractor moves
equipment and personnel into the theater by commercial means. Also, the commander is
responsible for prioritizing the movement of LOGCAP contractors in the battle space and
for providing force protection for the contractor's move to ensure that it executed in
safely. Col. LeDoux emphasizes that contractors are civilians. The further forward
contractors go while accompanying the force, the more military security force protection
and support the contractors require. Col. LeDoux further points out that military
commanders are responsible for having a plan for contractor requirements for surviving
in the battle space. In addition to planning for contractor force protection, the
commander's plan must include the provision of food, shelter, and emergency medical
support.
In the era between Vietnam and the Gulf War, thousands of contractors were
managed by the Pentagon under a single contract. However, since then, the Pentagon
restructured the way contracts are managed and structured. Now firms such as KBR are
administered as a prime contractor. The prime is managed under a single contract; in turn,
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the prime manages subcontractors or smaller firms under its prime contract. The
subcontractors' services come at a single set price. This allows the military to create the
type of contract known as cost-plus, which is often referred to as indefinitedelivery/indefinite-quantity contracts such as LOGCAP. This system is used across
government agencies to facilitate actors such as U.S. State Department getting what they
need quickly and at the best price.34 Cost-plus contracts, such as LOGCAP, give the
contract administrator the option to add "task orders" to fill additional needs. The
administrator gets what it needs without the bureaucracy of additional bids. The
contractor makes a fixed profit of 1-9 percent.35
In July 1991, Headquarters Department of the Army hosted a LOGCAP
Requirements Conference to take action on some of the LOGCAP lessons learned from
the Gulf War. The conference drafted a contract to support unique concept requirements
that linked the national security strategy to operational needs and as such required the
contractor to support two simultaneous wars and a natural disaster. This was an umbrella
contract Statement of Work (SOW) in solicitation for bids. The Headquarters Department
of the Army subsequently awarded the umbrella support through the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers to Brown and Root in 1992.36
Brown and Root won what is now known as LOGCAP I by outbidding two other
bidders. The contract was for $3.9 million. The terms of the contract had a number of
specifications. KBR had to be responsive on short notice. The firm had to have the ability
to transport a fighting force of up to 50,000 troops to any of thirteen different parts of the
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world. KBR then had to be able to supply the troops with food and other essentials for a
period of at least six months. The significant benefit of the LOGCAP for the firm is that
Brown and Root was given advance notice for contingency requirements under the terms
of the contract. Thus KBR was primed for the contingent support they would in turn be
expected to provide upon notice of a U.S. crisis intervention need. A drawback of the
contract for the firm is that it did not know when it would be called on.
Brown and Root's first LOGCAP contingency was exercised in 1992 in Somalia.
There KBR employed 2,500 of Somalia's citizens to get the work done. KBR's rapid
response to the U.S. military's need for assistance for support of humanitarian relief
resulted in the Pentagon's increased confidence in the utility of contractor support in
general. KBR was able to respond to LOGCAP requirements for laborers and vehicles
within eleven hours of notice.38 Some military officials assert this quick response is
evidence that contractors can respond quicker than the military. The firm earned
$110 million for its contributions in the Somalia contingency.39 LOGCAP in Mogadishu
integrated employees from countries in the immediate region into a useful team that
contributed to the operation of the Mogadishu Seaport and two airports.40
Then KBR responded to the contingency for Haiti in 1994. There it contributed
support for 18,000 troops and earned $141 million. In 1995 KBR significantly
contributed to the U.S. capability in Bosnia by delivering the building materials for
thirty-four bases and shelter for 16,200 soldiers. In the building efforts KBR teamed up to
augment military engineers so as to enhance military engineers' readiness and ability to
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deliver building output. KBR was the sole source of food and supplies for the U.S.
military force in Bosnia. LOGCAP I expired in 1997, and KBR lost the LOGCAP E
contract to DynCorp. However, the Army subsequently created another contract that kept
KBR building bases in Kosovo in 1999.41
In December 2001 the Army Material Command had a recompetition for bids for
the existing LOGCAP contract. Kellogg, Brown & Root Services won and was awarded
the contract for ten years. The definition of "event" under support of the contract was
made more inclusive. The revision made the LOGCAP more wide-ranging and it now
covers almost any contingency with national interest. The provisions of the event must be
approved by the Department of the Army. The LOGCAP today is a global support
mechanism, and in Iraq KBR now supports the Iraqi Survey Group, Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA), Threat Analysis Agency, and the U.S. Department of State.42
The LOGCAP revision that took place in December 2001 implies that contractor
support in Iraq is a natural extension of the military's internal efforts to modernize
logistics functions and become more efficient by using private logistics support. One
example of the increased scope for contractor support that indicates they are part of the
total operational force is that by March 2001, the Department of Defense had developed
the policy or military doctrine contained in the Deskbook Supplement titled "Contractor
Support in the Theater of Operations."43
KBR won the LOGCAP III in a competitive bid with DynCorp and Raytheon.
This LOGCAP has the potential for earning KBR up to $183 million. Significantly, many
41

Bianco and Forest, "Outsourcing War."
Trautner, "A Personal Account," 10.
43
David Isenberg cites the DOD, Deskbook Supplement of 28 March 2001 titled "Contractor
Support in the Theater of Operations" as policy that identifies how and why contractors are contributing
operational support for the U.S. military. See Isenberg, Fistful of Contractors, 12.
42

133
additional jobs are covered by the umbrella contract. This means that KBR has a sole
source advantage for those jobs. The KBR contract with the army is a no-cost contract,
which denotes the fact that there were no estimated costs. The contract is not readily
transparent, which signifies that it limits public scrutiny. According to the standard nocost rules, KBR is to be reimbursed for its allowable costs and receives a bonus awarded
on performance. In previous contracts, KBR has usually earned the maximum
performance award.
The sum of the circumstance of such a contract means KBR'S earnings may result
in costing the Pentagon and taxpayers more than if the military did the work. The
Government Accountability Office (GAO) report of investigation for contractor support
in the Balkans in 2000 reported one example of how poor contract management by the
U.S. Army contributed to cost increases that resulted in added earning for KBR. In
reporting for the New York Times, Jeff Gerth and Don Van Natta Jr. assert that KBR's
contributions for the Iraq War will "cost 10 percent to 20 percent more than if military
personnel were used, according to Army contract managers."44 KBR'S previous
experience with building and maintaining military bases such as Camp Bondsteel in
Kosovo and Camp Arifjan in Kuwait has positioned the firm to profit from war in Iraq.45

KBR: Iraqi Contributions
The U.S. Army awarded the LOGCAP III contract to KBR in 2002. This Type III
logistic support contract is for KBR to provide meals, deliver fuel and mail, and wash
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laundry. KBR is the U.S. military's biggest services contractor in Iraq. It is also the
largest employer in Iraq, with almost 50,000 employees. The Census for Contractors in
Iraq (Table 3) indicates that the 50,000 employees are spread between Afghanistan and
Iraq. In July 2007 T. Christian Miller reported in the Los Angeles Times that 14,000 of
KBR's employees are U.S. citizens. These numbers indicate that KBR is favorably
contributing to the employment of perhaps as many as 35,000 Iraqi citizens and/or thirdworld nationals. Additionally, the firm has contributed by providing food and shelter for
the Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance as well as at least 100,000
U.S. troops. In March 2003, KBR was awarded task orders with a potential worth of
$7 billion for military support in Iraq. One of the task orders under that contract was for
KBR to procure and deliver fuels for the war. Under the LOGCAP, administered by the
U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, KBR has helped to repair damaged oil wells and
pipelines and to get Iraqi oil back on the market. In all, KBR has developed a strong
partnership with the U.S. military over the past decade.47
Col. LeDoux, who has experience working on LOGCAP and with KBR in Iraq,
has provided figures for KBR's contributions that are very similar to those provided in
the New York Times report. According to the Colonel, KBR first responded to
contingency requirements for the Iraq War in November 2002. At that time KBR built
and organized the facilities at Camp Arifjan to make them ready for incoming U.S.
forces. As of June 2005 KBR had 48,000 employees contributing to the support of U.S.
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military forces in Iraq and Kuwait. KBR, according to Col. LeDoux, readily fulfills the
letter of its contract even though the firm has suffered the loss of a number of employees
killed or wounded. Col. LeDoux asserts that owing to KBR contributions, "troops in Iraq
have the best food, shelter, and quality of life possible." Col. LeDoux provided the data
in Table 4, which shows the results of KBR contributions in support of U.S. forces.

Table 4. KBR Contributions from November 2002 through June 200549
Between November 2002 and June 2005 KBR made the following contributions in
support of U.S. forces involved in the Iraq War:
Meals prepared - more than 160 million
Laundry bundles washed - 6.2 million
Gallons of potable water produced - 1 billion
Gallons of fuel transported - 300 million
The number of patrons hosted at morale, welfare, and recreation facilities - 18 million
Bags of mail delivered - 560, 000
Miles logged transporting supplies and equipment - 50 million (900 trucks per day)

So far in this case I have traced KBR'S contribution to military sustainability and
force readiness. The evidence indicates that the U.S. Army's decision to implement
LOGCAP was intended to produce just such results. Use of LOGCAP and the firm has
significantly altered the U.S. Army force structure. Critics of the Pentagon's policy for
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using contractors assert that the U.S. Army cannot go to war without KBR. This signifies
that the U.S. Army is dependent on contractors for its readiness. On this point, the
privatization critics are largely correct. However, the empirical evidence shows that
KBR's responses to military needs have in most cases achieved the intended goals for
providing Type III logistics support. KBR'S contributions have not always been as
harmful as the critics of contractors or privatization have maintained. The following
section examines the evidence related to the adverse publicity KBR's contributions in
Iraq have stirred up.

KBR: Threats/Adverse Impact
Democrats Henry A. Waxman of California and John D. Dingell of Michigan
have exercised oversight over all of the contractors in the Iraq War. The two
congressmen tasked the Government Accountability Office to investigate and to
determine whether there is evidence of special treatment in the DOD or USAID award of
contracts to KBR.50 The administrator for KBR's contracts is the U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers or DOD, not USAID. The results of the oversight process have been brought to
the public attention by the U.S. media. The U.S. media's reporting of unfavorable
allegations of KBR's contract favoritism and overcharges on its food services, fuel
delivery, and other faults has been enthusiastic and not very clear. The explanation that
follows traces what is known about adverse suspicions involving the contractor, its
administrator, and the contractor's eventual contributions to U.S. capability.
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It appears that KBR has violated one of the terms of the LOGCAP contract by
hiring proprietary security to protect a subcontractor's logistics convoy. In this situation,
Representative Waxman's committee has linked the Blackwater USA ambush in
Fallujah51 to KBR. As early as July 31, 2003, the U.S. Army's chief logistics officer
asserted that soldiers were going unfed and without mail because contractors that were
depended on to deliver mail and food had refused to deploy. The contractor was not
named, but food service and mail delivery were a part KBR's LOGCAP contract.
Lieutenant General Charles S. Mahan Jr. said, "We thought we could depend on industry
to perform these kinds of functions, but it got harder and harder to get them to go in
harm's way." Critics of the use of contractors on the battlefields point to incidents such as
this as evidence that contractors on the battlefield expose U.S. armed forces to
unacceptable risk. Military commanders are aware that contractors are not bound to
perform in accordance with the Uniform Code of Military Justice. As civilians, they are
outside of the military control. Soldiers who do not perform their duties are courtmartialed, while contractors who do not perform can merely be fired or lose pay. There is
a strong belief among actively serving military members that contractors are only
motivated by money and that they are paid at a rate much greater than is the military for
similar work.52
However, the terms of the LOGCAP stipulate that the U.S. Army is responsible
for providing force protection for KBR. Also keep in mind that General Mahan's
derogatory comments on contractor reliability occurred early in the war, and that the
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GAO report of 2003 reported that contractors were not adequately addressed in military
plans at that time.53 This all indicates the military had not protected the contractors as it
was required to, and the firm is prohibited, according to LOGCAP, from providing
proprietary protection. In the Fallujah situation, it seems that KBR took steps to protect
kitchen equipment necessary to feed the troops General Mahan is referring to.
Subsequently, Representative Waxman's committee has found evidence that the
Blackwater security team that was ambushed in Fallujah in March 2004 was providing
protection for a KBR subcontractor's convoy moving kitchen equipment. In another
incident, in April 2004 a KBR fuel convoy was ambushed and Thomas Hamill, a
Mississippi farmer turned KBR truck driver, was kidnapped. Hamill escaped later and
became a temporary media hero, and the status of the military security for his convoy was
not questioned officially. However, controversy over the security provider for the
Fallujah tragedy has increased because of the difficulty Representative Waxman has
experienced over more than three years trying to uncover who Blackwater was working
for on this job. This implies that the circumstances are complex—and they are.
Additional details regarding the Fallujah incident are provided in the case for Blackwater
USA, since the majority of the problem pertains to Blackwater.54
KBR's contributions in Iraq, which are often attributed to Halliburton, have been
plagued with allegations that the firm has overcharged for the number of meals it served
under the LOGCAP food service requirement. Allegations have also been made that the
firm is overcharging for fuel distribution contracts. The Defense Contract Audit Agency
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did two audits on KBR in 2004. Representative Henry Waxman, who has politically
argued that KBR may have gained contract favoritism from the Bush administration, has
questioned how KBR has managed the military dining facilities in Iraq. Representative
Waxman has called for investigations of the firm for billing the government for meals
never eaten. KBR has denied wrongdoing. The firm has said that it billed the government
for the number of meals prepared in advance. The firm argued that the estimate for
preparing meals in Iraq is a problem because the tactical situation causes the number of
soldiers who are present to eat to vary. During the audit KBR cooperated with
administers of the contract and deferred $16 million in payments.
I have found that untangling what is known to be true about KBR and the fuel
overcharges is best traced through the LOGCAP and what is known as the Restore Iraqi
Oil (RIO) contract. In November of 2002, in preparing for the invasion of Iraq, the Army
Corps of Engineers tasked KBR under the contingency provisions of LOGCAP to be
prepared to extinguish oil well fires. The army argues this is the kind of situation the
contingency contract was designed to support. This is the same contingency for which
KBR subcontracted Boots & Coots as oil well firefighters. Then, in March 2003, the
Army Engineers awarded KBR a separate no-bid contract to restore oil infrastructure in
Iraq. This is the RIO, and it had a potential worth of $7 billion. The contract did lead to
ten task orders and a billing ceiling of a little over $2.5 billion. The RIO also led to
controversy. Where the LOGCAP and the task to put out oil fires were covered in the
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initial competitive bidding for the contract, the RIO was not awarded as a competitive
bid.57
The army response to public and congressional criticism indicates that the March
2003 RIO contract was a "bridge" awarded to carry on work during the bid for a contract.
The contract was not awarded to KBR because of political influence. The army justified
the sole source procurement at that time because KBR was the only firm with the
capability to provide the services to satisfy the requirements. The army cited Federal
Acquisition Regulation (FAR 6.302-1) as authorization to follow that procedure.58
Shortly thereafter, in June 2003, with the bidding controversy in full swing, the army
decided to change the single RIO with two KBR contracts that would be up for bid in
January 2004. KBR won one of the two contracts. That contract had a top limit of
$1.2 billion under which the firm was to rebuild or repair Iraq's oil infrastructure in
southern Iraq. Parsons won the second contract, with a top value of $800 million to repair
oil infrastructure in Northern Iraq.'

BOOTS & COOTS
Boots & Coots was a KBR LOGCAP subcontractor hired to provide oil well
firefighting protection in 2003. ° The nature and character of Boots & Coots International
Well Control, Inc., as a company, hardly fits anyone's profile as a mercenary company.
They are not "shooters," but they are Type II engineers in a high-risk specialty that could
not be done safely by existing U.S. government resources. The company is headquartered
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at 7908 N. Sam Houston Parkway W, Houston, TX, 77064. The firm's president is Jerry
Winchester. The firm has a little over 300 full-time employees. The Boots & Coots home
page advertises that it is experienced and prepared to offer a complete range of
emergency response and prevention services for crisis support for clients in the petroleum
exploration and production business.61

Boots & Coots: Origins/History
Boots & Coots built the company legacy on its pioneer efforts as oil well fire
extinguishers. Today the firm is among the world's foremost oil well blowout
specialists.62
Boots & Coots apparently interacts well with the Pentagon and the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, as indicated by the results of the specialized Type III contributions
the firm provided to augment the U.S. military in the Gulf and Iraq wars. When Saddam
Hussein's forces sabotaged more than 700 oil wells in the Burgan oil fields of Kuwait,
Boots & Coots (then known as the Red Adair Company) led the way for contractor teams
from the United States, Canada, Kuwait, Iran, Hungary, Rumania, Russia, and China that
were part of the international team that blew out the fires. The Red Adair Company
subsequently changed its name as it was absorbed through a succession of companies to
become Boots & Coots International Well Control, Inc.
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Boots & Coots: Iraqi Contributions
A further indication of the Pentagon's positive reaction to Boots & Coots
contributions is that the firm landed a Type III contract to assist as a KBR subcontractor
in controlling oil well fires in the Iraq War in 2003. For example, in 1991, Saddam
Hussein's forces intentionally sabotaged more than 400 oil wells. Based on that
experience, a combined U.S. (including Special Forces), UK, and Polish force conducted
amphibious operations to secure the oil wells during the 2002 invasion. However, the
Iraqi forces managed to sabotage forty-four wells anyway. The plan also included
provisions for contractors with special skills for extinguishing oil well fires, a skill that is
not a normal military capability. In the invasion phase of the war, contractors from the
firm were used to extinguish the few oil wells that the Iraqi forces managed to set on
fire.64

Boots & Coots: Interaction with Authorities
In this case, Boots & Coots's specialized services and skills were necessary for
achieving the U.S. operational and tactical objectives. This is not only an example of
contractors operating in a combat environment. It is also an example that demonstrates
that, on the modern battlefield, some contractors provide services that the U.S. military
does not have the capability to perform. This case study is empirical evidence for how
contractor support can increase U.S. warfare capability.
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WILD WELL CONTROL, INC.
Wild Well Control, Inc., was a subcontractor under the KBR LOGCAP that was
hired to fight oil well fires in 2003.65

Wild Well Control: Origins/History
Joe R. Bowden Sr. launched Wild Well Control, Inc., in 1975. The firm was
among the first to compete with the Red Adair Company, which, as mentioned in the
previous section, was the founding company for Boots & Coots. The Kuwait Oil
Company hired the firm in 1991 to extinguish the fires in its oil fields after Saddam
Hussein's forces ignited them.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY
This chapter is a collection of the empirical evidence, framed by the research
question subset, for cases/firms that are administered and controlled by the U.S. military.
The empirical evidence found supports the argument that the degree of military control
over contractors determines whether they augment or threaten military capability. The
U.S. military had doctrine and experience for working with contractors according to
LOGCAP before the war in Iraq started. The contractors controlled by the military have
generally had a good impact on military capability. At the same time, the military did not
always control some contractors, and the controversies that occurred as a result seriously
threatened military/warfare capability.
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The KBR case illustrates how an old and experienced defense contractor, under
military control, can make essential contributions to U.S. warfare capability by changing
the force size and structure, which is linked to increased force readiness and
sustainability. KBR's identity as an established defense contractor enables the firm to
make a profit and contribute to the sustainability of the total force. The case shows that
the firm uses its engineering and oil field capability and experience to provide necessary
logistics support for the military. This support is essential and is linked to the military's
intention to make structural and policy changes. As pointed out, the firm's capabilities
include engineering skills, knowledge of logistics, and the experience it gained in the oil
fields, giving it the ability to respond quickly to the battlefield, where it manages vast
numbers of people and a great amount of heavy equipment and data. The contributions
help to augment military readiness and sustainability and enhance U.S. warfare
capability. KBR is politically connected to the current presidential administration, and
those connections have resulted in considerable political criticism and possible loss of
public support, both of which are linked to diminished warfare capability. However, the
firm has also contributed to the U.S. military for every commander in chief for almost
every war since World War II. In this war the firm has been cooperative when subjected
to rigorous investigative oversight. To date, allegations of criminal fraud have not been
substantiated. Critics claim that KBR is profiting from the war; however, KBR, like all of
the contractors in this study, is a business. The ultimate goal of business is to make a
profit for the firm's shareholders. My argument is that KBR has done a good job of
interacting with the military, and the military control of the firm's Type III logistic
support has increased military capability by augmenting the military logistics structure
and sustainability.
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In June 2003, the GAO specifically addressed the inadequacy of military planning
for the use of contractors. The lack of planning indicated improper military control of the
contractors. That being the case, the contributions made by KBR are even more amazing.
Also, it is even more surprising that the firm and its employees have not been involved in
more incidents of fraud and theft than investigations have found to date.
The GAO specifically pointed out the ineffective nature of the military
administrator's control of contractors working outside of the United States. For example,
the GAO found that some contractor employees did not have a clause in their contract for
deployment into a war zone. The military, in disregard of DOD Instruction 3020.37, had
not identified the contractors that provide mission essential services. The case in this
chapter shows that the LOGCAP contractor and its subcontractors did contribute mission
essential services that increased military capability. Just as Operation Iraqi Freedom was
about to kick off, the GAO reported that procedures established for planning for the use
of contractors was not adequate. This means that military plans to control and protect the
contractors did not exist. Also, the GAO reported that the staff and field commanders,
who were to receive contractor support, had inadequate training for overseeing
contractors. Further, this means field commanders had limited awareness or knowledge
of what contractors were doing in their area of responsibility (AOR).67
Significantly, the GAO report is dated June 2003. This case has shown that the
rigorous congressional oversight to which the contractors, the military, and political
decision makers have been subjected during the past four years is ensuring that LOGCAP
contractor Type III contributions are augmenting military capability. The case also
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indicates the contractor contributions have been evolving, as are the military policies for
managing them.
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CHAPTER V
MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL-SECURITY COMPLEX

This chapter comprises the second group of individual cases of firms whose
contracts are administered by the U.S. military. The goal of this chapter is the same as
was expressed in Chapter IV. This chapter continues the analysis of individual cases for
firms administered and controlled by the U.S. military according to my argument that
It is the degree of government (in this chapter, military) control over contractors
that determines whether the contractors' contributions have a positive or negative
impact on warfare capability.
I expect that the findings in this chapter will reinforce the findings in Chapter IV.
That is to say, I expect that the majority of firms analyzed in this chapter will be found to
favorably augment military capability, while others do not. I also expect to find that the
ultimate success or failure of contractor augmentation of capability depends on the degree
of oversight and control exercised over the contractor by the military.
Many of the firms in this chapter are linked to the military-industrial complex
because either the firm or its parent company is a Type IV defense contractor that
provides technology, weapons, or products to enhance military capability by modernizing
the force. Now, as a matter of business diversification, some of the military-industrial
firms are not only contributing hardware, such as aircraft; they also contribute Type II,
III, or V specialized support to augment military capability by modernizing the force and
also enhancing force readiness and sustainability. Some individual contractors in the
cases analyzed in this chapter have been involved in criminal acts that ultimately threaten
U.S. warfare capability and policy goals in Iraq.
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The military-industrial complex lobbyists have had a long and controversial role
in Washington because it is the goal of lobbyists to influence political and military
decision makers. Even so, it is not well known that many of the military-industrial firms
that produce high-technology weapons systems have diversified their business plans and
now have subsidiary firms that contribute Type II, III, and V military capability to the
war in Iraq and have lobbyists in Washington. For example, in early 2004 Computer
Sciences Corporation, took over DynCorp, and L-3 Communications acquired Military
Professional Resources Inc. (MPRI).1
The cases in this chapter include MPRI, L-3 Communications, Titan, CACI,
Armor Holdings, and Zapata Engineering. Most of these firms have roots in the militaryindustrial complex, which helps to modernize military capability by operating new and
complex weapons systems. In this chapter the contract administrator for the cases is the
U.S. military. The cases for CACI and Titan are significant because employees from
these two firms are alleged to have been involved in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. The
Zapata case is significant because of a highly publicized incident involving its
employees' reckless and dangerous firing on U.S. military forces. I expect to find that the
controversial incidents perpetrated by these firms, which severely damaged U.S. warfare
capability, are related to ineffective control and oversight of the contractors by the
military. The case for DynCorp and Computer Sciences Corporation, just mentioned as a
part of my diversification example, are grouped with cases administered by
nonmilitary/political contract administrators in Chapter VI.
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BACKGROUND
The military-industrial contractors are not often studied side by side with security
contractors as I do in this chapter. However, contractors from the private security
industry and the military-industrial complex are now interdependent to the extent that the
nature and character of their firms are often indistinguishable. A firm such as L-3
Communications may manufacture digital intelligence surveillance equipment one day
and hire interrogator-translators the next. The military-industrial contractors are leading
providers of technology and technology assistance that augment U.S. warfare military
capability by modernizing the military force. These individual cases examine how these
same firms contribute to Type II and III special assistance to increase military capability.
Military-industrial contractors, in addition to technology, do provide goods, manpower,
and services such as weapons systems, training, logistics, military skills, and military
experience.21 argue that because these contractors provide training, logistics, and military
skills, the definition that could clearly separate military-industrial contractors from
military or security contractors becomes fuzzy, and that military-industrial contractors
have become a part of the total force.
The old "iron triangle" or military-industrial complex manufactured weapons and
technology as Type IV defense contractors. Now they also provide Type II consultants,
advisors, and trainers for the military. Some firms in the traditional military-industrial
complex have established secondary companies that now provide Type III combat service
support. Thus the military-industrial complex and security provider firms' characters and
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contributions are becoming mingled into what could be referred to as a "militaryindustrial-security complex."

MPRI
Military Professional Resources Incorporated (MPRI) is a subsidiary firm of L-3
Communications. The case study for L-3, which is an established military-industrial
complex firm and is included in the Census for Contractors in Iraq (Table 3), follows in
this chapter. MPRI is headquartered at 1201 East Abingdon Drive, Suite 425, Alexandria,
VA 22314. MPRI established its reputation as a capable contractor that contributed Type
II advisory assistance for U.S. security needs in Bosnia. According to the firm's Web site,
the president of MPRI is Carl E. Vuono, General, U.S. Army (Ret.) and the vice president
is Ronald H. Griffith, General, U.S. Army (Ret.). The senior and management staff for
the firm consists entirely of retired senior U.S. Army officers. Today MPRI continues to
contribute Type II advisory assistance and training related to national security, defense,
and law enforcement. MPRI specializes in contributing integrated education, training,
and operations solutions in the transnational environment. MPRI not only trains foreign
armies; it trains the U.S. Army National Guard and runs recruiting centers in the United
States.4 The firm supports the national security and homeland security sector with more
than 3,000 employees and a database of thousands of military and police subject experts.
MPRI has facilities located in the United States and forty other countries. MPRI reported
its 2005 revenues at over $2 billion.5
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MPRI: Origins/History
MPRI was launched in 1987 to provide military resources to support national
security overseas. In June 2000 the firm was bought by L-3 Communications.
In 2002, executives from MPRI announced publicly that in 1994 representatives
from Croatia approached MPRI and requested their services. Subsequently, MPRI signed
a contract to restructure the Croatian military. In August 1995, after MPRI training, the
Croatian army captured a Serb-held enclave in Croatia. Of the total of 150,000 U.S.
military troops to serve in the Balkans, 30,000 were reservists. In Kosovo, 10,000 of the
56,000 U.S. military personnel who served there were reservists. Significantly, a Naval
War College review of U.S. force preparedness at the time that fully documented the
active and reserve forces known to have participated did not include contractor support. I
say "significantly" for two reasons. First, the lack of transparency that existed at that time
concealed the fact that contractors were contributing to the total force capability. Second,
at that time contractors were just not considered a part of the force and therefore were not
mentioned by Lawrence J. Korb in his essay on U.S. force readiness and capability,
which included that era.7
According to the Windfalls of War database, MPRI had a total of $41,714,000 in
federal contracts between 1990 and 2002.8
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MPRI: Lobbying and Political Contributions
MPRI has a substantial number of retired U.S. Army general officers on its
management staff who have experience within the Washington Beltway that can be and is
used to look out for MPRI's interest. One notable example is Lt. Gen. Jared L. Bates,
U.S. Army (Ret.). He was an MPRI senior vice president in charge of all contract activity
in the continental United States. MPRI gave Bates a leave of absence between January
and June 2003, during which time he assisted Jay Garner in setting up the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) in Iraq. Subsequent to his return to
the United States Bates was promoted to vice president, business development, of
SYColeman. SYColeman is a division of L-3 Communications. Bates is now president of
SYColeman, a firm that specializes in operations integration and other defense support
services. Jay Garner was the president of SYColeman when he was asked to set up the
Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance. Bates's positioning as a part of
ORHA gave him inside advantage regarding the needs for training the Iraq Army.9
The government of Equatorial Guinea, which was well known at the time for
torturing and killing political dissidents, approached MPRI in 1998 with a request that
MPRI conduct a threat assessment for protection of its oil reserves and its general defense
needs. MPRI's request for a license from the State Department was not approved because
of Guinea's human rights abuse record. MPRI mounted a determined lobbying offensive
directed at the Pentagon, State Department, and Capitol. MPRI's approach was to argue
that the United States should engage the Guineans so as improve their human rights
record. They pointed out that engagement would give the United States access to
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Guinea's oil resources. The MPRI lobbying apparently changed the Clinton
administration's foreign policy in that the State Department issued the license to MPRI in
2000.10

MPRI: Iraqi Contributions
In April 2003 the DOD awarded MPRI two contracts for Type II and III support
for the war. The total value of the two contracts was $2.5 million. The contracts are not
transparent and the details are hard to find. One contract was to restructure and train the
Iraqi Armed Forces and the other was for twenty translators for the Office of
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance.11 In a list of U.S. government prime and
subcontracts awarded in 2003, MPRI is listed as a subcontractor for Bechtel. The
administrator for Bechtel's contract is the U.S. Agency for International Development
(USAID). The scope of the contract is listed as "pre-deployment CONUS [Continental
United States] equivalent training." No further description of this subcontract or its value
is listed. There is no way to tell, but this could be the contract for the twenty translators,
because the same list of government contracts has a breakout for those contracts that are
administered by the DOD, showing MPRI as a subcontractor under Vinnell Corporation.
Vinnell was a subsidiary of Northrop Grumman Corporation. The scope of the contract
here clearly states the contract is "Train new Iraqi Army." Apparently this is the same
contract as the first contract mentioned earlier for training Iraqi Armed Forces.
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Tracing the contracts seems to indicate that MPRI's contributions in Iraq have
been made as a subcontractor for Bechtel and Vinnell. By 2004 MPRI, Vinnell, and
Nour, USA (see the Erinys International case in Chapter VII) shared the contracts for
training the Iraqi Army. Author Peter Singer says the cost of the military training contract
may possibly reach $2 billion.13 The Central Command census of December 2006 reports
that MPRI has 500 employees in Iraq.14 The census indicates the firm has twelve
contracts. MPRI is working to train the Iraqi Defense Ministry. Training subjects include
strategic planning, budgeting, and public affairs.

MPRI: Interaction with Authorities
MPRI is known as a tenacious lobbyist. The firm continues to progress in the
defense business, and no special problems have come to light related to MPRI's
interaction with authorities.

MPRI: Threats/Adverse Public Impact
MPRI is known to have a prosperous defense business. MPRI has conducted its
work with little fanfare and has not been the subject or source of adverse behavior. The
MPRI support for Croatia in 1994 could have been exploited as a political issue, but the
firm made its contribution quietly and without incident. MPRI's role in Croatia is now
well known and is mentioned from time to time as an example of how a private firm's
contributions can make a strategic difference.
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L-3 COMMUNICATIONS CORPORATION
L-3 is the U.S.'s sixth-largest defense contractor. Michael T. Strianese is the
firm's current president, chief executive officer, and director. L-3 is headquartered at 600
Third Avenue, New York, NY 10016. As a leading defense contractor, L-3 contributes a
broad range of Type II teaching and training for aircrews, mission operators, gunners, and
maintenance technicians. Hand in glove with Type II support, the firm contributes
logistics and maintenance support for Type IV high-tech security and military products
and services, which it markets to the U.S. military and intelligence services. The firm has
more than 60,000 employees located in 98 business units throughout the globe.15 L-3's
fiscal 2005 annual revenue was $9.4 billion.16

L-3 Communications: Origins/History
L-3 Communications was founded in 1997. The firm announced in February 2003
that its 2002 sales earning were $4 billion. These earnings are a significant sign of early
success and the aggressive nature of the firm. At that time L-3 had only been in business
about six years and already it was one of the top ten defense contractors. As a benchmark
of that success, the readily known defense industry giants Lockheed Martin and Boeing
were ranked only a little ahead of L-3. Credit for L-3's successful nature is generally
given to former CEO Frank Lanza, who passed away in 2006. In founding the firm Lanza
arranged for financing from Lehman Brothers and partnered with Robert La Penta. La
Penta was an executive with Loral Corp., an electronic warfare system manufacturer and
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another firm that Lanza helped launch with success. L-3 is named for Lanza, Lehman
Brothers, and La Penta.17
Frank Lanza was known for his leadership and steadfast dedication to building
businesses. He had an innate talent for taking the businesses he led in the right direction.
True to form, Lanza wasted little time and began to grow L-3 soon after it was launched
by acquiring ten electronic manufacturing divisions from Loral Corp. L-3 acquired MPRI
as a subsidiary in June 2000 and Titan Corp. in 2005. The case for Titan follows in this
chapter. Titan provided some of the linguists who were involved with soldiers and CACI
employees who were involved in the humanitarian scandal at Abu Ghraib prison. In June
2006 L-3 acquired Crestview Aerospace. Crestview provides services for assembling and
modifying military aircraft. Crestview is not profiled in this study, as its contributions are
made in the U.S. and not in Iraq.18

L-3 Communications: Lobbying and Political Contributions
Alexander Bolton, a critic of defense appropriations and campaign contributions,
has written that L-3 Communications, along with other military-industrial complex firms
such as Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics, has contributed to the political fortunes
of both parties. The employees of these firms have then contributed to politicians'
campaigns. Bolton's article asserts, for example, that representatives Jim Saxton (R-NJ),
ranking member of the Air and Land Forces defense subcommittee; Duncan Hunter (RCA); and Loretta Sanchez (D-CA) have received political contributions. In the case of
Representative Saxton, the political action committees (PACs) from L-3 and Lockheed

Miller, Annetta, "Here's How L-3."
L-3 Communications Holdings, Inc.

157
Martin have contributed a total of $91,000 for his most recent political campaign. Saxton
has subsequently worked to earmark $3 million for an L-3 Communications contract. L-3
has a plant in Camden, New Jersey, in Saxton's home district.
Representative Sanchez looked out for her political constituents and the defense
industry in Orange County with her earmarked funds for L-3 Communications and
General Dynamics. According to Bolton, she requested $10.7 million for the two
companies. In 2007 the employees' political action committee (PAC) contribution for
Sanchez was $4,500. In the last election the firm's PAC contributed a total of $10,500 for
her election.19

L-3 Communications: Iraqi Contributions
The census for contractors in Iraq (Table 3) indicates that there are 500 L-3
employees in Iraq. As pointed out earlier, MPRI, an L-3 subsidiary, also is reported to
have 500 employees in Iraq. L-3's subsidiary Titan, its most profitable venture, has 6,500
employees who are linguists in Iraq. Titan's earnings come from its contracts with the
U.S. Army in Iraq.20 The details of the Titan Iraq contracts will be covered with the Titan
case study, which follows this section.

L-3 Communications: Interaction with Authorities
L-3 has not been the subject of criminal allegations nor has the firm been reported
in the press for any derogatory behavior. This lack of notice indicates that the firm, which
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continues to win significant defense contracts, has good business relations with
authorities and the firm's contract administrators.
TITAN
Titan Corp. was acquired by L-3 in 2005. The subsidiary firm is now known as L3 Communications Titan Group, or more simply L-3 Communications Titan. I will refer
to the firm's activities in Iraq as Titan. Despite the adverse impact of having employees
involved in the Abu Ghraib human rights scandal, Titan continues to land large defense
contracts. Titan specializes in Type III and IV contracts that provide technology for
military intelligence support as well as Homeland Security. In 2003 Titan's defense
contracts produced 96 percent of its total revenue. The firm's headquarters address is
3033 Science Park Rd., San Diego, CA 92121. The firm's chairman of the board and
chief executive officer is Gene W. Ray. Titan Corp. employs 12,000 people in 12
countries, and in the United States the firm has representation in 243 cities and 41
states.21 The firm home page states that Titan has 2,000 contracts and 10,000 employees.

Titan: Origins/History
Before Titan was acquired by L-3, Titan acquired BTG, a little-known
information security firm in Fairfax, Virginia, which held a U.S. Army contract for
$10 million. The terms of the BTG contract called for the firm to furnish thirty linguists
for the U.S. Army. Apparently this was Titan's startup in the business of providing
linguists for the military.22
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Titan: Lobbying and Political Contributions
Titan has many good government and military connections within the ranks of its
top executives. Chairman Gene W. Ray is a retired U.S. Air Force general and former
chief of staff. Lawrence Delaney, Titan's executive vice president of operations, acted as
undersecretary of the Air Force during the Clinton administration.23 John H.
Dressendorfer, Titan's vice president for government relations, served in the Reagan
administration as special assistant for legislative affairs. In the Nixon administration he
assisted the secretary of defense.24 Dressendorfer has contributed as much as $4,100 to
Representative Duncan Hunter of California.

Another Titan executive, Susan Goldberg,

served the city of San Diego for two terms as mayor. She has also served as state deputy
secretary of business, transportation, and housing for the state of California.
Titan's lobbying interest is managed by Northpoint Strategies, whose employees
are linked to former Republican Representative Randy "Duke" Cunningham of
California. Titan's lobbying efforts between 2000 and 2004 amounted to $1.29 million.
The firm paid Northpoint $240,000 in 2003. Critics such as Robert Schlesinger assert that
the lobbying effort is why the firm's revenues for 2003 were $1.8 billion, 96 percent of
which came from U.S. government business. Titan's political action committee donated
$182,000 for Republican causes and about $15,000 for Democrats. At the same time,
Titan executives also made donations to both parties. They donated a total of $58,000, of
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which $10,000 went to Democrats and the remainder went to Republicans. Of that total,
the CEO's donation amounted $28,000. Titan donated approximately $10,000 to
Democratic Representative John Murtha of Pennsylvania, who was the ranking Democrat
on the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee.27
The law firm that represents Titan is Copeland, Lowery, Jacquez, Denton and
Shockey. A non-partner employed by the law firm is Letitia White, who was a staffer in
the office of Republican Representative Jerry Lewis of California. Titan is headquartered
in Lewis's district in California, and Lewis was the chairman of the defense
subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee from 1999 to 2005. On occasion,
Titan is legally represented by American Defense International, a firm that employs Van
Hipp. Van Hipp was Dick Cheney's deputy assistant secretary of the army when Cheney
was secretary of defense. Michael Herson is an American Defense International lawyer
who has ties to the former secretary as one of his then special assistants.

Titan: Iraqi Contributions
In 2003 Titan Corp. won a U.S. military contract for $112.1 million for
translator/interpreter services. Titan has provided up to 4,400 employees that contribute
to the U.S. military capability in Iraq. A 2006 Central Command census indicates that the
number of Titan linguists had grown to 6,500. The Intelligence and Security Command
(INSCOM) is the contract manager. L-3/Titan's U.S. employees supervise the
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translators/interpreters. The yearly salary of a translator/interpreter runs between $80,000
and$150,000.30
In January 2006 the U.S. Army awarded a $4.6 billion contract to a new firm,
Global Linguistic Solutions (GLS), which will now provide translators and interpreters in
Iraq. The new contract effectively cut L-3 Communications' Titan out of the linguistic
business even though it had been the leading supplier of interpreters to the U.S. military.
GLS now has its work cut out for it. Recently Titan has had to offer salaries up to
$175,000 per year to find linguists willing to work in Iraq. The industry that supplies
translators and interpreters is a $9.4 billion business, and because of the global economy
has experienced a 7.5 percent annual growth. This growth is attributed to three things: the
danger presented by Iraq; growing U.S. military needs; and an economy in which global
businesses need many different languages to communicate in the market.31
In April 2006 Titan was awarded a $7.2 million U.S. Army contract to provide
Type III management and to operate the Logistics Supply Area Anaconda in Iraq. L-3
will operate and provide technical maintenance for the Standard Army Management
Information System (STAMIS). The aim of the system is to provide automated logistics
support that will provide the military force with warfare resources.32

Titan: Adverse Public Impact
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Maj. Gen. Antonio M. Taguba's

report of investigation identified Titan

employees with the Abu Ghraib prisoner human rights abuse scandal. That incident and
the Blackwater USA Fallujah bridge incident together brought a lot of critical media and
public attention to all the contractors working in Iraq. From what is known from the
Taguba report, there were four contractors involved in the incident. Their names are
Steven Stephanowicz, John Israel, Torin Nelson, and Adel Nakhla. The Taguba report
indicates that their local administrators or the unit to which they were assigned in Iraq
was the 205th Military Intelligence Brigade. The commanding officer for the 205th was
Colonel Thomas Pappas, U.S. Army. The report found that the civilian contractors were
not properly supervised at Abu Ghraib.
Peter Beaumont published an online article in the Guardian Unlimited, a British
publication, that is critical of the employees, the firms, and the U.S. policy in handling
the scandal. Beaumont asserts that John Israel and Adel Nakhla were the two Titan
employees that physically struck and abused prisoners in the presence of soldiers who did
the same. Steven Stephanowicz was an employee of CACI International.

Beaumont

points out that human rights groups have actively called for Titan and CACI to be barred
from further contract work in Iraq. Beaumont's article goes on to report that Titan and
CACI have been awarded new contracts by the Pentagon despite the scandal. Titan's new
contract is worth $164 million and CACI's is worth $16 million.37
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Titan's employees have suffered an extremely high casualty rate while serving as
interpreters/translators in support of military members on the battlefield. As of November
2006, 216 had been killed. Former employees have reported that they were not armed
when they were in Iraq and they were not provided body armor. Further, some Titan
employees have said that they did carry arms and participated in combat, which included
participation in raids. The same employees acknowledged that the terms of their contract
stated they were not to engage in combat.38

CACI INTERNATIONAL INC.
The CACI International Inc. (CACI) Web site states that the firm "provides the IT
and network solutions needed to prevail in today's new era of national security,
intelligence, and e-government."

However, CACI gained notoriety when the press

announced that two of the firm's employees were among a group of contractors and
soldiers who were suspected of abusing prisoners at Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq. The
group of contractors alleged to have been involved in that incident included employees
from Titan Corp., as mentioned earlier in that firm's contractor case.40 On the other hand,
Pratap Chatterjee, an aggressive critic of corporate business practices, has written that
"CACI has generally stayed out of trouble" when compared with other contractors.
CACI's current headquarters is located at 1100 North Glebe Road, Arlington, VA 22201.
The CACI chairman, president, and chief executive officer J.P. "Jack" London, who is a
retired U.S. Navy reserve captain with a PhD in business from Georgetown University.
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CACI's defense contracts primarily contribute information technology (IT) solutions for
intelligence collection. Since its beginning CACI has aggressively diversified its business
strategy. For example, in addition to providing information technology for intelligence,
the firm has contributed to personnel support for U.S. Air Force installations in Texas and
California. Financially, the diversification strategy paid off. In 2001, before the Iraq War,
the firm's profits stood at $22 million with total revenues of $557 million. By 2003,
during the war, the firm's profits reached $44 million with total revenues of $843 million.
In 2004 CACI had about 6,300 employees working at more than 100 locations in the
United States and overseas. Many of the employees came to the firm with experience
gained in the military and intelligence communities. 41

CACI: Origins/History
CACI was launched under the name California Analysis Center Incorporated in
1962 by Harry Markowitz and Herbert Karr. In 1990 Markowitz won the Nobel Prize in
economics. The company's first federal contracts were for battlefield simulation
technology and the communication industry. CACI International, Inc., was incorporated
in the state of Delaware under the name CACI Worldwide, Inc. on October 8, 1985. The
firm has two subsidiaries CACI, Inc.-Federal, a Delaware corporation, and CACI-N.V., a
Netherlands corporation. The company's operations are conducted through its
subsidiaries, which are located in more than 100 offices located in the United States and
Europe. 42
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CACI: Lobbying and Political Connections
CACI has a large number of employees with ties to the military and intelligence
communities. For example, Michael Bayer, a member of the firm's board, was vice
chairman of the Pentagon's business board. Also on CACI's staff is Barbara McNamara,
a former deputy director of the National Security Agency; Arthur L. Money; who was an
assistant secretary of defense; and retired Air Force General Larry Welch, who was
assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 43
According to Robert Schlesinger, a critic of corporate influence on government,
CACI interests are represented in Washington by the Livingston Group, which was
founded by ex-House Appropriations Committee Chairman and Republican Bob
Livingston from Louisiana. Schlesinger asserts that the Livingston group's legal
"strategic partner" is Jones, Walker, Waechter, Poitevent, Carrere and Denegre, which is
also a Louisiana firm. Between 2000 and 2004 Livingston's representational fee has been
$160,000, while Jones, Walker's fees during that time have been $150,000.44
Schlesinger asserts that in 2003 over 92 percent of CACI's $843 million in
revenues were generated from contracts with the federal government. Schlesinger points
out that 63 percent of CACI's government business was with the DOD. On the other
hand, between 2000 and 2004 CACI executives donated a total of $25,750 for
Republican causes. They donated about $3,500 to other politicians. The CEO's donation
amounted to $10,000, all of which went to Republicans.45
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CACI: Iraqi Contributions
In August 2003, CACI gained a $19.9 million task order under an existing
contract to provide interrogation and intelligence gathering for the army.46 The initial
contract was for technology services, but because the contract fit under the less confining
blanket service agreement rules, the army requested that CACI provide interrogation
along with the data processing work. In December 2003, the Army tasked CACI to
provide counterintelligence support. This tasking came under the same blanket purchase
agreement and was valued at $21.8 million. Then NBC broke the news of the Abu Ghraib
scandal in April 2004. All together, eighty-one tasks were performed by both CACI and
Premier Technology, a company CACI had acquired in 1998, under the same purchase
agreement. Some details that have come from the Department of the Interior inspector
general investigation into use of the purchase agreement have shown that eleven of the
eighty-one tasks were contributed to Iraq. The same inspector general report of
investigation disclosed that CACI had a total of twenty-seven interrogators employed in
Iraq.47

CACI: Interaction with Authorities
The administrator of a particular contract is often difficult to find, and this makes
it difficult to see how the contractor and client interact. For example, the CACI
International Inc. contract for Abu Ghraib prison was administered by the Interior
Department, not the military, as would seem logical. It is also difficult to determine
whether or not this lack of transparency is intentional. The point is that there is no central
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department or bureau for administering contractors. In the case of contractors in Iraq,
according to Spencer E. Ante and Stan Crocker of BusinessWeek, the Department of
Defense is known to have had other agencies act as administrators for its contracts.48
In May 2004, Ellen McCarthy provided some enlightening details about the CACI
contract in a report for the Washington Post. McCarthy reported that the CACI contract,
under which Steven Stephanowicz was employed to contribute linguistic support for the
U.S. Army at Abu Ghraib, was managed by the Department of the Interior (DOI).
Apparently, the DOI role in administering the contract was in bill paying and
recordkeeping. However, according to McCarthy, the Interior Department's inspector
general blocked the army process of contracting through Department of the Interior for
CACI interrogators/translators. The point is the practical administration of the work was
done by the military.
McCarthy has reported a plausible explanation that clarifies the confusion over
the administrators of the CACI contract. The confusion is rooted in CACI's
diversification of business assets and acquisition of Premier Technology Group. In 1998,
before its takeover by CACI, Premier Technology Group, Inc. won a blanket purchase
agreement50 with a $500 million limit to provide support in Sierra Vista, Arizona, the
location of a U.S. Army intelligence training facility, Fort Huachuca. Then the DOI took
over the operation of the facility at Fort Huachuca and became the administrator of
CACI's contract. In 2003, the Commander Joint Task Force-7, while administering the
operational plans in Iraq, expedited the operational need for interrogators under the
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blanket purchase agreement. This move to get necessary language support linked CACI
and the DOI together the Iraq War.51

CACI: Threats/Adverse Public Impact
Steven Stephanowicz, a CACI Arabic linguist, was accused of raping an Iraqi boy
and physically abusing an Abu Ghraib prisoner. He was investigated along with two
linguists from Titan52 who were also accused of abusing prisoners. In the ensuing military
investigation, evidence was uncovered that indicated problems with the management and
training of the CACI employees. It was noted that one-third of the contractor staff at the
prison had no formal military interrogation training. At the time of the incident, CACI
contractors made up nearly half of all interrogators and analysts at the prison.53
The Abu Ghraib prison abuse scandal is a political black eye for the fundamental
U.S. mission in Iraq. The comparative risk between military forces and contractors is
very visible in the Abu Ghraib prison scandal. The military suspects in this case have
already appeared in court, while the contractor suspects have not. Because of that
disparity of justice, and the publicity the incident received in the press, the general
situation provides an opportunity to compare the risk to U.S. capability when contractors
contribute support with the capability available without contractor support.
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In this case CACI, as did Titan, provided essential support but also provided
individuals whose criminal behavior threatened U.S. warfare capability. The firm's
original contract was for technical support for intelligence. In response to the tasking to
provide interrogators as requested by the military, CACI diversified and quickly met the
essential need by hiring twenty-eight Arab linguists. Although the contract costs were
enormous, the company did contribute significant support for intelligence operations. My
argument is that the military could not have accomplished this without the contractor.
At the same time, the Abu Ghraib situation illustrates how a surge to fill a need
such as linguists can become a threat to military capability. That threat is a security
threat. The contractor and contract administrator had a minimum of time to do a thorough
security screening of the new employees. CACI does a great deal of classified defense
work in providing technical support, and the firm knows the importance of security
clearances based on background investigations. Ultimately, CACI, like all contractors in
this study, is in the business of making money. It is the contract administrator's
responsibility to see that the employees have proper security clearances.
I argue that in the early months of the war the military had a critical need for
linguists. Therefore the military used the flexibility for which the blanket purchase
agreement was intended to get the language support that did not exist in the ranks of the
military force at the time. In this case the military contract administrator needed to
closely supervise the integrated prison security unit, which consisted of both military and
contractor personnel. The inability to prosecute the contract employees due to loopholes
in the law does need to be corrected. However, I argue that the law alone is not sufficient
to control contractors. Contract administrators must actively supervise the contractor. The
abuses at Abu Ghraib would not have occurred if the prison had been properly

supervised. Because contracting is about money, the best mechanism for controlling
contractors lies in a firm's profits and its employees' pocketbooks. The administrator of
the contract needs to supervise the contractor as it does military and government
employees.

ARMOR HOLDINGS
Armor Holdings is a U.S. security firm that has significant ties to a number of
British security firms that have contracts in Iraq. I have analyzed those firms with cases
in the next chapter, grouped with nonmilitary/political contract administrators. Another
reason for doing this case is that one of the British firms is named ArmorGroup, which is
easily confused with Armor Holdings. I did this case study to trace the nature of the
relationships among these firms. Armor Holdings, Inc., headquarters is located at 13386
International Parkway, Jacksonville, FL 32218. Warren B. Kanders is the chief executive
officer, and Robert R. Schiller is the president and chief operating officer.
Armor Holdings specialized in the manufacturing of body armor. Armor
Holdings' Products Division manufactures law enforcement equipment. The wide scope
of products the firm sells includes ballistic-resistant vests and tactical armor; less-lethal
munitions; safety holsters; batons; and anti-riot products. Armor Holdings' Products
Division is one of the largest and most experienced passenger vehicle armoring
manufacturers in the world. Armor Holdings custom-armors vehicles to protect them
from ballistic and blast threats. The commercial and private vehicles the firm armors
include limousines, sedans, sport utility vehicles, and money transport vehicles. Armor
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Holdings Military Products division is the U.S. military prime contractor for armoring the
High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs [Humvees]). In 2002
Forbes magazine listed Armor Holdings among its list of 200 Best Small Companies. In
2006, Fortune magazine listed Armor Holdings as number three among its 100 fastestgrowing businesses.54
Armor Holdings: Origins/History
Armor Holdings was formerly known as American Body Armor. The firm
changed names after having to declare bankruptcy due to the Saudi Arabian
government's reneging on a major business deal, which led to a lawsuit. The lawsuit
involved a dispute over the sale of bulletproof vests. Armor Holdings bought Defence
Systems Limited (DSL) in 1997. DSL was a British firm. Few if any U.S. firms at that
time were international full-service security providers, and DSL was one of the world's
best. Armor Holdings changed DSL's name to ArmorGroup.
This heritage is important because it can be traced as links between Armor
Holdings and the five British security companies discussed in the next chapter. But for
now, here are some of the links important for Armor Holdings. DSL's Alastair Morrison
owned over $2.1 million in Armor Holdings stock in 1999. He and ArmorGroup are tied
to Erinys, a major security contractor in Iraq. One example of this tie is seen in Erinys's
director of security operations, Fraser Brown, who was employed by Armor Holdings in
1999 as part of the DSL deal. In addition, Erinys's managing director, Jonathan Garratt,
began his career with DSL in 1992, and in 1997 Garratt became an employee of Armor
Holdings. A very interesting Erinys associate is Bill Elder, who was Bechtel's corporate
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security manager. As I indicate in the Bechtel case, ArmorGroup was hired as Bechtels
subcontractor for security in Iraq. I will cover this in detail with the cases in the next
chapter.55
In 2002 Armor Holdings made a decision to focus on its armored vehicles and
law enforcement equipment business. The firm divested itself of ArmorGroup in 2003. A
case study of DSL and ArmorGroup is included in Chapter VII.

Armor Holdings: Iraqi Contributions
Armor Holdings' vehicle armoring business is located in Cincinnati, Ohio. Armor
Holdings has contributed to U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan by
manufacturing and installing Up-Armored (which provides or increases vehicle armor)
for Humvees. Other items that are also in demand in Iraq for its new police force are
produced by Armor Holdings' subsidiary Defense Technology of America in Casper,
Wyoming, which manufactures and sells a variety of riot control equipment such as
batons, helmets, shields, and non-lethal munitions.56

Armor Holdings: Threats/Adverse Impact
Jim Vallette and Pratap Chatterjee asserted in their critical article on the status of
private security companies in September of 2003 that Armor Holdings was subcontracted
to provide security for Bechtel and KBR. 7 This is the same approximate time frame
involved in Representative Waxman's investigation of KBR for allegedly hiring
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Blackwater to provide security for a subcontractor. However, Jonathan Marshall,
Bechtel's media relations manager, provided me with an e-mail on July 10, 2007,
advising that ArmorGroup met most of Bechtel's security needs as a specialized
subcontractor.58 This is an indication of the lack of transparency in the contracts and the
confusion that the firms themselves cause when they diversify or change names.
Mistaking Armor Holdings for ArmorGroup can cause a story to be told incorrectly.
Diversifying and changing firms' names are general business practices, and this is not
peculiar to security or defense contractors. However, in their case it does make tracing or
controlling their activities difficult.

ZAPATA ENGINEERING
In May 2005 a group of Zapata employees were detained and jailed for firing into
U.S. Marine positions near Fallujah. In Iraq the firm's contract was for specialized Type
III support. Zapata was not a security contractor. The founder and president of the firm is
Manuel L. Zapata. Zapata Engineering is an explosives disposal firm that provides
environmental response services for facilities, infrastructure, and military munitions. The
firm is headquartered at 63 Fairview Rd., #600, Charlotte, NC 28210 and has offices in
Colorado and Hawaii. The firm has about fifty employees and offers a complete range of
engineering services in the public and private sector. Zapata Engineering has the
appropriate professional licenses and is staffed with engineers, architects, geologists, and
unexploded ordnance technicians.59 The firm is not publicly traded on the stock market.
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Zapata Engineering: Origins/History
Manuel Zapata was born in Santiago, Chile, and immigrated to the U.S. in 1967,
when he was twenty-seven years old. By 1991 he had launched Zapata Engineering in
Charlotte, North Carolina.60 Because he was an immigrant, Zapata was given special
competitive status for obtaining government contracts. The firm's first government
contract came in 1996. That contract was a $32.5 million 10-year environmental project
for the destruction of explosives on base closures within the U.S.61

Zapata Engineering: Political Connections
Zapata's political connections are with the state of North Carolina and the city of
Charlotte. He was appointed to the North Carolina Entrepreneurial Development Board in
1993 and named Entrepreneur of the Year by the Charlotte Chamber of Commerce in
1996. In addition, his entrepreneurship has received special recognition from the city of
Charlotte. He is serving or has served on the boards of the Arts and Science Council, the
Charlotte Chamber of Commerce, Crisis Assistance Ministry, Presbyterian Hospital,
Novant Health, and Wachovia Bank.62
According to the Windfalls of War data on total contributions from 1990 to 2002,
Zapata Engineering has made a total of only $500 in political donations. No other details
for this donation were made available with the data.

Zapata Engineering: Iraqi Contributions
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Zapata Engineering began work in Iraq on September 30, 2003. It was one of five
companies contracted for $200 million to destroy and store U.S. military ammunition
worldwide. In April 2004 Zapata was awarded a $43.5 million task order by the Army
Corps of Engineers to manage captured Iraqi ordinance. Under the terms of the contract,
Zapata can subcontract or directly hire qualified security personnel for protection of the
firm's employees.64

Zapata Engineering: Interaction with Authorities
On May 28, 2005, a group of Zapata engineers were involved in one of the most
grave incidents involving friendly fire between contractors and the military in Iraq. The
incident shows the serious consequences that can take place when a contractor is not
under the proper control of authorities. On that day a U.S. Marine patrol reported that it
had been fired on from a convoy of sport-utility vehicles. The Marine patrol also reported
observing that the same vehicles were firing at Iraqi civilians. A few hours later the same
convoy returned to the area and fired on a Marine observation post. Remarkably, the
Marines were able to stop the convoy of sport-utility vehicles and apprehend the drivers
and passengers without anyone sustaining life-threatening wounds. The Marines took the
occupants into custody and conducted a search of the vehicles. The Marines identified the
occupants of the vehicles as Zapata engineers, who were armed with an assortment of
small arms consisting of anti-tank weapons, assault rifles, and hand grenades. The
Marines went on secure the contractors in jail before expelling them from Iraq.65
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One result of the Zapata shooting incident is that it energized the Iraqi authorities
to do something about contractor control. The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior expressed
concern about how to regulate and control the numerous contractors that provide private
security in Iraq. Ministry officials began to discuss how contractors could be punished
when they did not comply with the rules. Adrian Blomfield, a British reporter writing in
Baghdad, claimed that the U.S. military would be pleased if the Iraq Interior Ministry did
take action to regulate the contractors.66

Zapata Engineering: Threats/Adverse Public Impact
Zapata was not registered with the Private Security Company Association of Iraq
as a security company at the time of the shooting incident with the Marines. This means
that when the firm's employees were firing indiscriminately, they were not in compliance
with Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) Memorandum 17, which was issued by Paul
Bremer. They were armed and they were firing un-aimed rounds.67 Additionally, the
GAO 2005 investigation of private security contractors found there had been numerous
friendly fire incidents between contractors and the U.S. military. Friendly fire incidents
seriously degrade unit morale. These incidents signify a lack of communication and
control on the battlefield. This is a sign of diminished military capability because of the
lack of unity of command.68

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY
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The findings in this chapter indicate that the majority of contractors controlled by
the military augment military capability, though others do not. Additionally, the findings
indicate that when the military does not control its contractors, the contractors have a
potential for behaving in ways that become controversial and can be linked to incidents
that damage warfare capability. The best example of this is the Abu Ghraib prison
scandal. The abuse of prisoners perpetrated by improperly controlled contractors erupted
into an international media scandal. The scandal embarrassed the U.S. internationally,
caused many U.S. citizens to question their support for the war, and seriously damaged
Iraqi confidence in the U.S. and its warfare capability to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. This is
empirical evidence that supports the argument that the degree of government control over
contractors determines whether they augment or threaten warfare capability.
In the post-invasion phase, it became clear that the U.S. military commanders in
Iraq had not included contractors in their planning and as a result had little or no control
over them on the battlefield. Subsequently, the Government Accountability Office (GAO)
report of June 2003 found that the presence of contractors on the battlefield is now a
reality. That is to say that organized groups of civilians, many of them U.S. citizens, are
working in a dangerous and unstable environment where they may or may not be under
U.S. government control and protection. Military commanders and nonmilitary/political
administrators need a plan to ensure the contractors' safety as well as make the best use
of the contractors' contributions. My argument is that military commanders and
nonmilitary/political administrators must have a plan and policy for controlling
contractors to focus their contributions as a part of the warfare capability total force.
Military commanders must also have a plan for the administration, control, and protection
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of contractors that are in direct support of the military, as are the firms that contribute to
the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), discussed in Chapter IV.
One of the problems for military commanders charged with operational control of
the battlefield is that many of the contractors in Iraq are administered by
nonmilitary/political administrators rather than by the military. The next two chapters
consist of cases for those contractors that are administered and controlled by
nonmilitary/political agencies, such as the U.S. State Department and USAID.

Wallwork, Operational Implications.

CHAPTER VI
REBUILDERS AND SECURITY PROVIDERS

This is the first of two chapters that group the findings of empirical evidence for
individual cases in analyzing firms controlled by nonmilitary/political administrators
rather than the U.S. military. This continues the analysis of the contractor firms and how
the nature of government oversight and control over contractors determines whether
contractor contributions augment or diminish U.S. warfare capability in Iraq. Chapter VII
will continue the collection of empirical evidence for analysis of the problem with
additional cases.

CHAPTER GOAL
The goal of this chapter is to begin the analyses of individual cases for firms that
are administered and controlled by nonmilitary/political administrators. My argument is:
It is the degree of government (in this chapter, nonmilitary/political
administrators') control over contractors that determines whether the
contractors' contributions have a positive or negative impact on warfare
capability.
In the individual cases presented in this chapter I expect to find that the
nonmilitary/political control over contractors is different from that exercised by military
administrators. The nonmilitary/political administrators did not have a dedicated force,
written policy, or a plan for administering contractors when the war started. Therefore, I
expect to find that the contract administrators had to develop the control policy for
contractors as the contractors began their work on the battlefield. I expect to find that the
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contractors provided critically needed warfare capabilities to increase the force structure
and composition because the U.S. nonmilitary/political agencies did not have a standing
professional force to draw on. Additionally, I expect to find that the nonmilitary/political
administrators did not establish proper control over contractors, especially Type V
security contractors. I expect to find that the failure of nonmilitary/political
administrators to properly control the contractors hired to rebuild and to provide security
are linked to incidents and controversies that threaten the U.S. warfare capability to
rebuild and stabilize Iraq.
The case studies in this chapter link Iraq rebuilders and security providers to the
nonmilitary/political contract administrators such as the Coalition Provisional Authority
(CPA), U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the U.S. State Department,
and the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. The cases analyze how these firms were controlled
and how they contributed to or threatened the U.S. capability to rebuild and provide
security for Iraq (warfare capability).
The chapter begins by presenting the background for the Office for
Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), CPA, and the Iraqi Ministry of
the Interior. This background identifies who the nonmilitary/political agencies are with
regard to the policies they made for controlling contractors; for example, the rules of
engagement for the use of firearms for contractors that were established by the CPA. The
cases follow the structure of the established question set, from how the contractors were
controlled by nonmilitary/political authorities to how the nature of their specific
contributions has contributed to rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq. The contractor cases
chosen for this chapter include Bechtel National, Inc., Blackwater USA, Computer
Sciences Corporation, DynCorp, and Custer Battles.

The agencies that administer these contractors are involved with rebuilding and
stabilizing Iraq. In this sense the nature of their work is civil-political nation-building.
For example, USAID is the contract administrator for the Bechtel Type III construction
contract to build schools. Blackwater USA's Type V contract is primarily administered
by the U.S. State Department. However, Blackwater also has ties to the Department of
Defense (DOD), and the firm has provided armed security for private clients as well as
subcontractors for contractors with Type III military support. Untangling contractual
relationships such as this is part of my explanation for how contractors contribute to U.S.
warfare capability.

BACKGROUND
Lieutenant General Jay Garner, U.S. Army (Ret), a veteran of Operations Desert
Storm and Provide Comfort, was selected to organize, open, and administer ORHA as the
institution for administration and supervision of the rebuilding of Iraq. This means
ORHA was intended to be the authority for administering contracts related to the civilpolitical rebuilding of Iraq.1 Garner got the call for the job on January 9, 2003. Garner
took the job as a contractor. It was planned that he would be replaced after ORHA was up
and running. To accomplish his task, he was given little more than a job title.2
The Iraqi chaos that Garner came into was accelerating from bad to worse, and
from the start Garner was facing an almost impossible task in trying to organize efforts to
reconstruct Iraq. His attempts to establish a team and develop plans were thwarted by
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bureaucratic delays from the Pentagon. In the end, Garner got limited funds and approval
for 150 law enforcement experts. What he actually received was fifty "experts" to do a
fact-finding mission, and none of those were to do any direct enforcement of the law.4 On
April 24, 2003, Garner was told by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld that he would be
replaced by L. Paul Bremer III, a retired diplomat.5 The point is that ORHA did not
accomplish very much, but it did take up some time in the sequence of establishing
contract administrators that were not a part of the military.

CPA AND CONTRACT ADMINISTRATORS
In June 2003, ORHA dissolved and was replaced by the CPA under the authority
of Paul Bremer, who according to custom is referred to as "Ambassador" although he did
not hold rank as such in Iraq. As head of the CPA he served as a contractor. Bremer and
the CPA reported to the secretary of defense, not the State Department.6 The dissolution
of the Iraqi army was among Bremer's earliest official acts. Without the Iraqi army as an
organized workforce, the CPA had few resources other than money. Accordingly, Bremer
chose to use contractors in order to rebuild Iraq. His choice put the CPA on track as the
overseer of building and security contractors.7
Consequently Bremer started publishing the policies that established legal
jurisdiction for the contractors in Iraq. Again, I point out that this legal jurisdiction is
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currently being subjected to legal debate in U.S. federal courts. The U.S. government's
experience with contractors at the time Bremer started to include them in his plans mostly
came from the military's successful experience with the Logistics Civil Augmentation
Program (LOGCAP). The LOGCAP contributed Type III unarmed contractors such as
KBR. At that time, the U.S. government had very little experience using Type V armed
civilian security providers such as those Custer Battles was to provide. In a CPA Public
Notice issued in June 2003, international legal provisions were cited indicating that local
law and the jurisdiction of local courts did not apply to coalition forces and civilian
personnel accompanying them. The notice stated that coalition military and civilian
personnel were to remain subject to the "exclusive jurisdiction of the state that
contributed them to the coalition. The state could waive the jurisdiction or immunity at
their discretion."8
In August 2003, David Nash,9 newly appointed as the CPA Director of the Iraq
Program Management Office,10 started the design plan for rebuilding Iraq. Nash had
gained considerable experience working with Type II and III engineering contractors
during his career managing construction in the U.S. Navy. By November he announced
his plan and explained that the $18.4 billion approved by Congress would be used to hire
U.S. and coalition firms to do the rebuilding. Nash would oversee the contractors that
would administer the program and coordinate those doing the rebuilding. Nash organized
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the rebuilders as a structure consisting of three basic groups. These were the U.S. Army
Corps of Engineers, USAID, and various Iraqi ministries.11
The USAID administered most of the Type III rebuilding contracts for fiscal year
2003 (FY2003) before the CPA was established. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and
the U.S. Department of State administered only a few Type III rebuilding contracts at that
time. For the most part, USAID contracts are for "economic, social, and political
development programs." However, USAID did administer $1 billion in FY2003
construction money to Bechtel before there was a CPA. When the CPA became an
operating agency, the USAID, U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the Department of
State continued administering their contracts in tandem with the CPA efforts. The CPA is
the authority for the contracts that are administered by David Nash's CPA Program
Management Office (PMO). These contracts fall under the original $18.6 billion
allocated by Congress for rebuilding Iraq. According to the Congressional Research
Service, the PMO was responsible for twenty-five prime reconstruction contracts in Iraq
that were funded by these monies.12
In his briefing for a conference of potential contract bidders in Washington in
2003, David Nash provided guidance regarding administration and regulation of the
contracts. First he stipulated that the contract processing was to be competitive, done
quickly, and done with maximum transparency. Each contract would be a competitive bid
and in accordance with federal regulation.
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The CPA did publish clear public notices for the regulations, orders, and
memorandums that pertain to the regulation of contractors and their licenses to carry
firearms. CPA Order No. 3, titled Weapons Control (revised and amended) of 31
December 2003, is official authorization for contractors to possess and use licensed
firearms and military weapons. The Iraqi Ministry of Interior is the licensing authority for
the contractors. The licensed contractors are authorized to use the weapons in the course
of their duties. CPA Memorandum No. 5 implemented Order No. 3 and established the
weapons authorization for the individuals to carry weapons after demonstration of a need
to do so. CPA Order No. 17 provided regulations for the practice of contracting. This
order gave contractors immunity from Iraqi laws. The order, as issued, respected that
contractors are to perform their contracts under terms of their sending state's laws and
regulations.14
The CPA dissolved on June 28, 2004. At that time the Iraq Reconstruction and
Management Office (IRMO) was established under the Department of State. On the same
date the contracts administered by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers administratively
came under the Project and Contracting Office (PCO). The PCO reported to the DOD,
and for contracts in Iraq they both reported to the Department of State.

IRAQI MINISTRY OF THE INTERIOR
When the Iraq government stood up as a sovereign state, the Iraqi Ministry of the
Interior became the overseer or regulating agency for security companies in Iraq. This
authority was specified by the CPA Memorandum 17, which was published before the
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new government assumed sovereignty. Accordingly, as of June 1, 2005, all private
security companies in Iraq were to register with the ministry. By the end of the month,
thirty-seven security companies had complied with the registry requirement and nineteen
were either awaiting approval or were in the midst of compliance. The early data is
somewhat confusing, but this represents fifty-six of the total of sixty that were known to
be in operation. The confusion apparently is because some security provider firms are
subcontracted to prime contractors whose services are "rebuilding," and apparently these
contractors do not define themselves as security firms. The Ministry is the overseer for
security companies, but it is not the overseer for contractors that are rebuilders.

BECHTEL NATIONAL, INC.
Bechtel National, Inc. has a reputation for accepting tough construction jobs and
supporting conservative U.S. politicians. Bechtel is a longtime defense contractor
specializing in Type III construction support. The firm headquarters is located at 50 Beal
St., San Francisco, CA 94105-1813. The privately owned firm is one of the leading
international engineering, construction, and project management firms in the world. In
2006 Bechtel had $20.5 billion in revenues and booked over $24.7 billion in new work.
The firm employs 40,000 people. Riley Bechtel is the current chairman and chief
executive officer. Riley Bechtel's own words indicate some of the firm's character. He
has said, "Our business is delivering challenging projects for our customers. We are
challenge junkies."16

Porteus, "Fast Facts: Contractors in Iraq."
Washington DC Examiner, "Riley Bechtel."

187
However, meeting the challenges involved with some of the 22,000 projects
Bechtel has tackled in 140 nations since 1898 has not always resulted in success.17 For
example, the results of Bechtel's construction work on Boston's "Big Dig" and Iraq's
schools have both been criticized as being disasters. On the other hand, the firm has made
significant engineering contributions that include the San Francisco Bay Area Transit
(BART) and the Hoover Dam.18 This case study analyzes this civil engineering giant's
specific contributions in Iraq in light of the results of its work on the $1.03 billion
construction contract it was awarded to rebuild Iraq's schools. The construction contract
was awarded and under the control of USAID.19

Bechtel: Origins/History
Bechtel history and the fact that it originated nearly 100 years ago as a family
business suggest that the family character may hold some insight into how the firm could
be expected to react and contribute to the U.S. government's needs for a building
contractor in Iraq. In 1898 Warren A. Bechtel hired out himself and his team of mules to
help build the Oklahoma railroad. He soon started the W.A. Bechtel Co. to build roads,
tunnels, and do other engineering projects. Warren modernized his construction
capability with the latest technology to make it more efficient. For example, he led the
way in the use of the steam shovel and dump trucks when they became available. In
1931, Warren assembled the Six Companies consortium, one of the engineering
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industry's first large-scale joint ventures. The consortium built the Hoover Dam. This
story suggests that the legacy of Warren Bechtel's nature was to work hard, to be
inventive, and to build big projects.20
In 1933 Stephen (Steve) Bechtel, known within the firm as a visionary, took the
helm when his father, Warren, passed away. Steve, who once said about the firm, "We
can build anything, anytime, anywhere," developed Bechtel's global interest. For
example, Bechtel built the Trans-Arabian pipeline under Steve's leadership. Steve
Bechtel's visionary nature is his legacy at the firm. He initiated the firm's defense
business and got Bechtel into the Middle East as a builder during World War II. With this
experience it is natural to expect that Bechtel would be able to make significant
contributions as a builder in Iraq.21
When Stephen (Steve) Bechtel Jr. became the firm's president in 1960, he
continued to use the latest techniques and technology, as his grandfather had when he
first started in the industry. Under Steve Jr.'s management, the firm built various complex
projects, such as offshore platforms, nuclear- and fossil-fired power plants, and the Jubal
industrial city in Saudi Arabia. Thus Stephen Bechtel Jr. kept the firm involved in Middle
East construction. This suggests that the firm knows the regional culture and what it takes
to succeed as a builder there.22
Riley P. Bechtel's father, Stephen Bechtel Jr., retired in 1990. Riley, as the fourth
member of his family to lead the firm since it was begun by Warren A. Bechtel, has
expanded the extent of the firm's operations into building large urban infrastructures.
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Some examples of this trend are the Boston Central Artery/Tunnel project, the Hong
Kong Airport Core Program, and the Manila Water Company in the Philippines. Riley, as
pointed out earlier, has organized Bechtel to be able to quickly respond to challenging
industry opportunities to build "anything, anytime, anywhere."23 This all suggests that the
character of Bechtel National, Inc., has been shaped by determined leaders with rich
building experience and knowledge of how to succeed in doing contract business with the
U.S. government.

Bechtel: Political Connections
Bechtel has developed numerous political ties during its years in business. One
connection that was to become an important political tie was made early in the firm's
history, when Stephen Bechtel, Jr., met John A. McCone while both were studying
engineering at the University of California-Berkeley. In 1937 McCone, Bechtel, and
Henry J. Kaiser became partners in several firms, including the Bechtel-McCone
Corporation. The partners' various undertakings during World War II included
shipbuilding on the West Coast, oil pipeline construction in Alaska, and oil refinery
construction in Bahrain. After the war, Bechtel bought out his partners. McCone
eventually worked himself into position to become Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency (CIA) when President John F. Kennedy dismissed Allen W. Dulles after the Bay
of Pigs disaster.24
Another important political connection evolved when George P. Schultz, a
Bechtel president from 1974 to 1982, later became secretary of state. Former Secretary of
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Defense Casper Weinberger was Bechtel's general counsel. Retired Marine General Jack
Sheehan, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic, and Commander in Chief
U.S. Atlantic Command, was Bechtel's senior vice president for project operations in
Europe, Africa, the Middle East and Southwest Asia. He now sits on the Defense Policy
Board, which advises the Pentagon on defense issues. Certainly one of the most visible
political connections is seen in the fact that in February 2003, President George W. Bush
appointed Riley Bechtel to the Export Council. The council's mission is focused on the
enlargement of the U.S. export market.25 Thus the Bechtel president is advising the U.S.
president on how to improve trade. One result of the Bechtel's close political connections
is that it is frequently a target for political critics.

Bechtel: Lobbying and Political Contributions
Bechtel has made big political contributions over the years. In the three years
before it was awarded the US AID contract in 2003, the firm and its employees
contributed a total of $1.3 million to federal campaigns and candidates. Records of the
Federal Election Commission indicate that Republicans received nearly 60 percent of the
contributions, and Democrats the remainder.

Bechtel: Iraqi Contributions
On April 17, 2003, USAID awarded Bechtel a contract for $34.6 million. The
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract has a worth of up to $680 million over eighteen months. The
construction contract is for rebuilding infrastructure such as the water supply, electrical
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power grids, schools, and roads in Iraq. Subsequently, Bechtel awarded a number of
subcontracts:
1. ArmorGroup Land Mines, United Kingdom, for advisory services on
unexploded ordnance.
2. Al-Bahar and Bardawil, Kuwait, for construction and earth-moving
equipment.
3. Great Lakes Dredge and Dock, Oak Brook, Illinois, emergency dredging and
marine surveying of Umm Qasr port.
4. National Catering, Saudi Arabia.
5. Olive Security, Britain, for security during initial "pre-positioning and factfinding phases" of construction work.
6. Tamini Enterprises, Saudi Arabia, caterers.
7. Titan Maritime, Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, for marine survey of wrecks at Umm
Qasr port.
8. Verestar, Fairfax, Virginia, for emergency satellite communication.26

In September 2003, USAID amended Bechtel's contract because of the condition
of the infrastructure and Iraq's deteriorating stability. USAID announced that an
additional $350 million would be added to the $680 million. Additionally, the contract
ceiling potential reached $1.03 billion.27 Bechtel's revenue for 2003 grew
to $16.3 billion, a total increase of 40 percent. The firm's new work increased
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$21 billion, which was an increase of 65 percent. The firm's government contract and
increased profits all suggest that the firm is gaining substantial profits from the war.28

Bechtel: Threats/Adverse Public Impact
Bechtel's reconstruction work in Iraq has resulted in adverse publicity for the firm
and U.S. efforts to rebuild Iraq. In this massive project, which involved approximately
1,500 schools, Bechtel subcontracted work to sixty-five Iraqi companies. In an article that
is critical of Bechtel, Egyptian journalist Karim El-Gawhary points specifically to the
substandard work done by one of the Bechtel Iraqi subcontractors, Adnan Mussawi. In
one instance the Mussawi firm allegedly approached a school representative with a
request to sign a job completion order for work that was not done. In the same school the
subcontractor did cosmetic work, such as painting, but did not fix the toilets, which were
the most serious problem. El-Gawhary is careful to point out in his article that Anbariyn
School officials told him that no Bechtel official had been to oversee the work at the
school. In one case a student fell because a banister had been improperly installed. The
point here is that Bechtel's school reconstruction project is an extremely visible
humanitarian project.29
On May 5, 2003, Jane Mayer published an article in the New Yorker asserting that
there is a demonstrable connection between Bechtel's construction work in Iraq and
Osama bin Laden. Mayer wrote that bin Laden's estranged family has $10 million in
investments with The Fremont Group, a private equity group that was a Bechtel
subsidiary until 1986. The Bechtel family continues to own a majority of The Fremont
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Group. Mayer goes on criticize the bin Laden-Bechtel connection based on Bechtel's
receipt of the USAID contract to rebuild Iraq.30
In response to Myers's article and a similar one on the CNN/Money Magazine
Web31 site, the Bechtel Web site stated that the assertions made by both were "reckless
and false." The Bechtel rebuttal points out that The Fremont Group has been independent
of Bechtel since 1989 and that the bin Laden family investments had been reported over a
year before Myers article. Bechtel admitted that it has done business with the bin Laden
family construction firm in the past. Furthermore, there is no "money trail" between the
bin Laden investment with Fremont Group and Bechtel's reconstruction work in Iraq.32
In April 2004, Jude Laspa, Bechtel's executive vice president and deputy chief
operating officer, advised Reuters that the firm's work in Iraq was proving to be one of
the most challenging jobs the firm had ever attempted. Laspa indicated that the Iraqi
violence was affecting Bechtel's work, but overall he expressed confidence that the firm
was on target to complete its USAID work. USAID indicated there were no signs that the
surge in fighting at that time would prevent their projects from being completed.
However, Danielle Brian, executive director for the Project on Government Oversight, a
nonprofit government watchdog organization, expressed some doubt that it was possible
for contractors to "get anything done" as a result of the violent environment.33
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BLACKWATER USA
Blackwater USA was awarded its first U.S. Navy contract, worth millions of
dollars, soon after September ll. 3 4 Since that time the firm has specialized in aggressive
protective services in some of the world's most hostile environments. Blackwater has
sustained rapid growth as a defense contractor and now provides Type I, II, and III
services worldwide. The firm's headquarters are located at the end of Pudding Ridge
Road, Moyock, NC 27958. The firm's main client is the U.S. government. Blackwater is
a private enterprise.35 The firm is not traded on the stock exchange. Erik D. Prince, the
chief executive officer, cofounded the firm with another ex-Navy SEAL, Al Clark. In
March 2006 Gary Jackson, Blackwater president and ex-Navy SEAL, was selected by
Fast Company business magazine as one of its "Fast 50" leaders.
It has been reported in the press that between 2000 and 2006, Blackwater has
garnered almost a half-billion dollars in federal contracts. Many of the contracts are
classified as "no-bid" contracts. This suggests the public has little or no chance of
debating the merit of the contract, that the contract was granted due to political
favoritism, and there is a potential for fraud. The company also accepts contracts to
provide security services abroad. On any one day, Blackwater has as many as 3,000
employees working those contracts throughout the world.37
The profiles of the firm's executives and 100 training center instructors start with
their almost universal military background. The preponderance of the company's
leadership and its instructors have roots extending into the special warfare community. It
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is not surprising that, because of their military special warfare experience, the company
and its staff excel in self-reliance, small-team cohesiveness, flexibility, and a can-do
spirit when faced with difficult odds or uncertainty. This is true of the nature of how the
firm conducts business. All of these characteristics are hallmarks of their training and
experience. Blackwater's executives think big.38 The firm's vision is, "To support
security and peace, and freedom and democracy everywhere."39

Blackwater: Origins/History
Blackwater's origins and success are coupled with Erik Prince's entrepreneurial
skill, his personal wealth, and political connections, all applied to waging war against
terrorists. His father was Edgar Prince, who earned his fortune in the automobile parts
and machinery manufacturing industry as head of Prince Automotive. Erik greatly
admired his father, who passed away in 1995, and apparently inherited his dad's business
intelligence as well as his wealth. Erik knew from personal experience that the U.S. Navy
lacked suitable training facilities for training sailors in the individual and force protection
skills they would need after September 11. He invested a large sum of his personal
money on land near the huge naval installations in Norfolk, Virginia, and built the
facilities that earned Blackwater its first contract.40
The backbone of Blackwater's business is the firm's 7,000-acre training facility
for government, military, law enforcement, and private security providers. The training
center is complete with state-of-the-art classrooms, firing ranges, driving courses, and
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facilities for hand-to-hand combat. The facilities can easily handle up to 500 students a
day. The students pay up to $20,000 for an eight-week security course that prepares them
to work in the world's most hostile environment.41
Blackwater has rapidly expanded and diversified its security business. The
training center has ten divisions: Training, Blackwater Target Systems, Blackwater
Global Security Consulting, Blackwater Canine, Maritime Security, Custom Armored
Vehicles & Airships, Parachute Jump Team, Aviation, Raven Construction, and
Development Group. The firm lists two strategic partners, Aviation Worldwide Services
and Grey stone Ltd.42

Blackwater: Lobbying and Political Connections
Erik Prince has personal political connections. Joseph Neff and Jay Price reported
for The News & Observer that Erik Prince contributed $15,000 to the Republican Party
when he was only nineteen years old. He worked for Republican Congressman Dana
Rohrabacher's staff as a defense analyst and for Patrick Buchanan as a campaign staffer.
Erik also interned with the Family Research Council, which was founded by his father.43
Before he entered the U.S. Navy, he was an intern in George H. W. Bush's White House.
In a Harper's Magazine article, Ken Silverstein asserted that between 1998 and 2006,
Prince made political donations to various Republican Party committees that amounted to
almost $200,000. Some of these donations were made to candidate George W. Bush.44
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Erik's sister is a past chairwoman for the Republican Party in Michigan. Betsy
Prince DeVos is married to Dick DeVos, a prominent Michigan politician and extremely
wealthy son of the founder of Amway products and marketing. Erik, who is widely
known as a born-again Christian, is a Christian Freedom International board member.
Christian Freedom International is a nonprofit group committed to assisting Christians
around the world who are wronged. Prince is also known to have made political
donations to Tom DeLay when he was the House majority leader.45 Therefore, it is not
surprising that Blackwater has hired the services of the Alexander Strategy Group, which
is known to have close ties to the Republican Party and Tom DeLay, to represent the
firm's interest on Capitol Hill. Robert Schlesinger, in an article that is critical of
contractors and the Republican Party, asserts that Blackwater may have made a smart
choice in selecting Alexander Strategy Group. He means that Alexander, as do all
successful Washington lobbyists, has many connections in the federal government. The
Alexander employees identified by Schlesinger have ties that are traceable to the
Republican Party. The Alexander chairman is Ed Buckham, Tom DeLay's former chief
of staff. The other members that are identified as part of the Alexander team, Tony Rudy
and Karl Gallant, also have ties to DeLay.46
Blackwater's vice chairman is Cofer Black. Black was the former director of the
CIA's Counterterrorist Center, and at the State Department he held the rank of
Ambassador.
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Blackwater: Iraqi Contributions
Ambassador Paul Bremer's personal protective detail focused a lot of attention on
all contractors in Iraq. This is especially true for Blackwater USA because it became well
known as the firm that provided his highly visible personal security detail. However,
before explaining Blackwater's contribution in protecting Ambassador Bremer, it is
instructive to look at a related situation involving the private protective detail for Afghan
President Hamid Karzai, which shows that a private security detail is sometimes viewed
as much in terms of political prestige as in security. In September 2003, representatives
Henry J. Hyde (R-Ill.) and Tom Lantos (D-Calif.) joined to request that the State
Department and Department of Defense protect President Karzai with U.S. government
resources instead of using a contractor for such a high-profile politician. The
representatives' reasoning was that commercial vendors protecting Karzai would send the
political signal that the U.S. is not serious about the commitment to him. However, the
U.S. State Department's Department of Diplomatic Security, knowing this was a job
beyond its normal capability and training, contracted with DynCorp for Karzai's
protection. The State Department knew that DynCorp had successfully protected
President Jean-Bertrand Aristide in the hostile environment of Haiti in the 1990s. The
State Department could have chosen almost any firm, but it chose DynCorp. Keeping
President Karzai alive in such a hostile environment resulted in lot of earned respect for
the private security industry as a whole.47 The DynCorp case follows later in this chapter.
In Iraq, Blackwater USA also gained respect among those who favor private
security because of the capability the firm exhibited in protecting Bremer during the very
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dangerous year after the fall of Baghdad. Bremer traveled extensively in Iraq with his
Blackwater security providers. They were often photographed in his presence, and this
resulted in a lot of public attention and questions about who they were. The U.S. public
usually pays little attention to the president's low-profile Secret Service protectors. They
receive little notice because their body armor and weapons are concealed and the
environment is different. Protective service teams must adapt to the threat environment,
and the Bremer detail, which did so, was frequently seen on the cable news brandishing
an exotic assortment of weapons. In contrast to the U.S. president's Secret Service
protection, the heavily armed Blackwater team that protected Bremer presented a higher
profile in an extremely dangerous environment. One result of this was to make
Blackwater itself a "celebrity." However, no congressional criticism surfaced at the time,
as it had when DynCorp was contracted to escort President Karzai in Afghanistan.
Among other reasons, Bremer was an American official in a high-profile position
requiring mobility in the dangerous Iraqi environment.
The personal protective work in Iraq earned the firm $18.9 million by 2003. It is
difficult to find the numbers of employees Blackwater has operating in Iraq. In 2005, one
press report indicated there were 450 Blackwater employees in Iraq.49 In December 2006
David Isenberg asserted there were possibly 600 Blackwater employees working in
Iraq.50 During the same month, the Central Command Consensus reported a count of
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1,000 Blackwater employees, providing mostly private security. Private security in this
case, I believe, means security provided to protect a private, non-government client.
As result of Blackwater's experience with Ambassador Paul Bremer, the State
Department awarded the firm a follow-on contract in 2004 to protect U.S. Ambassador
John Negroponte when he assumed office after Iraqi sovereignty. This State Department
contract is known as the Worldwide Personal Protective Service (WPPS) and is valued at
$750 million. The scope of the contract includes more than protecting Negroponte; it is a
contract to provide armed protective service details for State Department diplomats
anywhere the need arises.

Blackwater: Threats/Adverse Public Impact
In an incident that has received substantial media attention, a group of Blackwater
employees and four military members defended the CPA in Najaf from a determined
attack. The contractors called for U.S. military assistance, but were left to themselves in a
raging firefight for hours. Two armed military helicopters did fly over the building during
that time, but did not engage in the fight even though at least four military members, one
wounded, were present on the ground and were assisting in the fight to keep attackers
from overrunning the Coalition Headquarters. On two occasions it was necessary for a
Blackwater helicopter to bring in additional ammunition and eventually evacuate the
wounded military member. Robert Young Pelton's report of the same incident states that
one U.S. Navy helicopter did provide supporting fire at one point. He also reports that
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during the Najaf engagement, an uprising of Moqtada al-Sadr forces was ongoing and
could have tied up U.S. forces, thus keeping them from responding.
Blackwater's strong protective capability has drawn criticism because it gives the
cloudy perception that the firm may have violated U.S. law. According to existing U.S.
military policy and U.S. law, there are three functions contractors are not to perform:
armed combat, command and control of U.S. military and civilian personnel, and the
function of contracting (the writing and management of contracts). However, I maintain
that the general combat environment in which contractors operate in Iraq gives them little
choice but to use firepower sufficient to stop determined assailants. To do otherwise
would handicap the contractors to the point that they could not fulfill their security
contract obligations and their lives would be put at risk.
As a matter of adverse criticism I will return to the Karzai protective detail to
make an additional argument. The congressional concern regarding the U.S. use of
private protection for President Karzai is interesting. International political perceptions
are just as important as the operational reality for keeping Karzai and Bremer alive. The
final decision for the protective detail went to a contractor. The merit of the decision has
to go to the results. President Karzai is alive and no damage has come to political
perceptions at the time I am writing this. In the case of Paul Bremer's use of contractors,
the perception of a private versus public means of protection was not a political
consideration. The operational consideration to protect Bremer was the first concern and
a Blackwater USA close security team was contracted to protect him.
One lesson learned from Afghanistan is the difference in capability between a
U.S. military close-in protective detail and the same service provided by contractors. On
September 5, 2002, an attempt was made to assassinate President Karzai. The U.S. Navy
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SEAL team that was temporarily assigned to protect him did so, but in the process killed
two innocent Afghanis. In the imminent circumstance of a possible attack on Bremer, it
was both an operational and political imperative for his protectors to be the most capable
personal protection providers available. Should an unfortunate incident have occurred
with Bremer's security team as it did with the military team protecting Karzai, it would
have seriously damaged U.S. warfare capability. I believe the Karzai and Bremer
experience with contracted security is a significant turning point for raising the level of
U.S. decision makers' confidence and acceptance that contractors can successfully
contribute to political and military goals.53
Blackwater did keep Bremer alive, but in doing so the tactics were a cost to the
U.S. civil/political goals. Bill Sizemore and Joanne Kimberlin wrote in The Virginia Pilot
that Thomas X. Hammes, author of The Sling and the Stone, related to them that during
his time in Iraq as a U.S. Marine colonel, he observed Blackwater security details
protecting Ambassador Bremer on several occasions. Hammes, who is known to be a
critic of security contractors on the battlefield, said the Blackwater security details he
observed did a professional job. He explained that they executed their tactics to protect
Bremer very aggressively. Hammes stated that Blackwater kept Bremer alive, but in
forcing his vehicles through traffic by intimidation of Iraqi drivers, the firm's employees
damaged the U.S. goal of winning the trust and confidence of the Iraqi people.54
In the debate over the nature of the individual contractor, some extreme
pessimists consider the contractors to be mercenaries that will go to any length on the
battlefield to make a buck. These critics frequently point to American civilians like the
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Blackwater contractors killed on the bridge near Fallujah. The critics focus on the fact
that the contractors earn up to $1,000 per day for security work such as protecting Paul
Bremer. Robert Young Pelton, who has interviewed and was protected by contractors
while investigating the industry in Afghanistan and Iraq, is supportive of them.55 The four
Blackwater USA employees killed in Fallujah that day were known to their families and
friends as patriots. They were young Americans much like those in uniform serving in
Iraq. They were named Wesley Batalona, Scott Helvenston, Michael Teague, and Jerry
Zovko.56 They did make a personal choice to work in a dangerous profession, which cost
them their lives. My argument is not with the fact that the contractors chose to make a
substantial amount of money; my argument is with the use of contractors in Type V
security roles.
The Fallujah bridge incident has been used to illustrate several arguments
throughout this study. In the KBR case I pointed out that Representative Waxman's
committee had experienced difficulty in determining who Blackwater was protecting at
the time of the incident. One of the obstacles to Waxman's inquiry is the litigation or
wrongful death lawsuit that the families of the Blackwater employees killed in Fallujah
have brought against the firm. Blackwater has declined to provide information to
Representative Waxman's committee on the grounds that the information could be used
against the firm in the lawsuit. The lawsuit charges that the firm's operational practices
placed the men in jeopardy, and that the firm's attempts to save money on equipment
such as properly armored vehicles, personal protective vests, and weapons made the men
vulnerable when they were ambushed. The lawsuit started in January 2005 in a North
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Carolina State Court. Blackwater's attorneys argue that the firm is not liable before the
state court. Blackwater further argues since it is a private contractor that is part of the
U.S. total force, the only remedy for the employee deaths is the Death Base Act. The
Death Base Act is a taxpayer-funded insurance program with death benefits capped at
$4,123.12 per month. The eventual outcome of the litigation of this case is expected to set
precedents with long-term consequences for the government's use of contractors in
combat. A loss could mean that contractors will have to figure the cost of state tort
lawsuits into their expenses. The results would make the overall cost of contractors
extremely prohibitive.57
There is an incident involving a Blackwater employee that is not well known to
the public and has a strong potential to create an adverse public response when it does
become known. Robert Y. Pelton, author of Licensed to Kill, wrote that after a Christmas
party in 2006, an off-duty Blackwater employee shot and killed an Iraqi security
contractor in the employ of the vice president of Iraq. Pelton asserts that the Blackwater
employee, who was drunk at the time, fired his entire pistol magazine into the victim. The
incident allegedly occurred in the Green Zone in Baghdad. Additional circumstances
related immediately to the incident are not known. In fact, the point of Pelton's article is
that this situation is a "dirty secret." That is to say, the Blackwater employee was flown
CO

back to the States and fired, with little or no official reporting about the incident.
On February 7, 2007, Representative Henry A. Waxman's Committee on
Oversight and Government Reform produced a memorandum that reported concern that
Blackwater may have been involved in overcharging and double-billing. The committee's
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information came from a January 2005 State Department Inspector General (IG) report
that found indications "that Blackwater was charging the government separately for
'drivers' and 'security specialists,' who were in fact the same individuals." The Oversight
Committee included these assertions in the memorandum. Even though the information is
more than two years old, no information was reported to explain how the IG's findings
were resolved. My point is that if Blackwater was involved in wrongdoing in 2005, the
matter was corrected between the firm and the State Department, because the two
organizations are still working together in Iraq in 2007. My other point is that
Blackwater's contributions to U.S. warfare capability have been made under stringent
congressional oversight.59

COMPUTER SCIENCES CORPORATION
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC) was chosen as a case because it is linked
to DynCorp, a firm originally chosen as part of this study. CSC is headquartered in El
Segundo, California. Today the firm is a global consulting and information technology
service company. Van B. Honeycutt is chairman and CEO. He leads a senior
management team that has both domestic and international experience in business and
technology. The CSC Defense Division president is Austin Yerks. The CSC Web site
claims the firm has partnered with the federal government for "half a century." The firm
has over 77, 000 employees located in more than eighty different countries. CSC's
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financial performance for fiscal year 2006 set a firm record for major business awarded
of $12.1 billion for continuing operations and an annual net income of $634.0 million.60

CSC: Origins/History
Computer Sciences Corporation was founded in 1959. CSC announced in
December 2003 that it was acquiring DynCorp. This was an interesting deal. CSC, a big
California-based IT company, was positioning itself to compete for lucrative defense
contracts as war clouds gathered over Washington. Acquiring DynCorp was a good way
to enter the defense industry because the firm had more than five years' experience as a
government contractor. Also, DynCorp is an experienced IT and security firm.61

CSC: Lobbying and Political Connections
In 2001, CSC spent $520,000 to get its business message to Congress and a
variety of government decision makers. In addition, the firm spent $580,000 on lobbying
efforts to target federal services including privatization legislation. CSC's lobbying costs
the following year were $1.1 million.62

CSC: Iraqi Contributions
CSC is DynCorp's parent company. The CSC contributions in Iraq have been
made in the name of DynCorp. The DynCorp case follows.
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DYNCORP INTERNATIONAL, INC.
DynCorp is a subsidiary of CSC. DynCorp primarily contributes Type V law
enforcement training, security services, and base operations, and Type IV outsourced
technical services to civilian and military government agencies. The chairman is Robert
B. McKeon; the president, CEO and director is Herbert J. Lanese. DynCorp International,
Inc., headquarters is located at Suite 700, 3190 Fairview Park Drive, Falls Church, VA
22042, where it has a staff of about fifty employees. The firm keeps the bulk of its
operational support, about 600 employees, in Irving and Fort Worth, Texas, and it has
nearly 14,400 employees scattered in thirty-three countries. The employees have varied
qualifications, including marketing degrees. Many of the DynCorp employees have longterm operations experience in various U.S. or foreign military services, which suggests
that the character of the firm is more military centered than security centered, even
though the preponderance of work is law enforcement training. The firm is a military
defense company and is traded on the New York Stock Exchange. In addition to the U.S.
government, its clients includes commercial enterprises such as Fluor, Lucent, Parsons,
and Washington Group International. The Kuwaiti and Royal Saudi Air Forces also are
DynCorp clients. In 2006 the firm had $1.97 billion in revenues and $28.4 million in net
income. As a warfare contractor, DynCorp provides Type II advisory and training
services for the State Department and the Defense Department. DynCorp established its
reputation as a security provider for government officials and facilities in Afghanistan
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and as a police trainer in other countries. The U.S. State Department granted the firm a
huge security contract to provide law enforcement training for the Iraqi police.64

DynCorp: Origins/History
Originally the firm developed as a result of a 1946 merger of Land-Air, Inc., and
California Eastern Airways. The Air Force Logistics Command awarded its first Contract
Field Teams (CFT) contract to DynCorp in 1951. Today, more than five decades later,
DynCorp continues to provide worldwide "mission support and depot-level repair to U.S.
military aircraft and weapons systems" under the CFT program, according to the
company's Web site. As DynCorp matured it developed a business interest in technology
and at the same time it included international clients in addition to its domestic business.
DynCorp has been involved in several mergers, and in March 2003 was acquired by
Computer Sciences Corporation (CSC). DynCorp retained its subsidiaries, DynCorp
Technical Services, Inc. (DTS) and DynCorp International LLC.65
In 1997, during the Balkan conflict, DynCorp won the bidding for LOGCAP II,
taking it away from KBR for five years. However, DynCorp lost the bidding when
LOGCAP III expired in 2001. LOGCAP III was the first time that the scope of the
contract was doubled from five to ten years.
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DynCorp: Lobbying and Political Connections
The vast majority of DynCorp's annual revenues come from government
business. Barry Yeoman asserted in the Independent Weekly that those revenues exceed
96 percent of $2 billion per annum. DynCorp, along with other firms, such as MPRI,
have contributed to reelection funds in congressional and presidential elections.

DynCorp: Iraqi Contributions
DynCorp was the recipient of a $750 million State Department Type II contract
for organizing and training the Iraqi police. The firm employed mostly retired U.S. police
officers to serve as trainers in Iraq. The challenge of creating an Iraqi police force capable
of establishing law and order did not go well from the start. The size of the problem was
overwhelming. In the fall of 2004 500 DynCorp trainers arrived to instruct some 90,000
police recruits. The number of trainers was not enough to get the job done. At the same
time, the security threat prevented the 500 trainers from getting out to work. It was not
long before the U.S. military had to step in to help with the police training.68
The State Department supervision of the DynCorp police training contract was
limited. There were only two government employees assigned to observe DynCorp
performance. It is not surprising that allegations of criminal fraud soon surfaced. A
DynCorp subcontractor in Jordan is alleged to have stolen $600,000 in fuel. In that
incident DynCorp had not properly installed fraud controls; it did so after firing the
employee and repaying the government. In another case the State Department has alleged
that DynCorp employees arranged a sale of Iraqi police ammunition. The firm, which has
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cooperated with contract supervisors as these investigations have proceeded, maintains
that the suspects in these cases were not American. The suspects have not been publicly
identified because the investigations are still open.69
The State Department did not hold DynCorp responsible for the success or failure
of the Iraq police program. According to Richard Cashon, a DynCorp vice president and
spokesman, contractor performance was judged by the quality of the employees the firm
employed. The output of the DynCorp trainers, the capability of the police to establish
law and order, was not a criterion forjudging how well the firm fulfilled the obligations
of the contract.70 That is to say, according to the contract, what mattered was the quality
of the police trainer—not how the police functioned after receiving DynCorp training.

DynCorp: Threats/Adverse Public Impact
Late in the 1990s, the alleged criminal behavior by two DynCorp employees in
Bosnia, who were said to have been involved in sex trafficking, drew adverse public
attention to the firm and the U.S. military. Barry Yeoman, who is a critic of private
military contractors, reported that the two employees were selling the sexual services of
young Bosnian women. Yeoman asserts that DynCorp sent the two alleged perpetrators
back to the U.S. and fired the two whistle-blowers.71
In 2000, primarily because the judicial system was unable to take court action in
the DynCorp employee sex-trafficking case, Congress passed the Military Extraterritorial
Jurisdiction Act. The law was intended to give the federal courts jurisdiction to prosecute
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DOD civilians working outside of the United States. Congress subsequently included
contractors under the provisions of the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act.
On June 12, 2007, DynCorp International released a business wire announcing
that Michael W. Butler, the senior deputy program manager for the Civilian Police
Advisory Training Team (CPATT), was killed in an ambush near Tikrit, Iraq. The
CPATT is a subcomponent of the Multinational Security Transition Command, which is
responsible for training the Iraq police. Mr. Butler, a retired U.S. Air Force colonel,
exemplified the training and distinct capabilities of DynCorp employees. He was an
expert logistician with more than thirty years' experience in supply, maintenance,
transportation, and food services. He was DynCorp's senior manager, responsible for
supporting over 700 DynCorp contract employees.73

CUSTER BATTLES LLC
Custer Battles is an example of how easily a firm can be launched with a strong
entrepreneurial spirit to take advantage of frenzied wartime contracting procedures and
then wind up entangled in legal controversies. Custer Battles and its owners are widely
known for their fraud schemes and the Federal False Claims Act lawsuit that has been
brought against them by former employees. The lawsuit has the potential of shaping the
way contractor fraud is prosecuted for defense contractors in Iraq. Custer Battles, a very
new firm, conducted Type V security work in Iraq. The firm's Web site lists the
headquarters address as 55 Hammarlund Way, Suite 100, Middletown, RI02842; the
company also maintains offices at 8201 Greensboro Dr., Suite 214, McLean, VA 22102.
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Custer Battles employed more than 700 people to work on at least $100 million in Type
V security contracts for the CPA in Iraq.74

Custer Battles: Origins/History
The company was launched in 2001 by Scott Custer and Mike Battles, two former
U.S. Army officers. Apparently the firm's first contract was won in Iraq. In June 2003 the
Coalition Provisional Authority advertised for a contractor to provide security for the
Baghdad airport. The CPA was in a rush to get the facility operational soon as possible.
Custer Battles accepted a contract for $16.8 million, promising to have security providers
on site in two weeks. The firm arranged for security subcontractors to meet the deadline.
However, some of these quit shortly after they started because of disagreements with the
firm.75

Custer Battles: Political Connections
A 2006 editorial for The Providence Journal claimed Mike Battles of Barrington
as one of Rhode Island's own. The editorial points out that Battles' campaign for
candidacy as a Republican for Congress in the 2002 primaries did not prosper. Following
his failure as a politician, Battles moved to Washington, D.C., where he occasionally
appeared as a Fox News analyst.76 Battles is alleged to have worked for the CIA, but the
circumstance relating to the end of his employment is not known. Scott Custer has said
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that Battles is well connected in the Republican Party and has ties to individuals in the
White House.77

Custer Battles: Iraqi Contributions
Custer Battles provided Type V armed guards and security screeners to protect the
Baghdad Airport, according to the CPA contract.78 Then in August 2003 the firm got
another CPA contract. This contract was for the firm to provide security for changing old
Iraqi currency for 2,400 tons of new money. By November 2003 a Custer Battles
employee advised U.S. military officials that company officials were submitting inflated
bills from front companies or subcontractors that were actually owned by Custer Battles.
Also, the quality of the protective service was such that the firm was eventually banned
from doing contract work in Iraq. The details follow in this chapter.

Custer Battles: Interaction with Authorities
Custer Battles is one of the firms often singled out as having participated in
criminal schemes to profit from the war. Peter Singer, for one, has used Custer Battles as
an example. Singer and Nick McKenzie have pointed out that the firm allegedly ran a
fraudulent scheme of subsidiaries and false charges. The fog of war and the press of
battle not only obscure the intent and actions of the enemy; the same environmental
characteristics make it difficult, but not impossible, to ensure proper management and
oversight to prevent fraud such as been attributed to Custer Battles.79
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According to Michael Hirsh of Newsweek, the firm acted fraudulently and was not
cooperative with U.S. military authorities. The overcharges amounted to millions of
dollars, including double billing for employee salaries. A suit against Custer Battles
includes the allegation that the firm used Iraqi Airways forklifts that were repainted and
leased back to the U.S. government. Furthermore, according to Hirsh, the forklifts were
part of the airport property the firm was contracted to protect. Hirsh reported that in
November 2003, Col. Richard Ballard, an army inspector general, reported that the firm
was incompetent. In addition, the firm would not obey Joint Task Force 7 orders.
Subsequently, in 2004, the U.S. Air Force Office of the General Counsel found the firm
had acted to increase its profits by fraudulently creating sham companies, thereby
inflating the cost it claimed. The firm was banned from doing further contract business
QA

with the U.S. government. The Providence Journal disclosed in an editorial that Battles
maintained an office in Middletown, Rhode Island, where at least two employees worked
on two firms that were formed after the U.S. Air Force suspension of Custer Battles from
contract work in Iraq. The editorial asserted that the apparent aim of these firms was to
avoid the Air Force ban and to allow Mike Battles and Scott Custer to continue doing
business in Iraq.81

Custer Battles: Threats/Adverse Public Impact
The legal proceedings that have resulted because of Custer Battles' fraudulent
schemes have resulted in a high level of negative publicity and given an inside look at the
firm's criminal behavior. For example, Lisa Myers, an NBC investigative reporter,
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interviewed four former Custer Battles employees who quit their security jobs because of
the extremely aggressive tactics the firm used while guarding supply convoys in Iraq. The
four former contractors, all of whom had experience on active duty with the U.S.
military, explained they witnessed members of their security detail fire on and kill Iraqi
civilians. Myers's article identified the former contractors as Bill Craun, Jim Errante,
Ernest Colling, and Will Hough. In one example, the men said that a Kurd employee on
their protective detail shot into a passenger car on November 8, 2005. The team was
protecting Iraqi army ammunition and equipment and the shooter was trying to get a car
to move from a traffic jam.82
In a second incident, a Custer Battle truck drove over an Iraqi automobile that the
four former contractors said was crushed with people inside. The four men claim to have
resigned because the firm was indiscriminately shooting and killing innocent people. In
reporting the firm's side of the story Myers wrote that the firm said the witnesses had
been disgruntled employees, and that there was no merit in their allegations.
Additionally, the firm spokesperson said that the Kurd worked for another firm. The
leader of the detail, Shawn Green, asserted that no one had been in the car when the
Custer Battles truck drove over the bumper and taillight of the car. Since resigning, one
of the four witnesses has filed a report with the U.S. Army Criminal Investigative
Division.
Will Hough, one of the employees who is now a witness, is a former U.S. Marine.
As a contractor, he made about $4,000 a week in Iraq while providing security for
convoys of weapons or people in late 2004. The company, according to Hough, was
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prepared to make money, whatever the cost was to their employees, coalition military
forces, or local Iraqis.84
On March 9, 2006, Custer Battles was found guilty in federal court for defrauding
the United States. Hough is a witness in the lawsuit reported in Newsweek by Michael
Hirsh, as noted earlier. This is the first case to come out of Iraq to be prosecuted under
the Federal False Claims Act (FFCA). This means it is a precedent-setting case for those
that follow. The FFCA, popularly known as the whistle-blower law, was enacted during
the Civil War. The FFCA was amended in 1985 and is intended to encourage those with
inside knowledge of wrongdoing to assist the judicial process in taking proper legal
action to put the situation right. The incentive for the whistle-blower, according to the
FFCA, is 25 to 30 percent of the recovered damages and penalties. According to Erik
Eckholm's report for the New York Times, Custer Battles created fake companies and
fraudulently overcharged the CPA and the Iraq government "by tens of millions of
dollars." This trial focused on one $3 million situation, of which Custer Battles was found
guilty, which means the firm and the two men are required to "repay the government
triple damages and also pay fines for 37 fraudulent acts."85
The proceedings leading up to Custer Battles' time in court raised some
significant questions as to the CPA's federal authority. Assistant U.S. Attorney Richard
Sponseller has allegedly declined to prosecute Custer Battles in a federal criminal court
because the Coalition Provisional Authority was not the U.S. government.86 The matter
of the CPA's jurisdiction is being debated in the FFCA lawsuit as this is being written.
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The central theme of the debate concerns the uncertainty of the CPA's legal status based
on how the CPA was established. There are three vague and conflicting possibilities that
exist in the argument. The first possibility is that the CPA has federal power and that it
was established by a National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD). A second
possibility is that the CPA was established under the United Nations Security Council
Resolution 1438 of 2003. The third possibility is that the CPA was created by the
Commander of U.S. Central Command.87 How this issue is finally decided will set a
precedent regarding whether or not legal action can be taken in a United States federal
court on this or similar cases when the client was the CPA.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY
The cases in this chapter cover Bechtel, one of the largest rebuilder firms;
Blackwater USA, one of the best-known security firms; and Custer Battles, one of the
most criminally notorious contractor firms operating in Iraq. All of the cases in this
chapter are for contractors administered by nonmilitary/political agencies, such as the
CPA, US AID, and the U.S. State Department, that are focused on the U.S. warfare
capability to rebuild and provide security for Iraq.
The chapter began by pointing out that the policies made by the
nonmilitary/political administrators for controlling contractors are not without problems.
These problems are reflected in a lack of oversight and control over contractors that has
resulted in controversial situations that damage U.S. warfare capability. For example, the
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authority or legal right for security contractors to use deadly force against Iraqi citizens is
morally questionable because it was not granted as a matter under Iraqi sovereign
authority. The Coalition Provisional Authority Order No. 17 was signed by Paul Bremer;
however, as previously noted, the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior has authority over security
contractors, but not over prime contractors who are builders. When Bremer began writing
the CPA orders, the U.S. had very little recent experience with Type III building
contractors like Bechtel and almost none with Type V security contractors like
Blackwater and Custer Battles. My point is that the U.S. nonmilitary/political
administrators like Bremer and David Nash "grew" into their organizations along with
the institutions they created for administering the contracts during the initial stages of the
U.S. occupation. Therefore regulation and the extent of control over contractors
administered by the nonmilitary/political agencies responsible for rebuilders and their
security are not clear and ultimately threaten warfare capability by eroding the ability to
rebuild and stabilize Iraq.88
Professor Deborah Avant has argued that the private sector's role in state security
during the past twenty years has been both positive and negative. Professor Avant's
assertions are illustrated in this chapter's cases, which found that contractors'
contributions to warfare capability in Iraq have been both positive and negative. The
cases in this chapter show that the United States is letting contracts to firms that can be
identified differently according to the functions they contribute.89 After Baghdad was
liberated by military forces, the United States began to hire the services of contractors in
increasing numbers. Those contractors now provide an unprecedented variety of services
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and perform in ways that have changed the composition of the total force as well as U.S.
warfare capability.
Bechtel has more than forty years' experience as a builder in the Middle East. The
firm responded to the need for rebuilders in Iraq by bringing a large number of personnel,
equipment, and building expertise to work on projects as varied as land-mine clearing,
emergency port dredging, facility construction, and satellite communications. This effort
was an enormous contribution to the force warfare capability. The firm did a very
credible job of responding in a short time. However, Bechtel's assets flowed into a very
unstable and dangerous Iraq. Security became a problem for the firm's vulnerable
employees. The firms' employees were rebuilding essential services such as electrical
power facilities, which made the employees and the facilities lucrative targets. Not only
did the work suffer; the contract cost rose, along with public and congressional criticism,
and together these damaged the U.S. warfare capability.
The Blackwater case identifies the firm as a Type III security provider. In Iraq,
under State Department control, the firm functions primarily to provide close protection
for U.S. diplomats. The firm's excellent record for protecting dignitaries has come with
the steep cost of alienating the Iraqi population and the U.S. military, which is a serious
threat to U.S. warfare capability. I will return to this point when I make my
recommendations and argue for a restructuring of this type of security in a conflict
environment because of its political cost. Blackwater has experienced a great deal of
criticism in regard to Erik Prince's political connections and for the efforts the firm has
put into defending itself from litigations brought by the families of the victims of
Fallujah. I have not found direct evidence that political connections resulted in any of
Blackwater's business success. Blackwater is tenacious in selling its capabilities and
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providing for its legal defense, but the cases in this study shows this is true of most of the
firms analyzed.
Custer Battles is an example of all that can go wrong due to weak contract
administration and contractor control. The firm was hired to fill a critical need to secure
the Baghdad airport on short notice. The weak administrators did not screen Custer
Battles, and the firm had no time to vet its employees. To further complicate the Custer
Battles case, it was difficult for the PMO to supervise the contract. Not only was the
airport vulnerable; the firm was involved in criminal issues that damaged the U.S.
warfare capability in general.
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CHAPTER VII
FOREIGN NATIONALS AS CONTRACTORS

The goal for this chapter is to continue the analyses of individual cases for firms
that are administered and controlled by nonmilitary/political administrators that were
started in Chapter VI. My argument is:
It is the degree of government (in this chapter, nonmilitary/political
administrators') control over contractors that determines whether the
contractors' contributions have a positive or negative impact on warfare
capability.
As stated in the previous chapter, I expect to find that the nonmilitary/political
administrators' control over contractors is different from that exercised by military
administrators. I argue that this difference is reflected in how these contractors augment
or threaten warfare capability. Not only are many of the contractors in Iraq not controlled
by the U.S. military; they are not Americans. However, they are part of the total force
contributing to the U.S. warfare capability and goals to rebuild and to stabilize Iraq. In
this chapter I will include individual cases for Erinys International, Defence Systems
Limited/ArmorGroup, and Aegis Defence Services, all Type V armed security firms.
Most of the firms in this chapter are administered by nonmilitary/political administrators
responsible for stabilizing and overseeing the rebuilding of Iraq. However, some of the
firms in this group do not hold government contracts, and the firms that are hired as
security providers by private enterprise or the media are administered and controlled by
the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior.
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I expect that the findings in this chapter will be similar to the findings in Chapter
VI. All of the firms for these cases are Type V armed security companies that operate
under the same less than satisfactory control as do the firms in Chapter VI. I expect to
find that even though these firms have generally provided good security, they have on
occasion seriously threatened warfare capability by committing controversial acts that
could have been controlled by established and aggressive nonmilitary/political contract
administrators.

BACKGROUND
Foreign contractors compose a large part of the total force that makes up the
warfare capability for rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq. For example, the United Kingdom
has 3,500 contractor employees in Afghanistan and Iraq. Approximately 25 percent of the
United Kingdom's total deployed force since 2003 has been contractors.1 Interestingly,
like the Pentagon, the United Kingdom's forces have relied heavily on Halliburton for
Type III logistics support.2
Foreign contractors, like U.S. firms, are making essential contributions in the Iraq
War. The cases in this chapter identify contributions that augmented U.S. warfare
capability. At the same time, some foreign contractors were found to pose serious
potential security threats. The evidence indicates that several of the foreign Type V firms'
activities are a serious threat to U.S. warfare capability. As a start, in April 2005 an
Australian contractor and his private security convoy were ambushed while he was on a
protective service detail, driving to the Baghdad International Airport. Chris Ahmelman,
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the contractor, died from being hit in the leg and head. Most security guards in Iraq are
British or American. However, the entrepreneurial spirit brings contractors from various
other countries. In many cases, the contractor's parent country is not pleased with its
citizens' participation in a coalition for hire. In this case, the federal government of
Australia wishes contractors like Ahmelman were not involved in the war. It is believed
that between 200 to 300 Australians ignore Canberra's wishes and work in Iraq anyway.
They earn $300 to $700 a day. The two Australian-managed companies in Iraq are OAM
and Unity Resources Group. Unity, run by Gordon Conroy, a former Special Air Service
(SAS) commander, reportedly has $50 million turnover in profits every year. 3
According to Robert Pelton, some U.S. and Iraqi security companies are
employing Iraqi Sunnis from Saddam Hussein's elite guards to work on their security
protective details. The Iraqi contractors bring a cultural advantage to the security
operations. When an Iraqi security provider is shot at or killed, revenge is called for at the
family level, which serves as a kind of deterrent for future attacks. When a U.S. security
provider is shot, there is not a comparable action.4 On the other hand, the employment of
contract employees from countries other than Iraq avoids the potential of their being
involved in cultural bias or local political conflicts.
An example of negative contributions by foreign contractors can be found in a
front-page story that was published by the Washington Post on April 8, 2004. That article
reported that armed security contractors are engaged in combat in Iraq. The article
featured a story about the death of an employee of the London-based Hart Group Ltd.,
who was killed in a raging firefight. The Hart employee and four other contractors made
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numerous calls for assistance. However, the assistance never arrived and they were left to
defend themselves. On the same night, after fighting for hours and calling for military
assistance that never came, employees from Control Risk Group and Triple Canopy, both
of which are Type V security firms, "self-evacuated."5 My point is that an analysis of
non-U.S. firms is important because they are a part of the total force in Iraq. Most if not
all of the foreign firms are controlled by nonmilitary/political or private administrators,
and they all have a potential for either augmenting or threatening U.S. warfare capability
to stabilize and rebuild Iraq.
The situation described here, where requested military assistance never came, can
accurately be described as an "international contractor incident" that threatens warfare
capability. The Hart contractor killed on April 6 was Gray Branfield, a South African.
The Guardian Unlimited, a British newspaper, published the report of the incident. The
article emphasized that the four guards involved in the incident had repeatedly called the
Ukraine coalition force in the area for assistance but they would not respond. A Hart
spokesman told the Guardian that the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) allowed
private security guards to carry only small personal-protection weapons. Based on this
incident, the firm questioned the CPA's restriction because contractors could not count
on support when "you got into a tight corner." The Guardian article is extremely critical
of contractors that contribute security in Iraq. This is interesting because many of the
Type V contractors in Iraq can be linked to the United Kingdom. The entire situation is
evidence of how the lack of central control or chain of command over contractors leads to
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situations that erode warfare capability by disrupting good relations among the few U.S.
alliance partners in Iraq.

ERINYS INTERNATIONAL
Erinys International is one of the major Type V armed security contractors in Iraq.
The firm has significant links to numerous other security firms doing business in Iraq. I
will cover those links in the explanation of Erinys's origins and history. Jonathan Garratt
is the managing director for Erinys International. The firm's Middle East headquarters is
located at the Old Bank of Kuwait Building, Deira, Dubai, United Arab Emirates. Erinys
provides the full scope of Type II and Type V security services for the UN, United States,
and United Kingdom, as well as for private international industry. The firm's senior
leaders are former UK military officers. They are also experienced in private protection
and security measures.7

Erinys: Origins/History
Erinys International Ltd. was launched in 2002 by South African Sean Cleary,
who is known to have had ties to the apartheid government and with Jonas Savimbi, the
UNITA rebel leader from Angola. The cofounder of the firm was Jonathan Garratt.
Erinys can be described as the epicenter for links that connect British firms that are cases
in this chapter. Erinys is also linked to at least one U.S. firm, Armor Holdings, which is a
case in Chapter V. Following is a synopsis that traces the intricate links from Erinys to
four additional contractors, for which cases are provided later in the chapter. When Sean
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Cleary resigned in October 2003, Alastair Morrison took his place. Morrison, along with
Richard N. Bethell, formerly managed Defence Systems Limited (DSL). DSL was
launched in 1981 and was sold to Armor Holdings, a Florida-based firm, in 1997, as
mentioned earlier in that firm's case. Then DSL became ArmorGroup. Bethell, who goes
by the title Lord Westbury, partnered with Morrison in an attempt to arrange for Tim
Spicer to join Erinys. Spicer, however, went on to associate with Sandline International
and to later launch Aegis Defence Service, which is now an Erinys competitor. In 1999
Richard N. Bethell—Lord Westbury—left his executive position with Erinys in order to
register Hart Group in Bermuda. Lord Westbury is a former Scots Guard and SAS
officer. The Hart Group primarily provides close in or personal security for the media and
some engineering firms.8 Finally, in March 2004 Morrison left Erinys to take a position
with Kroll, Inc.9
This is an excellent example of how corporate buyouts, business diversification,
and the ease by which corporations can adjust to market demands make them
nontransparent. This complicates government regulation of their activities. Furthermore,
this makes detection of possible fraudulent or unethical practices, such as hiring
criminals, difficult to detect.

Erinys: Political Connections
Erinys has done business with some questionable actors with political connections
in Iraq. This has brought adverse publicity to the firm and discredited contractors as part
of the warfare capability in Iraq. The two actors I will discuss here are Abdul Huda
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Farouki and Ahmed Chalabi. Erinys developed a joint venture with Nour USA Ltd. Nour
was launched by Abdul Huda Farouki, a Jordanian-American who is an experienced U.S.
defense contractor. The Nour joint venture managed to entangle Erinys into an alleged
bank loan swindle with a Jordanian bank that had been owned by Ahmed Chalabi. A
Farouki business venture borrowed $12 million from the Petra International Banking
Corporation back in the 1980s. At the time of the loan, Ahmed Chalabi's nephew,
Mohammed Chalabi, was the manager of his uncle's bank. Ahmed Chalabi later became
the Iraqi oil minister for about six months in 2005-2006. He also served as Iraq's deputy
prime minister for a year, between May 2005 and May 2006. Since then Chalabi has not
won or been appointed to a position in the government. The Jordanian government says
that Farouki and Chalabi were involved in the scheme to defraud the Petra Bank.10
Erinys's situation with Ahmed Chalabi can be traced to the firm's legal counsel in
Iraq, Salem Chalabi, who is another of Ahmed's nephews. Tracing the circumstances
closer to Erinys shows that its founding partner in Iraq is Faisal Daghinstani, the son of
Tamara Daghinstani. Tamara was the principal manager who put the membership in
order and established the National Congress for Ahmed Chalabi's political support.11
Another aspect that has every potential for being an adverse public opinion issue
and can be traced from Erinys to Chalabi and Farouki is that a large percentage of the
14,000 Iraqi security guards hired by Erinys belong to the Iraqi Free Forces, a militia
supportive of Chalabi. Chalabi's Iraqi political opposition quickly raised an objection to
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his having a personal militia. They were not pleased that Erinys was paying and arming
what amounted to a private militia out of funds provided by the CPA.

Erinys: Iraqi Contributions
In Iraq, Erinys Ltd.'s $80 million contract was awarded and is controlled by the
Coalition Provisional Authority. The contract gives Erinys responsibility for protecting
the Iraqi oil and electrical power infrastructure. As mentioned in the previous section, the
contract requires that Erinys provide and train 14,000 security guards.13

Erinys: Interaction with Authorities
Erinys has not satisfactorily completed the terms of its contract. It does have the
14,000 security guards on the roles, but they have not been trained. More worrisome is
the fact that the funding for training and equipping the guards is not available. This
means the firm did not interact with the authorities in terms of communicating the lack of
progress in training the guards, and did not keep account of spending and loss of
equipment—all of which may have been lost due to fraud, waste, and abuse. The
following report contains the details.
According to the Special Inspector General for Reconstruction, the mission of
Task Force Shield was to give Iraq the ability to protect both its oil and electrical
infrastructure. The task force was established in September 2003. The resources
earmarked to protect 340 installations, 7,000 kilometers of oil pipeline, and 14,000
kilometers of transmission line for electricity included an Iraqi Oil Protection Force
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(OPF) and an Electrical Power Security Service (EPSS) force with a combined total of
14,400 guards. Between August 2003 and September 2005 about $147 million was
expended on these efforts. These funds came from the Development Fund for Iraq and
the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund. A review by the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) dated April 28, 2006, pronounced Task Force Shield a
failure. The OPF and EPSS were not capable of protecting Iraqi oil and electrical
infrastructure. A capable management structure had not been established. The
documentation for monies spent was not available, and the equipment purchased for
millions of dollars could not be found. The SIGIR found that $147 million spent for
training and equipment was not used as intended.14

Erinys: Threats/Adverse Public Impact
In an incident reminiscent of the Abu Ghraib human rights abuse incident,
Anthony Barnett and Patrick Smith, two British reporters, asserted they received a
photograph of two Erinys employees restraining a sixteen-year-old Iraqi using tires in a
garage in Kirkuk. A spokesman from the firm told Barnett and Smith that the boy was
detained by the Erinys pipeline patrol for theft of a length of cable, was restrained for a
short time in May of 2004, and was released to his father. Erinys suspended one of the
employees and reported the incident to coalition authorities for "independent inquiry."15
The story was apparently short lived and has not become a big public issue. However, it
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did have the potential to have adverse impact on Iraqi public opinion had the incident
gotten further out of hand.

DEFENCE SYSTEMS LIMITED/ARMORGROUP
Defence Systems Limited (DSL) was launched in 1981. After a series of name
changes, the firm now exists as ArmorGroup. The DSL model, or what I term the
"Morrison security model" because it was designed by Alastair Morrison, combines the
special abilities of both the military and private security industry. The Morrison security
model has been copied by many of the recent British companies that are doing business
in Iraq. The aim of the firm was to market private protection internationally to
multinational corporations and national governments. DSL, as introduced in the Erinys
case study, has contributed to the character of a number of British firms that are
providing security in Iraq. In this case study I will trace the DSL origins and
contributions chronologically to the point at which ArmorGroup is launched, and then
will continue with the ArmorGroup case study.

DSL: Origins/History
DSL originated under the management of Alastair Morrison and Richard N.
Bethell, as was noted in the Erinys case study. In 1996, the British petroleum firm BP
hired DSL to help protect its oil pipelines in Colombia from Marxist rebels, who had
been destroying them. DSL sent a team to provide training for Colombian police. The
work of the trainers has been described as "mysterious." I take this to imply that what the
security team did was not transparent. However, according to Pratap Chatterjee, who has
written extensively about security contractors, the oil pipeline attacks on BP were largely

stopped, while the pipeline operated by its U.S. competitor, Occidental Corporation,
continued to be blown up. BP's security efforts were attacked by critics who argued that
the DSL security operations involved intimidation of "innocent civilians and human
rights abuses."16
Additionally, DSL contributed security operations to support BP's oil extraction
operations in Algeria. In doing so, DSL also provided protection for Bechtel contractors
who were providing services for BP. During the mid-1990s, DSL supported the United
Nations in Yugoslavia by providing building and logistic support, mine clearing, and
communications. DSL also helped protect the World Bank when it came in to do its
work, and contributed to the security of embassies in volatile states such as the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire). In the Congo DSL provided
protection for the U.S., South African, and Swiss embassies. In Angola, DSL provided
protection for the British, Italian, South African, Swedish, and U.S. embassies until
January 1998.17
In 1997 DSL was sold to Armor Holdings, a Florida-based firm. Then DSL
became ArmorGroup. At that point ArmorGroup was on the way to becoming what it is
today, one of the foremost international full-service security providers.

ARMORGROUP
ArmorGroup International PLC specializes in protective security services and
training in hostile environments. The firm's clients include national governments,
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multinational corporations, and nongovernment organizations (NGOs). The address of
ArmorGroup headquarters is 25 Buckingham Gate, London, SW1E 6LD. David Seaton is
the ArmorGroup chief executive officer. He joined the firm in 1998, when it was a part of
Armor Holdings Inc. He has solid business management credentials rather than practical
military or private security experience. Noel Philp began his career with ArmorGroup in
1989. He served in both the New Zealand and British armies. His career with
ArmorGroup includes management and consultant positions in the Asia Pacific, North
Africa, and the Middle East. ArmorGroup has over 9,000 trained and experienced
employees organized into three divisions. The protective security division provides
protection and security management for people and assets. The security training division
has an operational branch. The division also includes six training sites and can tailor
mobile training teams for its clients. The last division does weapons reduction and mine
clearing. ArmorGroup has an operational presence in thirty-eight countries.18

ArmorGroup: Origins/History
ArmorGroup International PLC, as noted in the DSL introduction earlier, began
under the management of two former Scots Guards, Alastair Morrison and Richard N.
Bethell. These two men focused DSL on the business of providing protection for
multinational oil and gas companies. The nature and function of the firm evolved
following its 1997 purchase by Armor Holdings Inc. At that time DSL became part of
that U.S. firm's ArmorGroup division, and DSL acquired International Training Inc.
(ITI). Since then ArmorGroup has continued to develop international security training as
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a part of its business. In 2002 Armor Holdings made a decision to concentrate its business
on armored car and law enforcement equipment manufacturing and sales. By 2003
ArmorGroup managed to do a management buy out (MBO) in order to divest itself from
Armor Holdings, Inc. After about six years as a subsidiary of Armor Holdings, which is a
U.S. firm listed on the New York Stock Exchange, ArmorGroup, supported by Granville
Baird Capital Partners and Barclays PLC, became a British firm again. Since December
2004 ArmorGroup has been registered as a public limited company (PLC) on the main
market of the London Stock Exchange.19

ArmorGroup: Iraqi Contributions
ArmorGroup's contract with the British Foreign Office in Iraq started at
about $154 million and rose 50 percent in luly 2004. The specifications for that contract
called for ArmorGroup to supply 20 security guards to protect the Foreign Office.
According to Robert Fisk and Severin Carrell, two British reporters, ArmorGroup has
hired 500 Gurkhas for protection of Bechtel and KBR executives in Iraq. Fisk and
Carrell assert that since 2004, Britain's largest sector of export to Iraq is private
security.21

AEGIS DEFENCE SERVICES
Aegis is a commercially focused security and risk management firm that
specializes in the identification, analysis, and mitigation of risk. Aegis Defence Services
19
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is headquartered in London at 39 Victoria Street, London, SW1H OEU. The firm was
founded in 2002. Tim Spicer is the Aegis CEO. He is a former British Army officer and
has experience in the security industry. Mark Bullough is managing director for Aegis
Defence Services. He is a former British Army officer and he has international business
experience. Aegis is a private security and risk management company. It provides
services on a worldwide scale and has offices located in Afghanistan, Bahrain, Iraq,
Kenya, Nepal, and the United States. Aegis is a registered UN contractor and provides
security services to government clients including the United States, international
agencies, and multinational corporations. The company is a security advisor to the Lloyds
Joint War Risk Committee.22
The Aegis corporate philosophy is based on providing services with the highest
degree of discretion, integrity, and client confidentiality. The firm claims to conduct all
activities within the framework of national and international law. Aegis maintains full
corporate transparency and is committed to complete industry accountability and
regulation.23

Aegis Defence Services: Origins/History
The origin of Aegis Defence Services is linked to Sandline International because
the founder of both firms is Tim Spicer. Spicer shut down Sandline in April 2004. This is
about when Aegis won a huge Type V DOD security contract in Iraq.
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Tim Spicer was extremely busy in 1997. In March he led Sandline into a
questionable operation that threatened the civil military balance of Papua New Guinea.
The island state was experiencing dissension over a copper mine on the island of
Bougainville. Outside mining interests were gaining most of the profits and the state's
defense forces were not able to establish sovereignty over the island of Bougainville due
to the violence of the Bougainville Revolutionary Army. Sandline signed a $36 million
contract to train the Papua forces and to secure the mine. The funds to pay the contract
were to come from cuts in the state's budget and from nationalization and sale of the
mines. In an amazing turn of events, the commander of the Papua New Guinea Defense
Force (PNGDF) became enraged over the contract. The PNGDF was professionally
insulted that outsiders were contracted to do their job and felt that the money should have
been spent on the defense force. The public learned of the Sandline contract and began to
violently demonstrate, with the support of the PNGDF. The Prime Minister, Julius Chan,
resigned and moderates used the chaos stirred up by the mutiny as an opportunity to
negotiate a power-sharing agreement. Sandline was never operationally engaged.
However, the firm had been paid half of its pay in advance and through international
litigation caused the new Papua New Guinea government to pay the remainder for arms
that were not delivered during the defense force mutiny.25
In May 1997 Spicer took Sandline to Sierra Leone. The "Sandline Affair," as it is
widely known in the United Kingdom, is a part of Tim Spicer's and Aegis's legacy. In
the late 1990 Sierra Leone was experiencing a series of coups and countercoups.
Executive Outcome, a South African Type I firm, had been instrumental in enforcing
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security for the government in Freetown in February of 1996. Subsequently Ahmed Tejan
Kabbah was voted in to lead Sierra Leone. Soon after he was elected, Kabbah saw to it
that Executive Outcomes would get out of the country. In January 1997 the firm left. By
May 1997 Kabbah's government was toppled. Once he was out of office, he hired
Spicer's Sandline International to put him back in. Sandline was successful in doing so.
This countercoup incident became an embarrassment to the United Kingdom, and the
British customs agency investigated Sandline for alleged violations of a U.N. arms
embargo. Tim Spicer responded by arguing that the British Foreign Ministry was aware
of its activities in the region. This was substantiated by U.K. Foreign Minister Robin
Cook, who came close to losing his job in the Sandline Affair.

26

Sandline was only in business about six years. Its activities during that time
resulted in toppling governments in Papua New Guinea and Sierra Leone. These
activities also seriously disrupted the government of Prime Minister Tony Blair.
Therefore it was a smart business move for Spicer to shut down Sandline and to launch
Aegis in 2004. With a simple name change from Sandline to Aegis, a new firm was
launched.

Aegis Defence Services: Lobbying and Political Connections
Aegis, much like MPRI in Washington, has excellent political connections within
government and military due to the many employees who have had careers in military or
public service. The firm lists its lobbyist in Washington, D.C., as Kristi M. Clemens,
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who, according to the Aegis Web site, pursues legislative issues pertaining to defense,
foreign relations, government issues, and homeland security."
The Aegis board of directors includes a number of former British military officers
and individuals, who are listed on the firm's Web page list with military ranks, titles, and
personal decorations, as is the British custom. These members of the board are presented
as an example: Field Marshal the Lord Inge KG GCB DL; Lieutenant-Colonel Tim
Spicer OBE; Brigadier James Ellery CBE; The Honorable Nicholas Soames MP; General
Sir Roger Wheeler GCB CBE; Sir John Birch KCVO CMG; and the token American,
Robert C. McFarlane.28
Robert C. ("Bud") McFarlane is a director on the Aegis board of directors. He
was national security advisor for President Reagan from 1983 through 1985 and was
indicted as a key figure in the Iran/Contra affair. During Bud McFarlane's tenure as
national security advisor, the President's National Security Council consisted of Vice
President George H. W. Bush, Secretary of State George P. Shultz, Secretary of Defense
Caspar W. Weinberger, and CIA Director William J. Casey. Shultz and Weinberger are
both linked directly to Bechtel, as is stated in that firm's case study. McFarlane is an
Annapolis graduate, a former U.S. Marine officer, and a decorated Vietnam veteran.29
Aegis Defence Services: Iraqi Contributions
In 2004 the U.S. Department of Defense, Project Management Office (PMO) in
Iraq awarded the firm a $293 million contract to coordinate security support for
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reconstruction contractors and to protect the PMO employees. In May that year the
Pentagon selected Aegis Defence Services to arrange for coordination and management
of more than fifty reconstruction companies and the companies that protect them. The
$293 million contract gave Aegis31 the opportunity to contribute to the reconstruction
effort by organizing the coalition force support so as to reduce friction between civilian
and military operations. To do this Aegis set up six Security Framework Reconstruction
Operation Centers (ROCs) alongside regional Coalition Military Headquarters that share
situational intelligence for logistical movement and reconstruction security operations.
The ROCs provide threat assessments notice to contractors. Contractor movement is
tracked by transponders integrated with U.S. military friendly force (Blue Force)
tracking, and a quick-reaction force responds when contractors are attacked or experience
other mishap.32
The Aegis contract to establish a system to coordinate and track reconstruction
and security contractors' movements while integrating a link to military forces is an
important contribution. This is an example of a contractor integrating technology and
special expertise to enhance warfare capability by increasing command and control. Lt.
Gen. Peter Cuviello, the U.S. Army's chief Signal Corps officer, has praised contractor
contributions of this nature as part of the process of increasing military capability. He
explained that experience gained from the current wars in Afghanistan and Iraq has
validated Army information technology transformation concepts as well as the Army
partnership with private industry. Aegis, in this case, stepped in to assist the military and
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contractors with a difficult installation for tracking friendly forces on the battlefield.
Furthermore, this case supports Stephen Rosen's argument that good ideas that lead to
innovation are an explanation for organizational learning. In turn, organizational learning
contributes to capability development.34
In October 2005, Aegis was contracted by the UN Office for Project Support in
support of the UN Electoral Assistance Division (UNEAD) and the Independent Electoral
Commission Iraq (IECI) to support the successful constitutional referendum in that
month and the general election in December 2005. The requirement was to provide a
mixed expatriate and Iraqi mobile security component to support electoral infrastructure
inspection and liaison with the Governorate Electoral Officers and to provide static site
security teams to electoral logistic sites in all eighteen Governorate capitals throughout
Iraq.35
The value of the contract, which was won as a competitive contract, was over
$430 million. At the same time, Aegis provided protection for the U.S. Project
Management Office for the DOD, and security for the UN investigation of the Oil-forFood Program scandal.3

Aegis Defence Services: Civil Outreach Program
Aegis has taken a proactive step to cultivate public support. The firm conducts a
self-funded civil affairs outreach program. The program includes projects such as medical
intervention and donation of schoolbooks. The aim is to establish goodwill in the Iraqi
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civil population. Much of this work is funded through the Aegis Foundation. Aegis also
provides a number of expatriate-led and Iraqi-manned reconstruction liaison teams that
routinely travel the length and breadth of the country to monitor the progress of
reconstruction work subcontracted to Iraqi building companies. Typically, this involves
week-long expeditions to remote areas, including those along the Syrian and Iranian
borders.37

Aegis Defence Services: Interaction with Authorities
The U.S. Embassy Baghdad, with whom Aegis interacts in Iraq, requested an
official audit of the contract. In April 2005 the Office of the Special Inspector General for
Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) released its findings of how Aegis Defence Services has
complied with Contract No.W911S0-04-C-0003. The aim of the audit was to determine
whether the firm provided its services under the terms of the contract. The audit found
that Aegis did not provide adequate documentation for its employees' qualifications and
use of firearms. Aegis's vetting procedures for Iraqi employees was inadequate. The firm
was found to have not performed some required aspects of its personal security
operations. It had fallen short of its requirements for regional security operations, as well
as for security operations and movement control.
The review of contracts funded by the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, such
as this one, is mandated by an amendment to Public Law 108-106. The SIGIR audit
provides a rare clear explanation as to who the contract managers are for Aegis and how
the oversight or audit is conducted in this international case. First the contract was
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awarded by the Department of the Army as a matter of reconstruction security support.
Aegis was operating in eight Iraqi locations during the time of the SIGIR audit. The
Army's Northern Region Contracting Center, located at Ft. Eustis, Virginia, passed
contract administration to the Defense Contract Management Agency, Northern Europe,
and its contracting management officers and employees, located in London, England.
Because Aegis is a British firm, the jurisdiction for its audits resides with the United
Kingdom Ministry of Defence (UKMOD). In this audit UKMOD, based on a
memorandum of understanding, agreed to and followed audit instructions according to
the Defense Contract Management Agency and/or Defense Contract Audit Agency.39
The responsibility for administering the contract falls to the Project and
Contracting Office (PCO), Iraq. The PCO is the manager of Iraq Relief and
Reconstruction Funds. That means PCO is the responsible actor for U.S.-assigned
activities pertaining to reconstruction resources, funding, assets, and construction and
their management. The SIGIR report found that PCO was not properly monitoring Aegis
under the terms of the contract.40

Aegis Defence Services: Threats/Adverse Public Impact
Aegis, like other international businesses competing in the global business
environment, sometimes runs into competition with U.S. firms. In August 2004,
Congressman Pete Sessions wrote to President George W. Bush to air his concern about
the awarding of a contract to the British contractor Aegis. According to the contract,
Aegis was to provide up to 75 armed guards to protect the officials managing the U.S.
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reconstruction funds in Iraq. Sessions made it clear to President Bush that he felt the
contract should have been awarded instead to DynCorp, a Texas-based firm.41 An
interesting political twist in this scenario is that an Irish-American lobbyist joined in
protesting the awarding of the contract to the British company. The protest was based on
three reasons: first, that Aegis was too small to handle such an important contract;
second, that Tim Spicer, one of the founders of Aegis, had connections to Sandline, a
firm that in a British parliament inquiry was found to have shipped arms to Sierra Leone
in violation of a United Nations embargo; and finally, that in 1992 Lt. Col. Spicer
supported two soldiers under his command who were convicted of killing a Belfast
42

teenager.
This scenario has been criticized widely in the press, with critical articles alleging
complacency on the part of U.S. civil and military leaders for awarding the contract to a
non-U.S. firm. Concerning the $293 million contract to Aegis Defence Services, Andrew
Ackerman wrote for The Nation, "One might think that the government would be wary of
awarding such largess to a man with dubious background. But not only did the Pentagon
have no idea who Spicer was when they gave his company a huge contract, they didn't
seem to care when challenged about it." 43 Ackerman provided further evidence of the
political cost of this particular scenario by reporting that Senator Ted Kennedy and five
Democratic colleagues challenged Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld's handling of the
matter. In the same article, Ackerman is critical of the U.S. Army's "inept" awarding of
the contract to Aegis. Simultaneously, he makes the point that one contract competitor,
41
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DynCorp, had fired a whistle-blower for reporting that some of its employees were
running a sex ring in Bosnia that provided the services of twelve-year-old prostitutes.
One example of adverse publicity that has involved an Aegis employee is an
incident that occurred in 2005 known as the "trophy video." Parenthetically, this is called
the trophy video because its intent was to serve as a memento of one contractor's
achievement as a shooter. The video, which shows an apparent random shooting of a
Mercedes that crashes with apparent casualties, was widely viewed on the Web. The
video is even backed up with an Elvis Presley soundtrack of "Mystery Train." The Aegis
employee who allegedly did the shooting is a South African named Danny
Heydenreycher. However, following an investigation into the incident, Aegis asserted
that the shooting was within the security contractor rules of engagement, and adverse
public notice of the incident has largely passed.45

IRAQI CONTRACT EMPLOYEES AS A THREAT
Iraqi Facilities Protection Service (FPS) security guards administered by security
contractors such as Aegis and DSL are suspected of having become a part of the security
threat. Ambassador Bremer set up the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior and formed FPS in
2003. The FPS mission is to guard Iraqi government facilities. The organization as
established under Bremer gave the guards a few days' training. The FPS are guards only;
they are not police. They are structured under the ministries they protect. This means the
FPS is not structured or administered as one cohesive organization under the Ministry of
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and Whitaker, "Security Industry."

244

the Interior or the centralized Defense Ministry, as are the police and military.
Additionally, the Bremer order gave contractor security firms the administrative control
of the FPS because they handle the contracting of FPS guards for the ministries. That
means the FPS guards are hired, fired, and paid by contractors.46
Since the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior and the administration of security
contractors and the FPS have evolved very little since 2003, it should not be a surprise
that now that U.S. and Ministry of the Interior officials are beginning to see the FPS as
militias. I argue that this is a reasonable assumption, since each ministry has its own
armed FPS guards. Some Iraqi and U.S. officials suspect that in the worse case, some of
the FPS guards are also "death squads" responsible for murdering members of factions
other than their own. This matter is currently being investigated. My argument is that this
situation is a result of poor administrative planning. One of the results is that private
security contractors, who have the money, are infringing on the ability of Iraqi
institutions to take steps to mitigate the FPS problem.47 This is to say that the private
security firms hire the Iraqi guards under the terms of the security firm's contract. The
security firm thus controls the money that is used to pay the guards.
As of June 13, 2006, it was recognized in Iraq that there is deficiency in the
ability of investigators to conduct background screenings of Iraqis. This was the case for
FPS guards, and it the same for third-country contractor employees. Contractors who are
rebuilding Iraq, as well as security contractors, are hiring third-country people to do the
work for their firms. In cases like this, a given employee may not be a citizen of the
United States, the host country, or the contractor's home state. For example, an Aegis
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employee may be from Nepal. Investigators screening a potential contract employee
living in the United States can use the available county, state, or federal public records as
part of the investigation. This is not possible for Iraqi citizens or employees from
countries such as India, Pakistan, or Fiji. Further complicating the security background
investigations in Iraq is the fact that it would not be unusual for the potential employee to
be working for a contractor firm from a coalition partner, such as the United Kingdom.48

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY
The cases for this chapter are a group of five firms that are administered by
nonmilitary/political organizations, such as CPA, U.S. Agency for International
Development (USAID), and U.S. State Department, whose goal is to rebuild and stabilize
Iraq. Part of the identity of the firms analyzed here is that they are Type V security firms
that originate from states other than the United States. Another part of their identity is
that these firms are all linked to the Morrison security model, which combines the special
abilities of both the military and private security industry. While foreign Type V contract
firms are potential assets for augmenting U.S. military and political needs, these firms
have at times become public opinion and political liability threats to U.S. political
capability. The evidence shows that the control over these firms was not sufficient to
prevent their threats to warfare capability. In addition to the legal and financial problems
these firms have caused, the cases have shown that, like some U.S. contractors, foreign

Contract investigators that do security screening for federal government agencies such as DOD,
Homeland Security, FBI, and others are most frequently retired special agents from these and other
investigative organizations.
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contractors such as Aegis have been violators of human rights, creating situations that
have on occasions damaged warfare capability.
In the case of Aegis, the firm has made essential contributions to fundamental
military capability while making some security mistakes that threaten U.S. warfare
capability. Aegis has made two essential contributions. First, Aegis's Reconstruction
Operations Centers have contributed fundamentally to military capability by giving both
the contractors and the military situational awareness of where security components are
located. The other contribution of significance for political capability was the security
support and coordination for the October and General elections in December 2005.
Tim Spicer, because he is a notorious public character, is always a potential
lightning rod for adverse publicity with any misstep that might befall Aegis. This means
the results could complicate or disrupt the harmonious relations between the United
States and the United Kingdom in Iraq that could seriously damage the coalition's
warfare capability. The dispute over the contract between Aegis and DynCorp illustrates
the point. Politicians from both states have worked to politicize contractor problems and
develop them as issues for shaping public opinion for the politicians' political advantage.
In that sense the employment of foreign contractors like Aegis can be a domestic and
international political liability.49 Aegis has made mistakes, as were shown in the April
2005 SIGIR audit. According to that audit, Aegis was not using adequate vetting
procedures for employees. This inadequate vetting is a serious threat to U.S. warfare
capability. The SIGIR report is evidence that relatively late in the war, the United States
started to take serious oversight steps to control contractors. The procedures for the
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collection of the information for this report showed that there is outstanding cooperation
between the United States and United Kingdom for controlling coalition contractors.
One example of improper contractor control and how contractors can threaten
warfare capability can be linked to the improper vetting of security employees for the
Iraqi FPS. The FPS guards are hired and fired by contractors. The FPS is not organized
under one central control agency. Now the U.S. officials and the Iraqi Ministry of the
Interior suspect that various FPS guards are acting as an armed militia that is threatening
civil-political stability and that the FPS is seriously damaging U.S. warfare goals.
Erinys was able to hire approximately 14,000 Iraqis to guard the oil fields, but
that contribution to force structure has been overshadowed by the threat these guards
pose that diminishes warfare capability. The surge to get the guards to work did not leave
a lot of time for the contractor or its employees to be vetted. Erinys's questionable
association with Ahmed Chalabi links the guards to Chalabi's militia, the Iraqi Free
Forces, and gives them a strong political hold on the oil fields. This seriously threatens
Iraqi politics and the warfare goal to stabilize Iraq. Erinys has not kept account of its
spending and has lost control of equipment and weapons. My argument is that Erinys's
failures have put the oil fields in serious jeopardy, and the situation is a threat to U.S.
political and military capability. Erinys has in effect given control of one of the most
strategic assets to one Iraqi faction, and this threatens the U.S. warfare capability to
stabilize Iraq.
The informal link these firms share through the legacy of the Morrison security
model connects them as a vicarious security monopoly that erodes their potential to
increase the readiness of the total warfare force. The firms can change names and
functions quickly to bid for a contract and then shift employees around to fill in the
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company. The flexibility to respond to change makes these firms nontransparent and
difficult to control, as illustrated by the changes DSL made to Armor Holdings and then
to ArmorGroup. Another example is Erinys, which was a South African firm and is now
a British firm. Sandline's quick change to become Aegis would make any chameleon
proud. It is difficult enough to ascertain who the firms are working for as it is, but being
loosely linked together as these British firms are provides a convenient means for
sheltering questionable employees or to cover a firm's illegal practices. It is difficult to
prove that these firms are operating in this way, and that is the point. All of the foregoing
is evidence that shows how the existing control measures fail and that these particular
firms are a serious threat to warfare capability in Iraq.
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CHAPTER VIII
FINDINGS AND COMPARISONS

In this case study I have thus far analyzed two groups of individual cases for
contractors in Iraq. The first group of cases is in Chapters IV and V. The individual cases
in that group are controlled by the military. The second group consists of individual firms
controlled by nonmilitary/political administrators; they are grouped in Chapters VI and
VII. The collection of empirical evidence for both groups of contractors was structured
by answering the question set that identifies who the contractors are, how they are
controlled by military or nonmilitary/political warfare administrators, and the
contributions the contractors make for warfare capability. In this chapter, I will complete
the case study for contractors in Iraq. I will do so by refining the analysis of contractor
contributions found in the individual cases by comparing the findings for the firms
administered by the military with the findings for the firms administered by
nonmilitary/political organizations. I expect to find that when the firms are properly
controlled by contract administrators they augment warfare capability, and also that when
they are not properly controlled, the contractors sometimes act in ways that are criminal
or controversial to the point that the U.S. capability to achieve its warfare goal to stabilize
and rebuild Iraq is threatened.

CHAPTER GOAL AND ORGANIZATION
The goal of this chapter is to consolidate the individual case findings and to
answer the stated research question:
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Who are the contractors, and how has the nature of government oversight and
control over contractors determined whether contractor contributions augment or
diminish U.S. warfare capability in the Iraq War?

The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: First I provide a summary
of case findings for the two groups of individual cases. Then I answer who the
contractors are by identifying the known firms found to be working in Iraq, providing
information regarding their size, capabilities, client or administrator, and the type of
functions they were contracted to perform that ultimately changed the composition of the
total force. Next I compare the findings for the cases administered by the military with
the findings for cases administered by nonmilitary/political agencies—the State
Department, USAID, CPA, and the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior—to determine how the
nature of oversight and control for each of the two groups impacts on contractor
performance. The findings show that some contractors augment warfare capability and
others do not. The remainder of the chapter compares the findings for contractors that
augment warfare capability with the findings for contractors that damage or threaten U.S.
warfare capability. The summary states that ultimately the findings support the argument
that the degree and nature of government oversight and control is key to whether
contractors augment or diminish warfare capability.

SUMMARY OF CASE FINDINGS
I have found that some Type II, III and IV contractors have had a positive impact
on warfare capability, while Type V armed security contractors have seriously threatened
the U.S. warfare capability to stabilize Iraq. Nevertheless, as a whole, contractors have
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made favorable contributions that augment U.S. warfare capability in both the political
and military dimensions of warfare capability. In some ways contractor contributions
have been essential for the United States to wage war in Iraq. Examples of essential
contributions include Bechtel's Type III engineering support for electrical power under
the administration of USAID, and Boots & Coots's Type III special expertise for
extinguishing oil well fires for the U.S. military. Also, KBR's Type III contributions to
military logistics under the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) have been
essential. Counter to those findings, however, some of the same contractors did function
in ways that diminish or threaten U.S. warfare capability. For example, both Bechtel and
KBR have been subjected to criticism in the press and have been addressed as subjects of
congressional oversight for alleged wasteful and/or fraudulent execution of their work.
I have also found instances of dangerous and irresponsible behavior on the part of
some individual contract employees, such as the employees of CACI, Titan, and Zapata.
In addition, firms such as Custer Battles have alienated the U.S. military and threatened
its traditional role. The findings indicate that Type V contractors such as Blackwater,
Erinys, Custer Battles, and Aegis have been depended on for security; however, their
tactics have damaged civil-political relations and threaten U.S. warfare capability. Some
of the actions of these firms are presently being litigated and will be analyzed here
according to the evidence I have found for how these contractors react under the degree
of oversight and control provided by their administrators.

IDENTIFYING THE CONTRACTORS
The goal of this section is to identify the known firms working in Iraq by their
size, capabilities, client or administrator, and the type of functions they perform as part of

252
the total force contributing to warfare capability. Some of the main functions that
contractors contribute to augment the military capability include technical military
assistance; strategic advice and military training; and support for logistics, intelligence,
and maintenance services. All of these contributions increase the military force capability
by modernizing the force and thereby enhancing its sustainability and readiness for
accomplishing the warfare goal to stabilize Iraq. Ultimately, the U.S. capability to
stabilize Iraq is also linked to increasing the capability of contractors that have building
skills to contribute to the political goal of rebuilding Iraq. Contractors have also
functioned as assets for the nonmilitary/political administrators working to stabilize Iraq.
In this capacity contractors have provided significant engineering and reconstruction
services, maintained the oil industry infrastructure, provided training for the military and
police, and provide protection for the builders and Iraqi infrastructure.
The total number of contractors and their function in Iraq are important because
they indicate how contractors change the mass and composition of the total force
structure. In turn, this is linked to warfare capability. I have not been able to ascertain the
exact number of contractors in Iraq because the available data is incomplete, but if the
contractors identified in the Appendix had not augmented the total force, the United
States would not have been able to sustain military or civil-political rebuilding operations
as it has. My argument is that the increase in mass and composition of the total force does
not explain fully the contributions that contractors have made for U.S. warfare capability;
the nature of the administrators' oversight and control of the contractors also is
considered.
The Appendix is a list of contractors based on input from four sources. This list is
not complete, and is only as accurate as I could make it with the data currently available
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from a variety of sources. Nevertheless, it is useful for helping to identify the contractors.
I argue that the list gives a reasonable perception of the number of contract firms that
have worked in Iraq, as well as a reasonable breakdown of the contractors who are
administered by the military and those who are not. The list identifies the contractor
contributions according to the study's taxonomy of five types where the information is
available to do so.
There are approximately thirty-nine Type V, armed security contractor firms
operating in Iraq that are providing protection for people or facilities. Both Deborah
Avant and David Isenberg assert there are sixty security firms.1 However, Avant and
Isenberg identify some firms, such as CACI and DynCorp, as security firms while I have
identified these firms as Type II, III, and IV according to this study's more rigid
taxonomy of firms. Of the Type V armed security firms defined according to this
taxonomy, seventeen are from the United States, seventeen are from the United
Kingdom, two are from Australia, and there is one each from India, South Korea, and
South Africa. Not surprisingly, the number of security contract firms is increasing.
According to a June 2006 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report there are now
181 security firms employing approximately 48,000 security specialists in Iraq. Due to
time constraints for completion of this study, I have not classified the security firms in
this latest GAO report according to my more restrictive taxonomy for Type V armed
security firms.

1
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My goal here is to put the known numbers of contractors in Iraq into a perspective
that gives meaning to how contractors have contributed to U.S. warfare capability by
augmenting the size and composition of the total force structure. Comparing the total
numbers of contractors working in Iraq with the total number of contractors that
contributed in previous U.S. wars shows that this is not the most privatized war in U.S.
history, as some scholars have argued. In the Gulf War the United States and United
Kingdom relied on more than 1,000 contractors and 9,200 of their employees to support
541,000 military troops at a ratio of 1:58. However, in the Iraq War, the ratio of
contractors to service members is 1:6, which is about the same as it was for the
Revolutionary War, World War II, and Vietnam.3 This means that the total numbers of
contractors contributing to the Iraq War is consistent with the ratio of contractors that
have contributed to previous wars. One exception is Type V security contractors, which
have a significant presence in Iraq. However, Type V armed contractors have not played
a similar role in other U.S. wars.

CONTRACTOR CONTROL AND U.S. WARFARE CAPABILITY
The goal of this section is to analyze the findings for how the nature of oversight
and control by administrators from the military and from nonmilitary/political agencies
impacts on contractor contributions for warfare capability for each of the two groups of
individual cases. The contractors' contributions for warfare capability becomes clearer
when the firms are analyzed by comparing how they function with the military or
nonmilitary/political administrators of the contract. For example, military contractors
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such as KBR have provided good support to augment military capability; they have
received more administrative oversight and control than have firms such as Bechtel,
which work to increase political capability under the control of nonmilitary/political
administrators. With some exceptions early in the war, the military has generally
provided good protection for its contractors. However, Bechtel, which is an engineering
firm similar to KBR, suffered casualties, and the firm's work was affected because the
administrators of its contract did not ensure that the firm's employees were protected.
As a result of the improper protection and control provided by their civilian
administrators, Bechtel and other builders hired Type V security contractors such as
ArmorGroup and Olive Security. One result of prime contractors hiring subcontractors as
proprietary security is that the Type V security contractors are not administered or
controlled by the military. The evidence shows that Type V contractors are linked to
controversial incidents that damage public opinion, which results in instability that
threatens the U.S. warfare capability to stabilize Iraq. In Iraq most Type V contractors are
hired on a cost-plus-expense basis by the prime contractor, such as Bechtel. Therefore the
Type V security contractors that are contributing to the protection of the building
contractors are administered by agencies such as USAID, the State Department, CPA,
and the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior, not the military. As I will discuss later in this
chapter, the separate system of control or chain of command for armed Type V
contractors and the military is linked to armed confrontations between the two, which
directly damages the readiness of both.
The numbers of security Type V contractors, such as Aegis or Blackwater, that
operate as a part of the total force for U.S. warfare capability in Iraq is unprecedented in
comparison with any other U.S. war. Therefore, there has been an unprecedented change
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in the composition of the total force, which means the warfare capability for stabilizing
and rebuilding Iraq is different from U.S. warfare capability for previous wars. I argue
that this means that the control of Type V contractors is critical to ensure they make a
positive rather than a negative impact on warfare capability to rebuild and stabilize Iraq.
In addition to protecting prime contractors, the Type V security contractors protect Iraqi
infrastructure and facilities; U.S. diplomats, dignitaries, and executives; the press; and
private firms that are not an official part of the civil-political rebuilding process. The
unprecedented need for Type V security is also traceable to the administrators for the
rebuilding of Iraq, such as Paul Bremer and David Nash, who were hired to fix an
emerging strategic crisis. When the downsized and overstretched U.S. military
occupation force did not have the capability or readiness to adequately stabilize Iraq, the
private security industry took commercial advantage of the opportunity to provide
protection for Type II, III, and IV contractors who were administered by civilian
government agencies. Agencies such as the CPA and USAID had a mission to rebuild
Iraq; however, the U.S. military and Iraqi police capability lacked a ready total force
structure large enough at that time to adequately protect the contractors that were hired to
do the work.
The findings show that Type V security contractors have damaged public support
and therefore have in some cases damaged U.S. warfare capability in Iraq. Security
contractors who have not been controlled or supervised have succeeded in creating
controversial situations that have adversely affected Iraqi public support, which is linked
to the growing insurgency and weakened Iraqi ability to establish its sovereignty. For
example, by not properly vetting their employees, some contractors have hired and armed
Iraqi security guards that are now suspected of being members of the "death squads" that
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are kidnapping and murdering other Iraqis. Type V security firms such as Aegis have
been paid huge sums of money to organize security providers for the CPA. In this
instance, Aegis's failures to properly organize and vet security providers threatened
warfare capability and is evidence of the CPA's failure to exercise proper oversight and
control over Aegis. This situation will be discussed in further detail later in this chapter in
regard to ways in which contractors are a security threat.
At the same time that some contractors threaten warfare capability, other
contractors that have been supervised and subjected to adequate oversight and control
have enhanced U.S. warfare capability by augmenting military readiness and
sustainability. A case in point is KBR. The firm performs functions that include handling
logistics and preparing meals for the U.S. military, which allowed soldiers to fill combat
roles instead of combat service support. KBR has been subjected to frequent
congressional oversight and investigation by the GAO for overcharges for the fuel it has
delivered and for meals it prepared and did not serve. In these situations the firm
cooperated with military administrators, and the administrators exercised strong steps to
control the contractor.
Bechtel is another example of a firm that provided special skills to augment
warfare capability needed to rebuild Iraq. Early in the war the firm organized huge
resources to do construction projects that USAID has no internal force structure or
capability to perform. Bechtel has been criticized for, among other things, the quality of
the work done. Nevertheless, Bechtel did contribute to the size and composition of the
civil-political force structure, and the company argues that it did complete the work on its
contracts despite being hampered due to violent attacks on its workers. My argument is
that this is a case in which the contractor and its administrator failed to interact properly.
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The situation indicates that if the administrators had overseen the contractor and properly
planned for adequate security to protect the contractor, the firm would have done better
construction, which would have augmented warfare capability to rebuild Iraq. In other
words, the reconstruction failure in this case is linked to the failure of this firm and its
administrators to interact as they should have. Contractors such as Bechtel have been
criticized for the expense of subcontracting for private security. However, I argue that the
government administrators are responsible for protecting the contractor. When a military
contract such as LOGCAP provides military security, and a building contract such as
Bechtel's does not, there is a comparative difference in how the contract administrators
organize, plan, supervise, control, and most important, support the contractor.
The contract administrators, as a function of overseeing and controlling
contractors, are responsible for having a plan to organize and to supervise the contractor's
execution of the contract. The U.S. military had policy for administration of contractors
when the war started. In comparison, civilian institutions such as the State Department
and CPA did not. The civilian administrators wrote their policy as the war evolved. The
difference in whether contractors contributed to or threatened U.S. warfare capability can
be traced to this lack of planning by civilian contractor administrators.
Warfare capability is diminished, and contractors become a threat to the U.S.
warfare goals, when contractors operate independently of military commanders' or
government administrators' control. That is to say that when contractors are not held
accountable, those who are not managed or controlled not only lose their ability to
contribute; they can become victims of the war themselves and ultimately become a
threat to warfare goals. The empirical evidence for this is that private companies are
increasingly using military levels of force in Iraq to protect themselves. This signals that
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there are control or coordination problems between the contractors and their
administrators. The contractors are operating without administrator oversight and control
in an increasingly hostile threat environment without police or U.S. military protection.
Contractors that are not properly controlled by their military administrators also
have a potential for producing adverse consequences that threaten warfare capability
goals. Early in the war, even though the military had policies for operating with and
controlling contractors, the GAO found that military commanders concentrated on
warfighting and did not properly manage contractors on the battlefield. One example I
discussed in the case studies is the Abu Ghraib human rights scandal, which occurred
because military commanders and administrators did not properly supervise and control
the contractors. The Zapata engineers' friendly fire incident is another example. The
Zapata team that fired into U.S. Marine positions was operating independently and
without direct supervision by the firm's U.S. Army Corps of Engineer contract
administrators. Zapata was a Type III contractor providing specialized mine clearing
under a contract let by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. Apparently the Zapata
employees were providing their own Type V security and were "self-supervised" when
they recklessly fired their weapons in disregard of the CPA's rules of engagement. The
incident damaged total force readiness and damaged the military's capability by infusing
distrust and conflict into the relationship between the military and contractors in general.
U.S. Marines did detain and expel those contractors from Iraq. The expulsion, I argue, is
an exercise of military control over the Zapata contractors, but it was after the damage
was already done to military capability.
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When the Abu Ghraib and Zapata incidents became public knowledge, the U.S.
public's image of the U.S. military and the contractors was damaged. These controversial
incidents added to the unpopularity of the war. The Iraqi citizenry was alienated and U.S.
military morale suffered. Ultimately, the military commanders failed to control their
contractors in a way that could have prevented both incidents.5
The rules for governing contractors in Iraq evolved under the authority of the
CPA as an administrator. These rules have gray areas that have been challenged in recent
legal proceedings. Contractors such as Custer Battles have challenged the rules and the
status of the authority of the CPA at the time the rules were made. Ultimately the results
of the ongoing legal proceedings are expected to establish precedents for how the United
States can or cannot use the U.S. court system to control behavior of its contractors in
Iraq. When he was undersecretary of defense, Paul Wolfowitz designated the secretary of
the army as the executive agency for the CPA. Therefore the Department of Defense
(DOD) and CPA were closely aligned when the CPA was established. For example, the
CPA Office of the Inspector General necessarily worked closely with the inspectors
general for the military and US AID.6
The regulations necessary to legitimize and control contractors on the Iraqi
battlefield evolved in the chaos of the early part of the war and as the institutions that
administered them evolved. The evolution of these civilian administrators started with the
Office for Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA), CPA, Program
Management Office (PMO), Iraq Reconstruction and Management Office (IRMO), and
includes the U.S. State Department and Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. Thus during the
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first two years of the war there was no strong central civilian institution to enforce or to
control the contractors administered by them. The rules that govern how contractors
provide protection and use deadly force when necessary is an excellent example. The
CPA's rules for contractors' use of deadly force or rules of engagement were written
during the tenure of Ambassador Paul Bremer. They have not been modified since Iraq
gained sovereignty, and are still binding. The CPA's rules state that all shots must be
aimed, as opposed to being fired randomly or at random. Contractors can use deadly
force in self-defense and to defend clients they are hired to protect. They are also given
the right to "stop, detain, search, and disarm civilian persons" according to the
requirements of the contract. The CPA's rules require contractors to cooperate with
coalition and Iraqi security forces. Contractors are prohibited from participating in
combat, but can protect their client if the client is in a combat situation.7
The rules for controlling contractors in and of themselves may have been
fundamentally sound when they were written, in the time of the crisis that existed during
Ambassador Bremer's tenure. However, the rules for controlling contractors have not
changed since the CPA was dissolved and the Iraqis assumed sovereignty. Without
change that takes into account the new political situation and official Iraqi input, the rules
governing the contractors weaken Iraq sovereignty and are at cross-purposes to U.S.
warfare capability needed to stabilize Iraq. In May of 2006 the Iraqi government began to
take some preliminary steps to control troublesome paramilitary units by putting them
under control of the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior. One example of this problem is the
Facilities Protection Service (FPS). The FPS originated as a security guard service. Its
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mission was to protect government installations. It did not have a centralized director or
commander. The FPS has been estimated to employ 146,000 armed security guards,
which means the FPS is almost as large as the U.S. military within Iraq. The FPS is more
closely associated with the security contractors that pay them than they are with the Iraqi
Ministry of the Interior. The Iraqi Ministry of the Interior is working to place the FPS
under a unified command structure; that is, to provide them with one commander who
can provide command and control. The contractor companies are arguing on behalf of the
FPS because the contractors' employees constitute the FPS.8 The irony of these
developments is that the contractor companies in many cases have not properly vetted the
Iraqi employees.
Integrating contractors into the total force is one way to oversee their work and
control their actions. The military is now starting to integrate contractors into its force
structure after having suffered the pain of congressional oversight. The
nonmilitary/political contract administrators' control of contractors has not evolved to the
same level as that of the military administrators. The Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) of 2006 cites the DOD instruction for contractors9 and requires combatant
commanders to include contractors as a part of their planning.10 Including the contractor
in planning regulates the contractor by establishing boundaries for how the contractors
can operate. The Army LOGCAP is again the example. The contract gives the contractor
a legitimate role that entails working within regulated boundaries for support of the
military. In the case of LOGCAP, both the contractor and the client using the contractor's
8

Knickmeyer, "Iraq Nears Consolidation."
The subject of this document is contractor personnel. It establishes and implements the policy,
guidance, and responsibilities concerning contractors that accompany the U.S. Armed Forces. U.S.
Department of Defense, Contractor Personnel Authorized to Accompany.
10
U.S. Secretary of Defense, Report of the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review, 81.
9

service know what the expectations are in advance of either of them deploying for
combat. The plan is not made "on the fly." Contract administrators, the military
commander, and the contractor can interface and establish lines of communication to
coordinate their work.
However, the U.S. military's fundamental policy for contractor management and
control still has some confusing points. The joint force, or DOD, doctrine makes
contractors responsible for their own security unless the terms of the contract specify
otherwise. The doctrine states that the individual contractor employees are not to be
armed except in specific circumstances as authorized by the regional commander.11
While U.S. Air Force policy is similar to the joint guidance, the army's is not. The army
makes the commander responsible for contractor security in hazardous areas. U.S. Army
policy states that responsibility for contractor force protection, that is to say the
protection of the contractors administered by the army, starts with the commander. The
same policy also makes the contractor responsible for self-protection.12 The evidence
shows that after having some problems with managing and controlling its contractors at
the beginning of the war, the military has improved.
For example, early in the war, military commanders were indifferent to
contractors and their role as a part of the total forces and military capability. By
corollary, I argue that the commanders' indifference to contractor use occurred because
the commanders were focused on the enemy situation and the maneuver of military units
and did not give the contractor control and protection sufficient consideration. On the
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other hand, military commanders may not have been able to work to control the
contractors simply because the military was stretched thin due to the fact that the size or
mass for the force structure was inadequate for the military operational or warfare goal.
The result of the military's lack of readiness and capability was that contractor
supervision was not one of the commanders' foremost priorities.
Thanks to Congress, military commanders now have some legal remedies for
controlling individual contractors that accompany them on the battlefield. Farah
Stockman, writing for the Boston Globe, has asserted that contractors in Iraq can now be
prosecuted for crimes they may commit in a war zone due to a provision that was
included in a 2007 defense spending bill. The Defense Bill of 2007 makes contractors
accompanying the military force accountable under the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(UCMJ). In 2004, the contractors from Titan and CACI who were identified as suspects
involved in the Abu Ghraib human rights scandal were not prosecuted due to loopholes in
the law. That is because at that time, U.S. law stated that civilians were subject to the
code when accompanying the military forces during a war, and the U.S. courts would not
prosecute because Congress had not declared war in Iraq. Now the code is applicable for
civilians accompanying the force during a declared war or contingency operation.
Stockman further asserts that now the press and contract employees from other countries
are subject to the code.14
I agree with Stockman that there are problems with the new bill. Nevertheless, it
is a preliminary step in the right direction. One problem with the new bill is that the
contractors working for USAID or other nonmilitary administrators are not
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accompanying the military force. The nonmilitary/political contractors administered by
civilian agencies such as US AID are part of the total force but are not part of the U.S.
military force. This means that foreign contractors such as Aegis and Erinys, though
under U.S. contract, are not subject to this bill. Bechtel's US AID contract means the
company would not be subject to the UCMJ, while KBR, when working on its DOD
contract, would be. To further complicate the issue, when Blackwater USA is under a
contract administered by the U.S. Army, its employees would be subject to the code.
However, if the same Blackwater employees in Iraq were working to protect a U.S.
diplomat under the provisions of a contract with the State Department, they would not be
subject to the code. This argument has not been tested according to the law, but it serves
to point out the control differences between military and nonmilitary/political contract
administrators.
While the contractual relationship between contractors and military administrators
is improving, the U.S. nonmilitary/political agencies and Iraqi administrators are having
problems managing and controlling the contractors they administer. On July 28, 2005,
Henry A. Waxman, Chairman, Committee on Government Reform, U.S. House of
Representatives, released a fact sheet reporting the results of a 2005 GAO investigation
of Type V security contractors. The report points out that administrators from the State
Department and USAID were not properly accounting for reconstruction security cost.
The failure to track security cost implies that administrators for the contracts are not
doing their job properly. Furthermore, the fact sheet indicates that if the security costs are

not known, that is evidence of the fact that the administrators are not properly
administering the contract or the contractors.1
Representative Waxman's fact sheet was critical of the high cost of private
security as well as dangerous clashes between the contractors and U.S. military on the
battlefield.16 The power of congressional oversight and domestic ideological politics has
proved to be an important lever for increasing the level of control over contractors and
their clients in Iraq. Representative Waxman's efforts to "check and balance" the
commander-in-chief's Iraq War decisions and policies relied heavily on the GAO to
investigate suspected contractor fraud, waste, and abuse in Iraq. Representative
Waxman's efforts and the results of the GAO investigations give the public information
regarding the contractors and their clients in Iraq that it would not have access to
otherwise. After investigating KBR's $16 billion service contract in Iraq for almost two
years, Waxman is convinced that the money has been mismanaged by the contract
17

administrators. The point is that congressional oversight and ideological politics are one
of the means for controlling defense contractors.
COMPARING THE FINDINGS
The findings to this point show that some contractors, depending on the degree of
government oversight and control, augment U.S. warfare capability and others do not.
The remainder of the chapter compares the findings for contractors that augment warfare
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capability with the findings for contractors whose actions diminish or threaten U.S.
warfare capability.

AUGMENTING U.S. WARFARE CAPABILITY
The goal for this section is to analyze the findings for the contractors controlled
by military and nonmilitary/political administrators according to how the contractors
augment U.S. warfare capability. I will do this by comparing how the contractors
augment warfare capability by increasing the size and composition of the total force,
which is linked to both improved readiness and sustainability of the force.
The U.S. military's experience with LOGCAP shows that contractors can
respond on short notice to supplement military readiness and sustainability and thereby
augment the warfare capability needs for the total force. LOGCAP, as a model, indicates
that contractors are also capable of providing special skills on short notice according to
the needs of nonmilitary/political administrators for rebuilding and providing security for
Iraq. In this section I will compare how contractors responded to augment the military
and how they responded to create and augment a civil-political building capability.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld focused on transforming the U.S. military
1 S

capability during his tenure in office.

The needs for contractors in Iraq can be traced to

his restructuring of the size and composition of the military force. Secretary Rumsfeld
used the QDR of 2001 to set the fundamental policy for transformation for U.S. military
capability at the beginning of the George W. Bush administration. According to Gen.
Richard B. Myers, USAF (Ret.), chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Rumsfeld's
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policies changed military joint force capability and made privatization a part of the
National Military Strategy by 2004, as evidenced by "full spectrum force—with a
seamless mix of active forces, the Reserve Component, DoD civilians, and contracted
workforce—fully grounded in a culture of innovation." 19
The QDR of 2006 focused on the purchase of conventional weapons systems, the
readiness of special operations forces, and the sustainability of the existing force. The
thrust of the QDR is on sustaining the warfare capability of the United States in Iraq.20
This suggests that the contractor contributions that augment military sustainability are
critical in light of the overextension of regular and reserve forces and the inability to
resort to a draft to add to the military force level and the warfare capability necessary to
stabilize and rebuild Iraq.
The QDR of 2006, as pointed out by Gen. Myers, includes contractors as part of
the strategic planning for the twenty-first century. The policy integrates forces,
organizations, and processes. This means that contractors are part of the total force
composition for U.S. warfare capability. The QDR, like the National Military Strategy of
2004, calls for a total force concept for future missions. The total force comprises active
and reserve military, government civilians, and contractor personnel, and calls for the
best mix of people with skills for the combat commanders' needs.21 To be successful in
achieving the goals for future missions, the total force is to be tailored for easy access to
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the joint commander and be configured to operate with other state and international
actors. The QDR points out that the skills of the four components must be balanced.
The Pentagon now considers contractors to be a part of the total force, in
accordance with the previously cited policy in the National Military Strategy of 2004 and
the QDR of 2006. This is illustrated by Army Regulation 715-9, which is a policy for
fundamental organizational change of the United States' largest ground service.
Contractors change the organization's combat or military capability by changing force
composition and the way the military functions.23 The U.S. Army has complied with the
Pentagon policy by changing the composition of its force structure and policy to
accommodate the use of contractors as part of the army. Also, according to Army
Regulation 715-9, the U.S. military uses contractors to increase its combat potential by
capitalizing on marketplace resources.24
The military and government downsizing can also be traced to the contractor
contributions that augment or diminish the U.S. warfare capability to accomplish political
or civil-affairs assistance goals in Iraq. The need for contractors to provide a nationbuilding capability starts with faulty planning for rebuilding and stabilizing Iraq. The
U.S. military prefers a force capable of decisive military operations that can quickly exit
from combat while avoiding the tedious quagmire and high casualties connected with the
warfare capabilities necessary for nation-building. Neither the U.S. military nor civilian
agencies such as the State Department or USAID had a force capable and ready to sustain
civil-political nation-building in Iraq when the war started. In their critique of the
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operational planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom, authors Michael R. Gordon and
Bernard E. Trainor write of General Tommy Franks, "Like many of his generation, he
had no fondness for Clinton-style nation-building."25
This suggests that the United States did not have a plan and therefore lacked the
proper warfare capability for achieving the political objective of stabilizing and
rebuilding Iraq.26 The U.S. military plan did not include civil affairs capabilities. Little
attention was paid to the Iraqi police and the need for law and order. As a consequence
civil violence increased, and in the ensuing tactical crisis the United States had little
choice other than to hire contractors as a nation-building force. The absence of a capable
Iraqi police force has been a constant throughout the war, and is traceable to one of the
most important contractors, DynCorp International. DynCorp won a $50 million Type II
97

contract administered by the U.S. State Department to train the Iraqi police.
According to Frank Miller, an official who tried to coordinate U.S. governance
for Iraq as the chaos started, "three different government groups developed three different
98

plans to train Iraq's police, all without knowing the existence of the other." The result
was that contractors found a way to interact with the different groups to contribute to
9Q

post-invasion warfare capability necessary to establish stability and to rebuild Iraq.
Contractors that were administered by the military and those that came to contribute to
rebuilding and security came because there was a need to fill a gap in the military and/or

Gordon and Trainor, Cobra II, 25.
Gray, Irregular Enemies.
27
Moss and Rohde, "Iraq Police Dysfunctional."
28
Ibid.
29
Gen. Anthony Zinni provides a very clear prescription for what the U.S. military must do to win
the next war. See Zinni, "How Do We Overhaul?"
26

271
nation-building/warfare capability that did not exist in the U.S. military or government at
the time. They also came for the money.
Contractors administered by the military in Iraq have augmented the size and
composition of the military force structure that was weakened by the downsizing of the
military. This contribution increased the capability of the military's total force by
increasing its readiness and sustainability, which was necessary to accomplish the U.S.
warfare goal to stabilize and rebuild Iraq. For example, KBR's truck drivers have
increased the downsized military force structure significantly. The military dependence
on contractors is asserted by Col. Ronda G. Urey, U.S. Army, in her excellent U.S. Army
War College Strategic Research Project. The colonel wrote that contractors contribute
many essential functions that U.S. military personnel previously performed. Col. Urey
asserts that the Army became dependent on contractors because of congressional pressure
to privatize. She traced the army's decisions to cut force structure to contingencymandated military strength and a need to modernize with technology to make up for the
reduced force.30
However, even with 20,000-21,000 or even 50,000 contractors working to
increase the size of the total force structure needed by the military and
nonmilitary/political agencies working to stabilize and rebuild Iraq, the total force to date
has not been large enough. The results show that the civil-military planners for the war
were slow to produce a plan to integrate necessary military and contractor resources into
a single force or resource for achieving U.S. warfare goals in Iraq. The U.S. plan to use a
ground force limited to approximately 150,000 troops has not proven to be enough to
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achieve stability and to rebuild Iraq. Not only are the size and structure of the employed
force too small; the size of the total military force has proven to be too small to provide
the sustainability necessary to keep 150,000 troops in combat for four years. Considering
that the original war plans for Iraq called for 500,000 troops, the contractor contributions
necessary to make up the difference would be at a ratio of 3.5 contractors to one service
member. The size or numbers of contractors participating in the war becomes important
when they are fully integrated into the war effort.
One of the warfare goals of Bechtel's Type III contract was to contribute to the
total warfare capability by helping to stabilize civil order through rebuilding
infrastructure and increasing the Iraqi quality of life. According to the U.S. Department
of Commerce, as of November 14, 2003, Bechtel had hired 41 Iraqi subcontractor firms.
Subsequently, during the course of my research, I found that Bechtel had hired a total of
123 subcontractors (see the Appendix). That included 95 Iraq firms.
The number of employees hired by these subcontractors is not known and
conceivably consists of as few as one or two employees. However, by hiring local Iraqis
as part of the force, the contractors further contributed to total warfare capability and
provided Iraqis with employment.
Contractors have contributed specialized skills that have augmented the
capabilities that the military and civilian agencies do not have and which are necessary
for achieving the warfare goal of stabilizing and rebuilding Iraq. For example, DynCorp,
under State Department administration and control, provided special police training
necessary to build a police force structure ready and capable of providing a secure
environment in Iraq. This was significant because before the war, the U.S. did not have a
capable civil-political nation-building force. Contractors also have provided special
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language skills for the military and for civil-political efforts to rebuild Iraq. It takes years
to develop interpreters/translators that are ready to support military and political
objectives. The U.S. force in Iraq does not have enough foreign-language capability.
Contractors such as Titan and CACI are a rational choice to increase that capability.
Another favorable or beneficial aspect of contractor service that contributes to
warfare capability is that the contractors are readily available. Contractors can "surge" or
respond quickly to fill requests for specialized skills that do not exist within the military
or government institutions. The contractors in Iraq quickly became resource multipliers
and increased the numbers of "boots" on the ground for the military and for
nonmilitary/political agencies such as USAID and State Department. Contract firms do
not have to maintain an expensive, large, paid organization when they are between
contracts. When needed, contractors such as Blackwater USA and MPRI can tap into
their digital Rolodex and mobilize the experts needed for special missions. Having a low
level of permanent employees minimizes overhead expenses, which means that
contractors can be hired for less than the cost of maintaining a military force of the same
•51

size. They also are capable of adapting to special needs and requests. Contractors are
pragmatic, and their availability gives U.S. military forces the ability to concentrate on
core functions, thereby extending U.S. sustainability and readiness.32 Resources are
precious and must be used wisely to maintain the warfare capability necessary to preserve
security. Paul Kennedy, in writing The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, uses the principle
of "overstretch" to explain the decline of great powers throughout history.33

31

Singer, Corporate Warriors, 105.
Brooks, "Messiahs or Mercenaries?" 131.
33
Kennedy, Rise and Fall, 72.
32

274
In a statement prior to September 11, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld identified
300,000 military jobs as "non-combat" tasks that could be done by contractors.
Subsequently a 2002 GAO report asserted that outsourcing of non-combat functions
saved the military approximately 20 percent.34 The 20 percent cost savings example is the
KBR LOGCAP experience in Bosnia. KBR reportedly was paid $2.5 billion for its
support in the Balkans through 2002. The firm was to earn $734 million more over the
next two years. A Logistics Management Institute report that analyzed KBR's
contribution in Bosnia makes the following comparison: It would have taken 8,918
military troops and $638 million to accomplish what 6,766 KBR employees did with
$462 million. The report concluded that a comparison of a military force equivalent and
its cost with LOGCAP resources indicated that the LOGCAP contributions were the most
economical. Builders such as Bechtel and combat support firms such as KBR do not have
the expense of training the builders and truck drivers, for example, that are among their
employees. In contrast, the military has the expense of training its future drivers for up to
a year to become soldiers before they ever step into a truck. However, some security
contractors do require some extra training. For example, Blackwater personal protection
specialists receive extensive training, but the employees pay Blackwater to train them
before they are employed.35 Contractors can save by hiring host-country nationals at less
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than the government scale. Carpenters and electricians in the Balkans were paid $15.80
per hour compared to $24.38, and laborers were paid only $1.12 per hour.36

EROSION OF U.S. WARFARE CAPABILITY
The goal for this section is to analyze the findings for the contractors controlled
by military and nonmilitary/political administrators according to how the contractors
diminish warfare capability. I will do this by comparing how the contractors threaten
warfare capability by misusing resources, a situation that is linked to both the erosion of
readiness and sustainability of the force. This section also analyzes four other ways that
contractors erode both military and political dimensions of warfare capability; the four
ways are related to public opinion, political lobbying, contractor criminality, and
contractors as security threats. These threats are not mutually exclusive and overlap in the
ways they diminish warfare capability.
Contractors have threatened and thereby eroded the fundamental capability of the
United States to rebuild and stabilize Iraq due to the misuse of resources that may have
been better spent to augment warfare capability. These findings are counter to the
findings that contractors can be force multipliers, as I argued earlier in the chapter. For
example, Custer Battles claimed cost for equipment that it in fact stole from the Baghdad
airport. The economic consequences of that fraud run counter to the claims that
contractors can extend resources by being cost-effective. War profiteering has eroded
military capability and diminished unit readiness by wasting defense resources that could
have been used for increasing the size and composition of the military to include more
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civil affairs forces. The case study for KBR pointed out the allegations involving
overcharges for fuel the firm purchased and passed on to the military contract
administrator. In another example included in the Custer Battles case, the firm allegedly
defrauded its CPA administrators with a scheme of fake subsidiaries and false charges.37
Security contractors such as Aegis, Erinys, and Custer Battles are enormously
expensive. The GAO report of August 2005 states that more than $766 million was paid
by the United States for private security companies in Iraq just for the period covering the
start of the war until the end of 2004. As an example of the expense, the GAO report
explains that four Type III contractors similar to Bechtel spent more than 25 percent of
their total contract cost on security. For the most part, the USAID and CPA Type III
contracts are cost-plus contracts. This means when Bechtel subcontracts with Olive
Security and ArmorGroup for protection, the cost is paid by the USAID contract
administrator.38 As was pointed out in the Blackwater USA case, some reporters have
asserted that under the CPA contract to protect Paul Bremer, individual contractors were
paid as much as $1,000 a day to work his security detail.39 As a matter of comparison,
contractors administered by the military are protected by the military, while those
administered by nonmilitary/political administrators are not. Therefore, the cost of
security contractors is related to an erosion of the economic resources available to pay for
the warfare capability to rebuild Iraq.
The empirical evidence for how security cost threatens warfare capability is
contained in the GAO report of August 2005. That report recognized that the cost
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accounting data for the use of contract security was incomplete and recommended that
the Department of State, DOD, and USAID "develop a means to track and account for
security costs to develop more accurate budget estimates." Subsequently, the State
Department's January 2006 report to Congress showed that 16-22 percent of its
infrastructure reconstruction cost was for security. Based on GAO recommendation, the
DOD, USAID, and State Department now will include direct and indirect security cost
with reconstruction contract cost.40
The relevance of competition is an important factor to be considered in evaluating
the economic cost advantages of private services and how they augment or misuse
resources. When the government is the only customer, contractors do not face
competition and are more likely to misuse resources. This lack of competition means the
advantages of the free market and the full economic advantage of privatization are not
maximized and cannot be quantitatively evaluated.41 Contractors that are controlled and
administered by the military in support of the U.S. military generally win their contracts
through the competitive bid process. Later in this section I will analyze the evidence of
contractor lobbying, which I argue is a factor that affects competition and influences
whether or not the contract acquisition and bid process is fair. In that lobbying influences
competition, it is linked to the erosion of warfare capability. As found in the KBR case,
the LOGCAP is a competitively bid cost-plus contract. However, the military
administrator can give the contractor a task order that is not bid but which falls under the
parameters of the LOGCAP. The point is that even though the contract was bid for, the
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task order is an expensive option that the military may bear for the advantage of
bureaucratic expedience in the face of a crisis. In other words, the task order is a financial
cost but can enhance operational capability.
I do not accept the argument that temporary contractor force is more economical
when compared to the overhead costs for an active duty force that includes military
retirement and medical benefits, training, and equipment. The evidence shows that the
U.S. Army spends one out of three of its operational dollars for contractors. This is
empirical evidence that supports my argument that contractors threaten warfare capability
by the misuse of financial resources.42 The findings have shown that some individual
salaries paid to security contractors administered by nonmilitary/political agencies in Iraq
are much more than the average soldier's pay. One key to making outsourcing costeffective is competitive bidding. The evidence disclosed in this study indicates that
competitive bidding, especially after the fall of Baghdad, was not used due to the task
order clause that is part of LOGCAP. The lack of competitive bids and cost-plus
contracts creates opportunities for fraud and war profiteering. I argue that the case studies
show that use of contractors was more about avoiding political cost and lobbying than
about concerns with warfare capability.43Iraqi public opinion or support, as the empirical
evidence has shown throughout this study, is a reflection of order and stability, which is
the U.S. warfare goal in Iraq. In other words, contractor behavior that erodes public
support is linked to the erosion of warfare capability.
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U.S. domestic public opinion is an essential influence necessary for shaping the
debate on the role of contractors as a part of the U.S. warfare capability. This is traceable
to the arguments and oversight of politicians and to military decisions regarding the use
of contractors on the battlefield in Iraq that was explained in the introductory chapter. It
is apparent that both civilian and military Pentagon leaders chose to use contractors
because of casualty dread and to avoid public backlash for the Iraqi intervention. This
implies that civil and military leaders were more attuned to public opinion and the desire
to avoid casualties than to long-run operational capabilities. This argument is also a part
of the logic for using contractors, which suggests that the loss of a contractor
theoretically would result in less notice and avoid a backlash from public support.
Interestingly enough, Professor Jeffry Record, of the Department of Strategy and
International Security at the U.S. Air Force Air War College in Montgomery, Alabama,
argues that the U.S. public can tolerate casualties and will support intervention when
presidential leadership is sound and when combat is conclusive.44
In the June 28, 2006, edition of The Christian Science Monitor, an editorial by
John Hughes concerns the impact that foreign policy has had on public support for
political candidates in U.S. elections. He noted that Henry Kissinger45 has argued that
public support is the acid test for foreign policy.46 Partisan alliance politics can
complicate or shape the events in a conflict, especially where allies are depended on.47 As
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an example, in Kosovo, the various states' governments that make up NATO limited the
military objectives and the way the NATO commander fought the war due to each state's
partisan interest. General Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, said
that the controversies that surrounded the conflict in Kosovo were an impetus for
NATO's success.48 The foregoing is evidence that public opinion is linked to the overall
way the Iraq war is waged and how contractors that contribute to it are perceived as part
of the total force for U.S. warfare capability. Also, this is linked to how partisan politics
can gain or lose political currency by shaping how the public perceives the role of
contractors in Iraq.
Lt. Col. Lourdes A. Castillo, U.S. Air Force, an experienced logistics officer, has
argued that contingency contractors increased military capability by increasing
deployment options that can be linked to public support for the war. According to
Castillo's argument, contingency contractors make it easier for any administration to go
to war. As an example, President Clinton, who agreed to a congressionally mandated
troop ceiling of 20,000 for the peacekeeping operation in Bosnia, gained political
flexibility by adding 2,000 contractors to the total force. President Lyndon Johnson, as
shown in the literature review, had done the same thing on an even larger scale in
Vietnam by sidestepping a congressional mandate and using more than 80,000
49

contractors at one point.
However, I argue that in some cases contractors threaten public opinion, thereby
poisoning the contractors' potential to support the necessary use of force as a matter of
warfare capability. The evidence for this is that the use of contractors results in
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diminished transparency and the ability to hold politicians accountable as they make
decisions to go to war. When transparency is lost it minimizes congressional oversight of
the issue, and the executive branch is less restrained from taking action. The loss of
transparency that allows politicians to act without oversight is a political "benefit" in
limited and contained situations, such as when the Clinton administration allegedly used
MPRI in Bosnia. However, in the long term the short-term operational solution changes
or "backfires." At that time the contractors become a political cost as Congress and the
U.S. public discover they have been deceived. Thus, the way in which contractors are
used has the potential to damage the public support necessary for the United States to
wage war, and this in turn is a threat to U.S. warfare capability.
Contractors mostly provided a short-term gain for politicians in the earliest stages
of the Iraq War. However, the cases indicate that the actions of some contractors
diminished the public's support for the war as the war stretched out. In an interview about
how and why contractors are part of the total force for U.S. warfare capability in Iraq,
Peter Singer told Robert Young Pelton, "It's not about economic cost savings: it's about
political savings. When things go wrong, you simply blame the company."50 Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld shaped the military plan to deploy an expeditionary force that was
quickly and easily transported into the operational theater. The more rapidly deployed
force lessens the time and opportunity for a long critical debate that could persuade the
public to oppose intervention.51 The LOGCAP contract enabled KBR to contribute
logistic support quickly without a lot of public notice because the terms of the contract
were negotiated and bid before formal war planning began. As a contractor, KBR was not
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as visible to the public before the war started as were military forces. This means KBR
had much of the logistics ready to support a rapid deployment. This increased military
capability and helped politicians escape a long political debate about the merits of
intervention.
Contractor human rights abuse incidents, such as those at Abu Ghraib, have a
strong negative impact that diminishes favorable U.S. public opinion, especially when
there are other widely published incidents of individual contractor criminal behavior. The
Aegis "trophy" video is a good illustration of the point. First of all, the video, which
shows an Iraqi automobile apparently being shot by a contractor, was posted on the
Internet. Then the press began to report the story of the incident. My point is twofold.
The international public has broad access to the stories regarding contractor behavior in
Iraq. These stories are frequently followed up by respected news organizations.
Therefore, stories of human rights abuse, such as the trophy video, are readily accessible
to inform the general public and to shape its perceptions of contractors and U.S.
policies.52
An example of how contractors damage public opinion and warfare capability is
seen in the problem of excessive security costs. In one case the GAO has traced that
problem to the closing of two US AID energy projects in March of 2005. The two energy
projects were closed before work started because the cost of Type V security contractors
would have added 20 percent to the $15 million that the two projects were already worth.
The $15 million cost savings realized from closing the two projects helped to pay the
increased security cost of other projects. Incidents of waste and mismanagement of

Regan, "Trophy Video.'"

283
resources due to the use of contractors have contributed to the U.S. public withdrawing
its support for the war and elected officials. Additionally, incidents such as this indicate
CO

to the public that contractors waste money. The Vietnam experience shows that military
success depends a great deal on economic power and advanced technology for successful
warfighting.54 Public support is necessary to sustain and shape the government choices
for achievement of its security or warfare capability goal. Civil-military leadership,
especially the U.S. Army, has an obsession with casualty dread, which is associated with
adverse public opinion and therefore is a threat to the public support necessary for
matters pertaining to warfare capability. Casualty dread comes from the specter of a
disaster such as Blackhawk Down or from the long and constant loss of life in a long war
such as Vietnam. Professor Jeffrey Record has argued that Pentagon aversion to taking
casualties is so strong that war and peace decisions have been made with U.S. troop
safety as the primary concern.55
My argument is that the foregoing example links public opinion to the use of
contractors as a means of avoiding military casualties. Therefore, the role of contractors
and how they perform as part of the total military and nonmilitary/political force for
warfare capability ultimately influences the degree of public support for the war and U.S.
warfare capability.
Lobbying, as I mentioned earlier in this section, erodes warfare capability by
influencing government decision makers and contract administrators. The case studies
show that most contractor firms are active lobbyists and have strong connections with the
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Pentagon and the government community. Lobbying facilitates the primary goal of
contractors, which is to earn money, and the results of mixing politics and money have
the potential for eroding the U.S. warfare goals in Iraq. Numerous U.S. contractor
companies, such as MPRI, have executives or board members who are retired diplomats,
government officials, or general officers. One of the best examples is the vice chairman
of Blackwater USA's board of directors, retired Ambassador Cofer Black. The firms have
a well-documented record of lobbying and providing political donations. The benefits the
contractors and politicians gain from such a relationship are easily exploited by critics of
contractors and privatization. In turn these arguments can influence public support for the
war and ultimately damage warfare capability to achieve U.S. goals in Iraq.
The individual cases contain an abundance of circumstantial evidence that shows
that lobbying relationships have leverage for securing profitable contracts for the firms
who pay back politicians with political donations and support. I argue this damages
public confidence in elected officials, contractors, and ultimately U.S. warfare capability.
The primary example here is the frequent criticism of Halliburton and KBR, which makes
a point of linking their contracts and huge profits to Vice President Cheney's past
executive status with the firms.
Between 1999 and 2003, more than $12.4 million was put into lobbying efforts by
defense contractor firms. As an example, in 2001, contractors united in a lobbying effort
to defeat a bill that would have mandated that federal agencies justify private contracts on
a cost savings basis. With the huge profits contractors are making in Iraq today, the
$32 million spent in that lobbying effort could be doubled if necessary. Over a dozen
lobbyists—including the wife of then Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle—
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participated in the 2001 effort. In 2002, L-3 Communications, MPRI's parent company,
gained defense contracts valued at $1.7 billion.56
The potential for augmenting warfare capability in the political dimension is
jeopardized when contractors become involved in the commission of crimes such as fraud
and human rights abuse. This is equally true for contractors controlled by the military or
nonmilitary/political administrators. Contractors administered by both the military and
nonmilitary/political agencies have been involved in criminal behavior.
Contractors also present other drawbacks that threaten military and/or warfare
capability. A good many of the drawbacks involve the legal status of contractors on the
battlefield. This problem was identified to be a military management and administrative
problem in the Gulf War. Since then little has changed.57 Adam Easton, reporting for
BBC News, points out that, even though contractors are essential to the U.S. war effort,
they are largely unregulated. This was argued in the findings pertaining to contractor
legal restrictions. The point of Easton's report is that contractors were found to have been
involved in one out of three of the known incidents in the Abu Ghraib scandal. None of
the contractors, according to Easton, have been prosecuted. This international report by a
respected news agency is an example of how criminal or humanitarian abuse by
CO

contractors can damage the U.S. goal to stabilize Iraq. Widespread public reports such
as Easton's damage the chances for the U.S. to gain the confidence or support of the Iraqi
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people. Dissidents opposed to the U.S. goals in Iraq benefit because they can use the
incidents to shore up their propaganda and enlist additional dissidents.59
Contractors administered by the military or nonmilitary/political administrators
that do not cooperate with the military can disrupt military operations and erode military
and warfare capability. Unity of command (chain of command) is a simple military
control procedure that can help prevent disruptions and accidents on the battlefield. As a
case in point, the relationship between the military and the Type V security contractors
administered by civil-political nation-builders "is based on cooperation not control." ° A
recent GAO report that investigated private security providers shows this to be the case.
Rebuilding Iraq: Actions Needed to Improve Use of Private Security Providers (June
2005) indicates that the security services provided by contractors have come at a high
cost, which includes dangerous clashes between them and regular U.S. military forces.61
The Zapata Engineering case shows that irresponsible contractor behavior can damage
contractors' reputations and ruin military relations. When contractors do not cooperate
and come into or operate within a military commander's area of responsibility without
coordination or oversight, their presence can disrupt military operations, erode the
potential for stability, and at the worst can result in a friendly fire incident. Unity of
command facilitates communication and visibility.62 However, unity of command breaks
down when a civil-military contractor fails to coordinate with the regional combat
commander while moving to a building site.
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The March 2004 Blackwater incident at Fallujah is an example of a contractor
operating outside of oversight. The findings indicate that Blackwater's contract in Iraq is
administered by the U.S. State Department. However, in this incident it appears that
Blackwater was working as a subcontractor for a KBR subcontractor. No central
authority knew where the Blackwater security contractors were operating. The
contractors, who were lost, could not even reach out to determine their location. The
death of the contractors is tragic, but the ramifications of the incident had military and
political consequences that further eroded Iraqi stability and U.S. warfare capability.
The White House and Pentagon ordered a U.S. military attack on Fallujah in
retribution for the incident. The Fallujah area was the responsibility of U.S. Marines who
had been taking a constructive and conciliatory approach to develop civil and political
cooperation up to the time the contractors were ambushed. The Marine commander, Lt.
Gen. James Conway, was not in favor of the attack, but the Marines followed the orders
from Washington and attacked Fallujah accordingly. The subsequent operations in
Fallujah resulted in the death of seventeen Marines and numerous Iraqis. My argument is
that the political damage came because Blackwater was operating without oversight.63
The Zapata friendly fire incident is another example of how contractors operating outside
of military control have disrupted military operations and damaged military/warfare
capability.
When the contractors' activities in the local community are not coordinated with
the military, they can be a security threat and complicate counterintelligence activities,
thereby damaging military capability. Contractors who work independently lead to
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friction and controversies that diminish warfare capability and the ability to achieve Iraqi
stabilization. By the beginning of 2005, there had been twenty reports of friendly fire
incidents between contractors and the military. Aegis won a contract to create a system to
prevent these incidents. As a part of that contract, the firm established Reconstruction
Operations Centers (ROCs), which facilitate the sharing of information between the
contractors and the military. According to the GAO, the Aegis ROC system contributed
to there being fewer clashes between the military and contractors.64 The cost of the Aegis
contract was $153 million.
However, the GAO returned to Iraq in May 2006 to learn from U.S. military
officials that even though there were some improvements in 2005, there currently are
problems with the lack of coordination between security contractors and the U.S.
military, which threatens U.S. warfare capability. The GAO interviewed Third Infantry
Division officials regarding their experience with security contractors in the Baghdad
area circa January 2005 to January 2006. The military officials reported that they had no
means of communication with the Type V security contractors. Thus, the military and
security contractors had problems and did not interface. The military reported that
contractors frequently came into the military area of responsibility without coordinating
beforehand. The military pointed out that they could not assist contractors in trouble if
the contractors do not communicate with them. The military interviewees, who were not
aware of the ROC, stated that with better coordination they could advise contractors of

Kelley, "GAO: U.S. Contractors."

289
danger zones and other problems they could encounter while transiting their area of
responsibility.65
The contractors' failure to coordinate with the military has resulted in numerous
incidents that have caused dissension between them and the U.S. military and thus have
damaged force readiness and warfare capability. An example of how contractors can
damage warfare capability by creating a controversial situation is seen in a shooting
incident in Irbil, Iraq, on July 14, 2005. A convoy of SUVs allegedly fired on and
wounded an Iraqi citizen, Ali Ishmael. According to Iraqi police, the contractors drove
from the scene of the shooting to a US AID compound nearby. The U.S. investigation
exonerated the contractors and reported that Ishmael's vehicle had been fired on from the
sides and rear. Ishmael and the Iraqi authorities claim a contractor fired from the rear of
his vehicle into the front of Ishmael's. The evidence and facts for this incident are not
entirely clear. However, it is clear that Iraqi citizens, authorities, and the U.S. military are
frustrated with contractor involvement in situations such as this. Brig. Gen. Karl R. Horst,
deputy commander of the Third Infantry Division, was the top U.S. official responsible
for the security of the Baghdad environs at the time. Horst is critical of security
contractors. He has asserted that they operate with impunity and without military
authority over them. Horst explains that when the security contractors shoot someone, the
U.S. military ends up taking the blame, as it did in a May 12, 2005, incident in which
contractors killed three people. Subsequently, according to Horst, the contractors' killing
of the Iraqis was linked to an attack on his soldiers that occurred a few days later, when
the soldiers came into the area where the incident had taken place. "Do you think that's
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an insurgent action? Hell no," Horst said. "That's someone paying us back because their
people got killed. And we had absolutely nothing to do with it."66 My point is that the
actions of Type V armed security contractors in this incident have threatened U.S.
military capability and damaged the U.S. warfare goal of gaining the Iraqi public
confidence needed to stabilize Iraq. Furthermore, these incidents have damaged the U.S.
public's confidence in its elected officials' administration of the war.
Contractors diminish U.S. military capability when they compete with the military
for core military roles and functions. Contractors are, for the most part, paid much more
than are military members for doing or performing essentially the same functions. The
issue of contractor pay and the lack of balance in pay for military members came to light
in the arguments that followed after Zapata contractors fired on Marines.67 These findings
show that having contractors as a part of the total force can diminish military
professionalism and ultimately result in damaging military readiness. Representative
Waxman illustrated the cost of private security by posting the results of the GAO report
of 2005 on the Internet. According to the posting, private security employees earn as
much as $33,000 per month. These costs suggest that some security contractors are
drawing the same salary as the president of the United States. These costs represent a
threat to military morale and readiness and ultimately to warfare capability.68
Security contractors challenge the uniqueness of the military culture and
professional status by competing for its roles in the marketplace. The results damage
warfare capability. Private firms offer higher wages for military personnel, and create
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competition for core military duties. Contractors pose a threat to the capability of the
military profession because special skills that take years to develop are exploited by
contractors for profit. For example, special operations skills have been drained away by
contractors who pay high salaries to those who have such skills.69
However, there is evidence that indicates that contractors are motivated by more
than paychecks. A contractor firm's loyalty may be focused on pleasing stockholders, but
the individual contractor is a different matter. Robert Young Pelton is an experienced
observer who has enjoyed considerable success studying contractors on the battlefield. In
living and working with contractors from various firms, he has gained their trust and
insight into their world in a way other researchers have not. Pelton argues that the
contractors in Iraq are loyal, patriotic Americans. Most are former military members or
police officers. One contractor interviewed by Pelton told him that "just because a man
gives up his uniform, does not mean he gives up his professional ethics."
Contractors diminish military/warfare capability when the military becomes
dependent on contractor services, because this represents a loss of unit readiness. That is
to say that the military cannot then stand to fight on its own. The inability of U.S. forces
to establish order in Iraq shows that it does not have the mass to carry out civil protection
or policing operations. The fact that contractors were tapped by the Pentagon civilian
leadership to be part of the total force to fill the empty military "boots" is empirical
evidence of U.S. military dependency on contractors in order to have a ready and
sustainable warfare capability. This dependency is traceable to how contractors diminish
military readiness. In particular, army dependency on contractors is at cross-purposes
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with the general U.S. Army policy for contract support for military operations. That
policy states that contractors are not intended to replace force structure. Accordingly,
contractors are to augment Army capabilities, and contractors must be integrated into the
overall support plan.71
There is no doubt that the military has become dependent on contractors. For
example, the army's force reduction of the Fourth Infantry Division (Mechanized) to a
technology-centric warfighting organization has resulted in a need for contractors to
maintain unit readiness and sustainability. The Fourth Infantry Division (Mechanized)
was designated to become the First Force (prototype force for modernization) for the
twenty-first century. The transition to the "Digitization Division" and evaluation of its
new way of war started in 1995. With the increase in digital technology, there was a
reduction of about 1,700 soldiers. In addition, 24 percent of the platforms—mechanized
vehicles for mounting weapons or transporting troops—were removed from the former
armor and infantry structure. The smaller, faster division's level of capability increased
through information-age technology and logistic efficiencies. On the other hand, when
the "Digitization Division" took to the battlefield in Iraq in April 2003, the soldiers were
not all fully trained with the specific skill sets for the division to fight with its newest
systems. The division found it necessary to deploy with 183 contractors to teach the
soldiers how to operate their new weapons. One-third of these contractors were deployed
with the command and control element, where they were needed to support high-tech
digital systems. 72
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When contractors have not been properly vetted, they are a security risk and a
serious threat to warfare capability. Generally the U.S. military administrators have done
a good job of vetting the military's contractors. However, the cases do show several
incidents in which contractors administered by nonmilitary/political agencies have hired
employees that have become a threat. Custer Battles was hired by the CPA without its
management or employees having been vetted. The same is true for Erinys and the
14,000 guards it hired. The Iraqi guards from the FPS have also become a security threat,
and one reason is that they were not properly vetted by the security contractors that hired
them. Iraqi contractors and third-country nationals, such as Pakistanis, need security
background checks to give them access to U.S. facilities where they may be working.
Contractors in Iraq such as Bechtel and Erinys have hired large numbers of Iraqis
and third-country nationals. This has increased local employment and reduced the cost of
contract employees. However, Iraq and some other countries do not have criminal records
or files to access. Access to criminal records is critical for background screeners to do a
security investigation. The GAO found that in the case of Iraqi subcontractors, there is no
understanding of the screening process. The GAO found that the Iraqi subcontractors
were screening potential employees based on inquiries with tribal leaders and the Iraqi
Ministry of the Interior. The effectiveness of such screening is evident with the problems
that have surfaced with the FPS and Erinys guards.74
The improper vetting of contractors is linked to contractors' ability to quickly
respond or surge to fill an administrator's needs. The cases show that when contractors
surge, especially if a firm is not an established business, there is a potential for problems
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that will damage warfare capability. For example, Custer Battles was quickly launched
with the intent to make money. The CPA was under pressure to get the Baghdad airport
operational as quickly as possible. The CPA contracting authority signed Custer Battles
with little more than a promise that the firm would secure the airport. The contractor was
not vetted, and the employees the firm hired also could not have been properly vetted in
the short time period available before they took over security for the airport. The Custer
Battles record of criminal behavior is evidence of how improper oversight (vetting) and
control of the contractor by its nonmilitary/political administrators resulted in a
controversial situation including both security threats and criminal fraud, which damaged
U.S. warfare capability.

BLACKWATER THREATENS U.S. WARFARE CAPABILITY
At high noon on September 16, 2007, there was a shoot-out at Nisoor Square in
Baghdad that was heard all the way from there to Washington. The aftermath of the
shooting caused uproar among Iraqi and Americans citizens, created friction between
U.S. and Iraqi officials, and enflamed controversy at the highest levels of the U.S.
government.75 At the same time, the shooting, which involved a Blackwater USA
security detail protecting a U.S. government diplomat, is a concise summary of how Type
V armed contractors damage the U.S. warfare capability in Iraq.
The details of the shooting as claimed by Iraqi and Blackwater officials vary. The
incident is currently under investigation. At this time, it fundamentally appears that a
three-vehicle Blackwater security detail may have encountered a car bomb and
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exchanged fire with an unknown number of assailants. Eleven or more Iraqi citizens are
believed to have been killed. Apparently there were no U.S. casualties. The Blackwater
detail's exit from the scene was initially blocked by an Iraqi military or police unit.
However, the Blackwater detail was subsequently able to depart the scene with the
assistance of the U.S. Army.
Not surprisingly, soon after the shooting the Iraqi Ministry of the Interior
announced that Blackwater would no longer be allowed to work in Iraq. I say not
surprisingly because Iraqis have a great dislike for Type V armed security contractors
such as Blackwater because of the intimidation tactics the contractors use in traffic and
their apparent immunity from prosecution if they shoot Iraqi citizens. One Iraqi official
asserted that Blackwater security providers have no respect for the lives of Iraqi
citizens. The Iraqi officials point to Blackwater in this incident, but they have the same
problem with all Type V armed security contractors.
Blackwater is known for its aggressive tactics and apparently has a history that
includes the unreported killings of several Iraqi citizens. On the other hand U.S. State
Department officials, none of whom have been killed while being protected by
Blackwater, have supported the firm. According to reports recently released from Rep.
Henry Waxman's committee, the firm's employees have been the first to fire 85 percent
of the time in more than 195 "escalation of force" incidents, which resulted in a total of
sixteen known Iraqi casualties. Rep. Waxman has been critical of the State Department's
soft approach to restraining Blackwater's aggressive tactics. Blackwater officials counter
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that a total of 122 of its employees have been terminated while working on the State
Department contract.77
Not surprisingly, Iraqi officials particularly do not like Blackwater because of the
2006 Christmas shooting of an Iraqi vice-presidential security guard by a Blackwater
employee. In the Blackwater case I explained that the firm's employee was allegedly
drunk and was returned to the United States and fired without further legal retribution.
Thus, these situations give rise to the Iraqi mantra that security contractors are above
Iraqi law. Worse, the most recent incident gives Iraqi officials and citizens a popular
political issue to use against the United States.78
This latest situation with Blackwater has also shown that the United States has
become dependent on Type V armed security providers. When the Iraqi Ministry of the
Interior announced that Blackwater could no longer work in Iraq, it became apparent that
the U.S. State Department would not be able to function in Iraq without the contractors.
This necessitated the involvement of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, who had to
ask the Iraqis to allow Blackwater to continue providing protection for U.S. Ambassador
Ryan C. Crocker.
The controversy over the shooting incident has been an impetus to get the U.S.
government moving to pass legislation to control the contractors in Iraq. On October 4,
2007, the House of Representatives voted 389-30 to pass a bill designed to control
contractors in Iraq by giving U.S. criminal courts jurisdiction over them. There is a
similar bill pending a vote in the Senate. The White House opposes the legislation on the
grounds that the bill requires the F.B.I, to establish a capability in Iraq to investigate
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contractors, and asserts that the bill will stretch the resources of the F.B.I, and the
military. A New York Times editorial discussing the bill states that U.S. agencies in Iraq
are supported by approximately 180,000 contractors, and that this number includes "some
30,000 heavily armed guards."79

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY
This chapter has critically analyzed the findings for the research problem by
comparing the findings for those contractors administered by U.S. military with those
administered by nonmilitary/political administrators. This chapter has consolidated the
findings for the individual cases and identified most of the contractors known to have
worked in Iraq. Ultimately the findings for the case study support the argument that the
degree of government oversight and control is key to whether contractors augment or
diminish warfare capability.
This chapter contained a summary of case study findings for the two groups of
individual cases: those that have military administrators and those that have
nonmilitary/political administrators. The contractors working in Iraq are identified and
described by their size, capabilities, client or administrator, and the type of functions they
were contracted to perform. The summary of this effort is included in the Appendix. Next
the findings for the cases administered by the military were systematically compared with
the findings for cases administered by nonmilitary/political agencies in terms of how and
whether the contractors either augmented or eroded warfare capability.
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The findings show that some contractors augment warfare capability and others
do not. Contractor contributions have augmented both U.S. military and civil-political
nation-building needs when the contractors have been properly controlled by the
government. Some contractors, such as KBR under the LOGCAP, have contributed
essential logistic support that has augmented military sustainability and capability. At the
same time, the military contractors are expensive and are the focal point of political and
domestic criticism, which erodes U.S. warfare capability. Contractors that provide
enormous engineering and building capabilities, such as Bechtel, have provided a
capability to rebuild Iraq that does not exist in any U.S. agency. The use of firms of this
nature also comes with the cost of domestic U.S. public and political criticism when the
contractor is not properly controlled. Additionally, Type III contractors such as Bechtel
are "soft targets" without an inherent capability to protect their workers. As a result,
rebuilders such as Bechtel have subcontracted armed Type V security firms such as
ArmorGroup and Olive Security. This security is then added to the cost-plus contract and
adds as much as an additional 25 percent to the cost of the contract. In addition, Type V
security contractor firms such as Erinys and Aegis and numerous Iraqi guards from the
FPS have provided security for important government facilities and assets such as the oil
fields. These efforts have augmented warfare capability.
However, Type V security contractors, most of which are not administered by the
U.S. military, have also diminished both U.S. military and civil-political capability needs.
This is because Type V contractors' controversial behavior can seriously disrupt the
potential for establishing good relations with Iraqi citizens and government. Therefore
Type V contractors have at times seriously eroded U.S. warfare capability. A recent
example of Type V security contractors' threat to U.S. military capability is seen in the
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Blackwater USA incident at Nisoor Square, which has reverberated all the way to the
highest levels in Washington.
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CHAPTER IX
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS
The goal of this chapter is to present the comprehensive conclusions in support of
my argument that
It is the degree of government control over contractors that determines whether
the contractors' contributions have a positive or negative impact on warfare
capability.
The following conclusions are based on a generalization of the findings in the
previous chapters. Contractors that were properly controlled by the U.S. military in Iraq
have augmented warfare capability in two basic areas. First, the contractors quickly
increased the size of the total force structure in Iraq. The mass that contractors added was
a critical contribution that increased military sustainability and force readiness and made
a civil-political rebuilding capability possible. With proper planning and early
mobilization of reserve forces, this would not have been necessary. However, because
there were no military or government resources or personnel available to make up a civilpolitical rebuilding force, contractor contributions in these roles have been essential. The
reasons behind the necessity of contractors' contributions can be traced to political
decisions made to reduce the size of the military and federal government structure; faulty
war planning; the reluctance of allies to get involved; and the length of the Iraq War. The
United States had few choices other than to hire contractors to fill empty military "boots"
and to create a civil-political rebuilding force structure after it invaded Iraq so that it
would have the warfare capability necessary to stabilize and rebuild that country.
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The second area of contractor contributions that augment warfare capability in
Iraq includes providing specialized expertise and technology for modernizing the force
composition, which made a technology-centric military force possible. Contractors
changed the composition of the total force by contributing essential special skills for
civil-political rebuilding. These skills included a large civil engineering capability, port
salvage and dredging, mine clearing and ordnance disposal, oil well maintenance,
translators, and police trainers. The military-industrial complex provided technicians to
train the military to operate the advanced weapons technology that increased military
sustainability and unit readiness. The contractors' beneficial contributions are a function
of firms controlled by the U.S. military that provide Type II, III, and IV services in
support of the U.S. warfare goals. Even as contractors have made favorable contributions,
those that have not been properly controlled have frequently threatened military
capability and damaged the capability to restore order to Iraq. The contractors in Iraq are
frequently firms that have made large political contributions, and many are engaged in
political lobbying. The contractor lobbyists contribute to the perception that private
enterprise contributes better service than does government or military resources. The
lobbyist efforts make it politically easier to go to war, while at the same time contractor
financial goals can be at cross-purposes with political goals for increasing stability.1
Contractors that have engaged in criminal acts of human right abuse and fraud have
wasted economic resources and damaged their good standing with both U.S. and Iraqi
citizens. These same acts have weakened public confidence in elected officials and
created friction with active duty military forces. Contractors are competing with the
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military for its mission and its personnel, and also are damaging the professional military
by paying relatively huge salaries to its employees while the government is paying
military members a great deal less for similar work. Type V security contractors also
diminish U.S. warfare capability because their aggressive and threatening tactics and
immunity from prosecution have created controversy and damaged the fundamental good
reputation of the United States.
Contractors from private industry contributed ten times the number of contractors
for the Iraq War that they did for the Gulf War of 1991. On the other hand, the numbers
of contractors that have participated in Iraq is consistent with contractor participation in
most U.S. wars. Armed Type V contractors, the majority of which have not been
administered by the military, have participated at a level that is unprecedented in other
modern U.S. wars, and they have seriously changed the composition of the total force
capability. Because they have the potential for creating controversial incidents that can
severely damage the U.S. warfare capability to stabilize Iraq, proper oversight and
control over Type V contractors is paramount.
I have concluded that the findings indicate the U.S. Army is dependent on
contractors, especially in the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program (LOGCAP) contract.
Thus, because of the joint nature of U.S. warfare, the total force is now dependent on
contractor contributions, and this dependency diminishes military readiness and threatens
warfare capability. Still, the contractors' "surge" or quick response to requests for their
services after the fall of Baghdad contributed essential tactical and strategic support at a
time when the U.S. had few options.
I have concluded that Type V civilian security firms such as Blackwater USA,
Custer Battles, and Erinys are too expensive, and that their contributions are an

unacceptable threat to both military and civil-political capability. It has been estimated
that 10-15 percent of total reconstruction funds for Iraq are paid to contractors that
provide security.2 In the aftermath of Abu Ghraib, CACI CEO Jack London posted a
press release on the firm's Web site that contributes to my conclusions. London asserted
that contractors are a permanent part of the U.S. total force. The press release stated in
part, "Since 1962, CACI has successfully provided IT and related professional services
during nine U.S. Presidential administrations that have had varying policies and
objectives."3 That statement says to me that even though contractors can and do threaten
the success of U.S. warfare goals, contractors have been, and will continue to be, an
essential part of the U.S. total force. More to the point, in this study I have shown that
contractor contributions are essential and that they either augment or diminish U.S.
warfare capability according to the nature of government oversight and control over
them. Also, I have identified Type V armed security contractors as posing an
unacceptable threat to U.S. warfare capability and emphasized why they must be
controlled.
In sum, based on the findings for this dissertation I have concluded that
It is the degree of government (military or nonmilitary/political) control over
contractors that determines whether the contractors' contributions have a
positive or negative impact on warfare capability.

2
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RECOMMENDATIONS
Since some contractors in Iraq have had a positive impact on warfare capability
and others have not, depending on the nature of government control that was exercised
over them, it is paramount for the United States to institute and maintain good control
over these firms. Contractors that have been properly controlled fundamentally have
made significant, and, in some cases, critical military and political contributions. They
have done so in an extremely hostile environment. The findings show that when they are
not properly controlled, some firms and individual contractors have perpetrated criminal
acts, including serious human rights abuse, fraud, and waste, that have seriously
diminished the overall U.S. warfare capability.
I have four recommendations: (1) all contracts should be administered by one
joint contracting office consisting of representatives from the military and civilian
agencies involved; (2) enforceable rules and regulations need to be created that will shape
the contracts and behavior of the contractors; (3) the security for Type II, III, and IV
contractors and U.S. government officials in support of the military and U.S. federal
organizations should be provided by the military commander; and (4) Type V security
providers, especially teams that provide close individual protection, should be eliminated
or placed under the strict control of military commanders. If Type V security providers
continue to be used, I recommend that each firm and each employee be required to show
proof that they are qualified to serve with U.S. forces on the battlefield. This means that
each security provider must meet a specified standard for licensing.
In crisis circumstances, the use of contractors administered and controlled by the
military on the battlefield is a rational, short-term choice for filling the gaps. Optimally, I
would recommend structuring the military force to be completely self-sustaining on the
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battlefield. However, civilian decision makers have bureaucratically made subjective
choices to privatize existing military functions to such a point that this option is not a real
possibility.4 The military has few options other than to change its organizational structure
and accept that contractors are part of the military total force structure, as it has done. The
LOGCAP contingency contractors are a practical choice for augmenting Type II and III
support. However, I recommend that these activities be for theater support as much as
possible. In those circumstances in which LOGCAP contractors and their convoys and/or
storage areas must traverse or locate within the battle space, the military contract
administrators should provide security for the contractor.
In circumstances in which the United States may need an organization to establish
stability and to rebuild, as it did in Iraq, contractors are essential. Fundamentally, the
United States does not have an organized nation-building or civil-political building
capability. As part of my first recommendation, a contingency contract modeled on
LOGCAP should be designed for civil-political builders such as Bechtel and others that
contribute Type II, III, and IV support. Contractors of this nature need security. My
recommendation is that all matters of security, based on the principle of unity of
command, should be under operational control of the military commanders. The
LOGCAP model for this contract would put the firm on notice, and neither it nor the
government would be a victim of frenzied or surge planning.
Contractor control should come under the administration and control of one
agency or institution created to manage the contracts with one set of rules. My argument
is that having one administrator with legal jurisdiction and operational control over
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contractors will ensure the contractors' optimal contributions. This will also help prevent
criminal behavior on the part of contractors and their employees. My recommendation is
that the agency or institution should be under the operational and administrative control
of the military commander up to the point at which stability and order are clearly
established. When order and security have been established, the operational and
administrative control could be passed to civilian administrators, such as the State
Department. Contractors can make essential Type II, III, and IV contributions when there
is a secure environment. Resources such as DynCorp police trainers and Bechtel
engineers can augment warfare capability, but they are vulnerable and require a relatively
secure environment in which to work.
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APPENDIX
CONTRACTORS IN IRAQ

Source Key: 1 234-
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Central Command Census of Contractors, 20063
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USAID
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III

US

UK
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DOD
Air
Force
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2

DOD

1

V

Center for Public Integrity, Windfalls: Contractors: All.
U.S. Agency for International Development, "U.S. Government Iraq Reconstruction."
3
Merle, "Census Counts 100,000."
4
Isenberg, Fistful of Contractors, 80-99.
2
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4
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UK
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2

330

Contractor

Bechtel Group
Inc.
Bechtel had a
total of 123 subcontractors that
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4

DOD

1
3

V

Pvt.
Firm

1

Interior
(DOD)
Navy
DOD

1,4

US
2004 $21,331,693

UK
US

$66,221,143.19

III
III

US

$125,000,000
$11,803

UK

V

$40,492

V

UK

n,v

Services
CDW
US
Government, Inc
Iraq
US

4
1

4

DOD

UK

Risk Assessment

Cellhire USA
Iraq

Type
Agency
of
Contract
III, IV USAID

1

4
The

4

Media

$35,174

DOD

1

$1,465,983

DOD

1
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Contractor

CH2M Hill
Iraq
Chugach
McKinley, Inc.
Iraq
Cochise
Consultancy Inc.
Combat Support
Associates
Comfort Inn
Iraq
Complement,
Inc., The
Iraq
Contrack
International Inc.
Iraq
Control Risk
Group
Creative
Associates
International Inc.
W/ subcontractors:
Research
Triangle
Institute,
American
Manufacturers
Export Group
(AMEG), The
Iraq Foundation,
American
Islamic Congress
Iraq
Critical
Intervention
Services
Custer Battles
Dataline Inc.
Iraq

Country of Number of
Origin
Employees
in Iraq
US

US

Year Value

$1,528,500,000

Type
Agency
of
Contract
DOD

$3,068,407

Source
1

DOD

1

US

V

DOD

4

US

V

DOD

4

us

$47,324

DOD

1

us

$3,358

DOD

1

us

$2,325,000,000

DOD

1

4

II, III

Pvt.+
Gov.
USAID

us

V

DOD

4

us
us

V

CPA
DOD

4
1

UK
US

500

V
$273,539,368

$1,028,851.89

2
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Contractor

Decision
Strategies

Country of Number of
Origin
Employees
in Iraq
UK

Year Value

Type
Agency
of
Contract
V
Pvt.

Source
4

Dell Marketing
L.P.
Iraq

US

$513,678.88

DOD

1

Detection
Monitoring
Technologies
Iraq

US

$5,584,482

DOD

1

USAID

2

DOD

1

Development
US
Alternatives Inc.
W/subcontractor:
Sagric
International
Iraq
Australia
DHS Logistics US
Company
Iraq
Diligence Middle
East
D S Vance Iraq
DTS Security
L.L.C.
DynCorp
(Computer
Sciences Corp.)
Iraq
Earth Tech, Inc.
Iraq

$39,523,857

II

$223,497

US

V

Pvt.

4

UK
US

V
V

CPA
?

4
4

II

State

1,3,4

$65,449,155

DOD

1

$111,000

USAID

1

$3,956

DOD

1

$6,974

DOD

1

US

US

EGL Eagle
US
Global Logistics
Iraq
EHI Company
us
Iraq
Electric
us
Generator Store,
The
Iraq

1,000-1,500

$50,000,000
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Contractor

Country of Number of
Origin
Employees
in Iraq
US

Environmental
Chemical
Corporation
Iraq
EOD Technolog)'US
Inc.
Iraq

Year Value

$1,475,000,000

Type
Agency
of
Contract
DOD

30

$71,900,000

IILV

DOD

1,4

14,000

$100,000,000

V

CPA

4

Source
1

Erinys
International

UK

Expedited World
Cargo Inc.
Iraq
Explosive
Ordnance
Technologies
Inc.
Iraq
Export Depot
Iraq
Fluor Corp.
Iraq

US

$55,004

III

USAID

1

US

$1,475,000,000

II, III

DOD

1

US

$21,182

DOD

1

US

$3,754,964,295

1,2

$274,651.95

DOD
Air
Force
DOD

$8,416,985

DOD

1

DOD
Air
Force
III, IV, V Pvt.
DOD

1
2

US
Force 3
Iraq
Foster Wheeler US
Co.
Iraq
General Electric us
Company
Iraq
Genric
Giesecke &
us
Devrient
America
Iraq
Global Container US
Lines Ltd.
Iraq
Global
us
Professional
Solutions
Iraq

Value Unknown

$72,700

III

III, IV

1

4

$1,850,000

USAID

1

$590,232

DOD

1
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Contractor

Global Risk
Strategies Ltd.

Country of Number of
Origin
Employees
in Iraq
UK
1,500

Global Security
Services
Global Services
Iraq

US

Group 4 Falck
A/S

India

US

$910,468

Intelligent
Enterprise
Solutions
Iraq

US

4

1

4

DOD

1

$4,304

DOD

4
1

$165,000,000

DOD

1

Sub-to
Iraqi
firm

4

V

V

40

UK, US
Joint

Inglett and
Stubbs LLC
Iraq

DOD

$19,761

Source

4

V

UK,
offshore

Henderson Risk UK
Ltd.
ICP Group Ltd. UK

ISI

$28,000,000
$7,112,813
$3,537,449
$2,413,205
$1,633,032

Type
Agency
of
Contract
V
DOD

V

GPS Store, Inc.,
The
Iraq
Halo Group
US
Hardware
US
Associates
Iraq
Harris
US
Corporation
Iraq
Hart Group

Year Value

V

4

II, IV, V Pvt.
Firms,
NGO's
V
CPA

4

4

$1,826,974

DOD

1

$19,835

DOD

1
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Contractor

Country of Number of
Origin
Employees
in Iraq
US

Year Value

International
American
Products Inc.
Iraq
US
International
Global Systems,
Inc.
Iraq

$628,421,252

International
US
Resources Group
w/sub-contractor
Crown Agents
Consultancy Inc.
Iraq

$38,000,000

$157,383.40

US

II, III

50,000

Source
2

DOD

1

USAID

1,2

V

Janusian Security UK
Management
Ltd.
John S. Connor
Inc.
Iraq
JSI Inc.
Iraq
Kellogg, Brown
and Root
(Halliburton)
Iraq
Kollsman Inc
Iraq
Kroll Inc.
(Kroll Security
International Ltd.
Iraq

Type
Agency
of
Contract
DOD

4

$34,153

USAID

1

$3,376

DOD

1

$10,832,000,000

DOD

1,3

1

US
US

Value Unknown

USAID

1

$11,880,000

DOD

1

$53,379

DOD
DOD

3
1

$19,536,683

DOD

1

UK

Kropp Holdings US
Iraq
US
L-3
Lab Safety
Supply
Iraq
Laguna
US
Construction
Company, Inc.
Iraq

500
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Contractor

Country of Number of
Origin
Employees
in Iraq

Year Value

LandSea
Systems, Inc.
Iraq
Landstar Express
America Inc.
Iraq
Liberty Shipping
Group Ltd.
Iraq
Logenix
US
International
L.L.C.
Iraq

$47,750

Type
Agency
of
Contract
DOD

$24,396

USAID

1

$7,300,000

USAID

1

USAID
Air
Force

1
2

Louis Berger
US
Group
Iraq
Lucent
US
Technologies
World Services,
Inc.
Iraq
ManTech
US
International
Corp.

$27,671,364

DOD

1

$75,000,000

DOD

1

DOD

4

$29,000

44

III

IV

Source
1

Management
Systems
International
Iraq

US

$15,116,328

USAID

1

McNeil
Technologies,
Inc.
Iraq
Mediterranean
Shipping
Company
Iraq
Meteoric Tactical
Solutions
MEI Research
Corporation
Iraq
Meyer &
Associates

US

$716,651

DOD

1

$13,000

USAID

1

DOD

4

South
Africa
US

US

$599,383

II, V

1

III, V

4
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Contractor

Country of Number of
Origin
Employees
in Iraq

Year Value

Michael Baker US
Jr., Inc.
Iraq
Midwest
US
Research
Institute
Iraq
Military
US
Professional
Resources Inc.
Iraq
Miscellaneous
Foreign Contract
Iraq

$4,528,328

Motorola Inc.
Iraq
MZM Inc.
Iraq
NANA Pacific
Iraq

1

1

DOD

1,4

$3,026,630

DOD

1

US

$15,591,732

DOD

1

US

$1,213,632
$3,640,896
$70,000,000

DOD
DOD

1
4
1

DOD

1

IPA
Pvt.
Firms
DOD

4
4

$5,000,000

USAID

1

$1,500,000,000

DOD

1

Pvt.
Firms,
Bechtel

4

Odebrect-Austin
Iraq

UK

Optimal Solution Australia
Services

$1,765,000

Source

DOD

Native American US
Industrial
Distributors Inc.
Iraq
Neareast Security
New Korea Total S. Korea
Service
Night Vision
US
Equipment
Company
Iraq
Ocean Bulkships
Inc.
Iraq

Olive Security
(UK) Limited

Type
Agency
of
Contract
DOD

$2,608,794.74

III, IV

V

$123,572

V
V

100
$153,118

rv

V

V

1

4
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Contractor

Outfitter
Satellite, Inc.
Iraq

Country of Number of
Origin
Employees
in Iraq
US

Overseas
Security &
Strategic
Information,
Inc/Safenet Iraq
Parsons Corp.
Iraq
Parsons Energy
and Chemicals
Group
Iraq

US

Year Value

$33,203

Type
Agency
of
Contract
DOD

Source
1

4

II, III, V

US

$5,286,136,252

DOD

1

us

$43,361,340

DOD

1

Perini
Corporation
Iraq

us

$2,525,000,000

DOD

1

Pilgrims Group

us

II

4

RamOPS Risk
Management
Group

us

V

The
media
Pvt.
firms

Raytheon
Technical
Services
Iraq
Readiness
Management
Support LC
(lohnson
Controls Inc.)
Iraq

us

$12,412,573

DOD

1

us

$173,965,104

USAID

1

Red River
Computer
Company
Iraq
Research
Triangle Institute
W/subcontractor:
Creative
Associates
International

us

$972,592.90

DOD

1

us

II

4

USAID 2
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Contractor

Ronco
Consulting
Corporation
Iraq
Rubicon
International
Services
SCG
International
Risk
S&K
Technologies
Inc.
Iraq
Science
Applications
International
Corp.
Iraq
Sealift Inc.
Iraq
Security
Applications
Systems
International
L.L.C.
Segovia Inc.
Iraq
SETA
Corporation
Iraq
Shaw
Group/Shaw
E&I
Iraq
Signature
Science
Iraq
Simmonds
Precision
Products
Iraq

Country of Number of
Origin
Employees
in Iraq
US

Year Value

$12,008,289.60

Type
Agency
of
Contract
DOD
II, III

Source
1,4

UK

V

4

US

II, V

4

US

$4,950,384.80

DOD

1

us

$159,304,219

DOD

1

$4,000,000

USAID

1

us

Erinys 4
Subcontract

$320,636

DOD

1

us

$3,165,765

DOD

1

us

$3,050,749,910

DOD

1

us

$4,704,464

DOD

1

us

$4,412,488

DOD

1
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Contractor

Country of Number of
Origin
Employees
in Iraq
SkyLink Air and US
Logistic Support
(USA) Inc.
w/sub-contractor
Serco Group
(UK)
UK
Iraq
Smith Office
US
Machines
Corporation
Iraq
SOC-SMG
US
(SPECIAL
Operations
ConsultingSecurity
Management
Group)

Year Value

$27,344,600

Type
Agency
of
Contract
II
USAID

$2,961

V

Source
2

DOD

1

DOD
&
Subcontract
for
builders

4

SPARCO
Iraq
Stanley Baker
Hill L.L.C.
Iraq

$9,215

DOD

1

$1,200,000,000

DOD

1

Stanley
Consultants
Iraq

$7,709,767

DOD

1

$4,194

DOD

1

Staples National
Advantage
Iraq
Steele
Foundation
Stevedoring
Services of
America
Iraq
Structural
Engineers
Iraq

us

Sumer
International
Security
TECO Ocean
Shipping Co.
Iraq

us

us

V

us

$14,318,895

us

$1,113,000

us

II

V

$7,200,000

Sub for 4
builders
USAID 1,2

DOD

1

Pvt.
Firms

4

USAID

1
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Contractor

TetraTech Inc.
Iraq
Titan
Corporation
Iraq
Total Business
Iraq
Transfair North
America
International
Iraq
Triple Canopy
Inc.

Country of Number of
Origin
Employees
in Iraq
US
US

US

6,500

$1,541,947,671

Type
Agency
of
Contract
DOD

$402,000,000

III

Year Value

Source
1

DOD

1,4

$4,696

DOD

1

$19,351

USAID

1

4

US

V

Triumph
Technologies
Iraq
Unisys
Corporation
Iraq
United Defense
Industries, L.P.
Iraq
Unity Resources Australia
USA
US
Environmental
Inc.
Iraq

$228,924

CPA
State
Dept.
DOD

$320,000

DOD

1

$4,500,000

DOD

1

DOD

4
1

Vinnell
US
Corporation
(Northrop
Grumman)
Iraq
Wade-Boyd and US
Associates

$48,074,442

$1,541,947,671

V
III

1

4

($65,000,000
according to 4)
II

DOD

1,4

4

L.L.C.

Ward
US
Transformer
Sales & Services
Iraq

$115,000

II

DOD

1
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Contractor

Washington
Group
International
Iraq
WECSYS
Iraq
Weston
Solutions, Inc.
Iraq
Worldwide
Language
Resources, Inc.
Zapata
Engineering
Iraq

Country of Number of
Origin
Employees
in Iraq
US

US

Year Value

$3,133,078,193

Source
1

$3,040

DOD

1

$16,279,724

DOD

1

US

US

Type
Agency
of
Contract
DOD

III

$1,478,838,958

III

Windfalls of War list of contractors modified for those serving in Iraq.

4

DOD

1,4
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VITA
Wyman E. Shuler, HI
Graduate Program in International Studies
7045 Batten Arts and Letters Building
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Education
PhD

2008

International Studies, Old
Dominion University, Norfolk, VA.

MA

2000

Security Management, Webster
University, Chicago, IL.

MA

1982

Multidisciplinary Studies (Criminal Justice,
Political Science, and Sociology), Texas
A & M University, Formerly Corpus
Christi State University, Corpus Christi, TX.

MA

1972

International Relations, Webster
University, Charleston, SC.

BS

1967

Physical Education, The Citadel,
The Military College of South Carolina,
Charleston, SC.

Areas of Interest &
Specialization

International Security, U.S. Foreign Policy,
U.S. Way of War, Counterterrorism,
Counterintelligence, Private and Corporate
Security Management, and Criminal Justice.

Languages
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(Native)
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